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Public health, free movement and macroeconomic coordination: Mapping 
the evolving governance of European Union health policy  
Eleanor Brooks 
 
Health is a unique and intriguing sphere of European Union (EU) policy, not least of all 
because it has only been recognised as such for the last 15 years. From piecemeal origins in 
public health and occupational safety it underwent dramatic expansion as a result of exposure 
to free movement and internal market law in the 1990s. Now, in the aftermath of the economic 
crisis, it is entering another unprecedented era. As the focus of the European project has 
turned to fiscal sustainability and the strengthening of collective economic governance, health 
policy has been swept into frameworks designed for the oversight of macroeconomic policy 
and national expenditure. Crucially, these frameworks extend EU health influence into areas 
reserved in the founding treaties for exclusive national control. This thesis seeks to map the 
changing nature, scope and governance of EU health policy, contributing to the existing 
patchwork of literature and reviewing the prevailing narrative in light of the critical juncture 
now being faced. It draws on the theories of European integration, the Europeanisation 
framework and the more recent governance approaches to assess the continuing relevance of 
core themes – crisis politics, regulatory policy, the internal market, new modes of governance, 
and the role of the Court – in health policy development. Using six case studies and data from 
41 interviews with experts, policy-makers and officials, it examines the catalysts, drivers and 
dynamics of health policy integration. It finds that as the actors and interests involved in 
health policy have proliferated, health issues have become increasingly politicised. 
Addressing the consequences of this trend, the thesis explores the growing dependence on, 
and progressive strengthening of, voluntarist governance, as well as the declining scope and 
influence of EU health policy. Finally, it reflects upon the future of health within a politicised 








The thesis is divided into three sections. Part I lays the foundations of the study and is 
comprised of the first five chapters – the introduction, methodology, conceptual and 
theoretical framework, literature review and history chapter. As such, it outlines the research 
problem and resulting questions, the methodological tools available for addressing these 
questions and the conceptual and theoretical approaches which the thesis employs. The 
literature review and history chapter place the research within its academic and historical 
context, and allow it to draw on existing work in the field. The typologies and hypotheses 
developed in Part I are used to structure the empirical research which follows.  
Part II contains the six case studies which the thesis uses to explore the research questions and 
test the hypotheses identified in the earlier chapters. These case studies occupy one chapter 
each and detail the governance of health in six selected policy areas. They cover EU policy in 
blood, tissues and organs, cancer prevention, medicines information to patients, tobacco 
control, patient mobility and health in macroeconomic governance. The policies chosen each 
embody a particularly unique or important feature of EU health policy and thus offer a 
valuable insight into the dynamics which have shaped and guided health governance. At the 
end of each of these chapters, the relevant horizontal theme is examined in more detail.  
Part III, comprised of chapters 12 and 13, brings together the previous chapters to analyse the 
patterns, trends, common factors and defining features of health governance in the EU. It 
‘tests’ the hypotheses and typologies identified in Part I against the policy experience 
described in Part II and examines the implications of more recent developments in EU health 
policy for the characterisations seen in the existing literature. Finally, it considers the future of 
health governance in the EU, particularly in light of the economic and financial crises, and 
discusses the potential further evolution of this unique and important area of EU policy. 
 




From both an academic and a political perspective, health is a fascinating area of EU policy. It 
is unpredictable, contentious and often contradictory, yet firmly institutionalised. It is crisis-
driven, having been brought onto the agenda and shaped over the years by emergencies such 
as the thalidomide tragedy, the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak, the 
global blood safety crises and the Poly Implant Prothèse (PIP) breast implant scandal. Yet in 
periods of calm, it has ‘muddled through’ and woven a steadily expanding web of policy and 
law. It rests on a fractured legal base and an unwieldy division of mandates which provide at 
the same time for shared competence and national primacy. It has implications for almost 
every other policy sector and frequently encroaches, often via non-health policies, upon areas 
of responsibility reserved exclusively for national governments. Yet, health remains a widely 
accepted portfolio of EU activity; its logical added value and interaction with the internal 
market mean that no actor is demanding absolute renationalisation of health policy. It is both a 
hugely sensitive and an utterly uncontroversial field of supranational politics.  
In the post-crisis era, interest in health governance has been reignited. The financial crash, 
sovereign debt crisis and economic recession have pushed the constituent parts and the sum-
whole of the EU to the limit and resulted in a crisis of the European project. Economic and 
social decline have prompted rising anti-EU sentiment, implicitly curtailing the mandate and 
ambition of European policy-makers, nowhere more than in health. Furthermore, the 
mechanisms put in place to manage and avoid repeat of the crisis have ushered in a new era of 
EU governance. Member states now conduct budgetary and macroeconomic processes at the 
European level, coordinating national policy with supranational priorities through the 
‘European Semester’ framework. This new governance tool enables the European 
Commission (the Commission) to intervene directly in domestic policy from a financial 
perspective, to survey and monitor national progress towards economic goals and to impose 
early warnings and even sanctions where rules are breached. It opens the whole range of 
national policy to EU involvement but imposes a strict financial lens – only where national 
policy has an impact upon the economic stability of the region may the EU prescribe specific 
measures. This means that those policy areas which contribute most to the national debt are 
exposed to direct intervention – constituting an average expenditure of eight per cent of gross 
domestic product, health is an unavoidable target (OECD, 2015a).  
A recent article celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the Maastricht Treaty reflected upon 
the development of EU health policy since the ratification of the Treaty, with the aim of 
identifying concepts which might help to inform the future evolution of the policy area (Stein, 
2014). In particular, it was concerned with the nascent economic governance framework and 
the way in which it was beginning to obtrude upon health policy. A short time later, and in 
light of the institutionalisation of health within the economic governance framework, this 
thesis pursues a similar goal. In the broadest sense, it seeks to place the latest ‘chapter’ in EU 
health policy within the context of what came before. More specifically, it examines the 
established theoretical perspectives on the governance of health with a view, firstly, to 
pushing beyond the traditional integration and Europeanisation theory characterisations and, 
secondly, to employing these perspectives to assess the possible trajectory of health in the 
post-crisis era.   
The rest of this introduction describes the current state of understanding in EU health policy. 
It reviews the prevailing characterisations of health as an EU portfolio, gives an overview of 
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the EU’s response to the economic crisis and how this has impacted upon health and identifies 
a number of challenges raised by this latest development. Finally, it lays out the research 
questions which will guide the study, ahead of an account of the methodological approach in 
the following chapter.  
The European Union and health 
The thesis is concerned with the role of the EU in health systems and how this has changed 
over time. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines a health system as:  
‘(i) all the activities whose primary purpose is to promote, restore and/or maintain health; 
(ii) the people, institutions and resources, arranged together in accordance with 
established policies, to improve the health of the population they serve, while responding 
to people’s legitimate expectations and protecting them against the cost of ill-health 
through a variety of activities whose primary intent is to improve health.’ (WHO, 2015) 
It also identifies six ‘building blocks’ which make up the health system (WHO, 2007: iv). 
These are: 
1. Health services 
2. The health workforce 
3. The health information system 
4. Medical products, vaccines and technologies 
5. The health financing system 
6. Leadership and governance (‘health stewardship’) 
These building blocks are helpful in illustrating what EU health policy involves and how this 
has expanded and developed. The characterisation which follows is purposefully simplified 
but offers a rudimentary framework for understanding the different strands of EU health 
policy.  
The explicit competence of the EU in health concerns public health, understood as the 
management of population or collective health. The founding treaties provide a two-fold role 
– firstly they allow the EU to coordinate and support national public health policies, via the 
public health programmes and related initiatives, and secondly they require the EU to ensure 
that all of its other policies work to protect health. As such, the public health ‘strand’ of EU 
health policy most directly affects building blocks three and six. In block three, the EU 
collects, curates and disseminates reliable and timely data on health determinants, system 
performance and health outcomes for use by member states to inform better public policy. In 
block six, it coordinates and advises on the creation and leadership of strategic policy 
frameworks that are supported and informed by the experiences of other member states, via a 
number of platforms for exchange of best practice and mutual learning.  
By contrast, building blocks two and four – concerning the supply, distribution, competency 
and effectiveness of health professionals and the quality, efficacy, safety and cost-
effectiveness of health technologies – represent those areas of the health system most 
influenced by the EU’s internal market competence and law. Here the free movement 
principles have created a strong role for the EU in the mobility of health professionals and 
product standards regulation. They have also allowed the EU to encroach into building block 
one – health services – by requiring the free movement of health services, though 
responsibility for service delivery has remained at national level.  
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Until recently, building blocks one and five – the safe, effective and good quality health 
services provided to individuals and populations and the financing system which ensures that 
these are adequately funded – were explicitly recognised by the treaties as areas of sole 
national competence. Some aspects of health services, such as the effectiveness of particular 
health interventions, are informed by the EU evidence base generated under building block 
three but responsibility for the choice of interventions delivered, how they are administered 
and the resources used to provide them lies with national governments. However, since the 
late 2000s, this ‘final frontier’ of national health competence has been significantly eroded. 
Though the process was already underway when the financial crisis and economic recession 
hit Europe, this erosion has been accelerated and institutionalised in the post-crisis era as part 
of the EU’s strengthened economic governance framework. It is this change, and its contrast 
to the changes which came before it, that the thesis explores.  
Up until the late 2000s, the narrative of EU health policy was relatively well understood. 
Based on a weak legal mandate and a constitutional asymmetry which favours economic 
integration over social policy imperatives, health policy was driven forward by health policy 
actors making creative use of the tools available to them. With the support of the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU, the Court), a ‘treaty-base game’ was played, stretching the existing 
mandate and exploiting the strength of internal market law. Where this reached its limits, 
innovative modes of governance were employed; these were largely based on soft law but 
wielded surprising power. Health had thus been characterised by a process of creative 
‘muddling through’, employing different approaches according to whether the issue stemmed 
from the public health mandate – encompassing and affecting building blocks three and six – 
or from the impact of the internal market on health via building blocks two, four and, to some 
extent, one. The dichotomous nature of EU health policy has been challenged, however, by 
the EU’s response to the economic crisis and the inclusion of health in the strengthened 
economic governance framework. Since the late 2000s a third face of EU health policy has 
emerged, sharing few characteristics with the original two described above, and necessitating 
a revision of the dominant narrative. 
Health in EU economic governance 
The aftermath of the financial crisis and resulting economic recession has seen the focus of 
the European project shift back to economic and fiscal policy. In an attempt to address the 
weaknesses exposed the EU has sought to strengthen its economic governance framework and 
to increase the extent to which member states coordinate their macroeconomic and fiscal 
policies. This has included an overhaul of existing provisions, such as the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP), and the introduction of new instruments, such as the European Semester. 
It should be emphasised that the inclusion of health and social policies in economic 
governance mechanisms did not start with the economic crisis – macroeconomic policy tools 
and instruments began targeting pensions and, with less force, health expenditure in the late 
1990s as part of the SGP (Baeten and Thomson, 2012: 188). However, the risk posed to the 
European economy by instability in any of its 28 member economies was painfully exposed in 
the aftermath of the crisis, providing ample justification for a tightening of fiscal oversight 
and coordination.  
The EU has pursued a twin-track response to the financial crisis and economic recession. 
Firstly, it has provided short-term relief to those countries facing immediate financial 
pressure. This has included the creation of the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), 
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the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism (EFSM) and, more recently, the umbrella European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
These vaguely synonymous facilities have provided bail-out funding and loans to member 
states struggling to keep their economies solvent, thus addressing the apparent symptoms of 
the crisis. The second track of the EU’s response seeks to tackle the longer-term problem and 
address the causes of instability in order to prevent its repetition. Over a period of five years, 
the EU has strengthened existing mechanisms and introduced new ones to create an economic 
governance framework which monitors, coordinates and enforces fiscal and economic policy 
in the member states.  
By contrast to the frameworks put in place to manage future financial crises and the temporary 
bail-outs being administered to countries under severe pressure, the longer-term strengthening 
of the economic governance system is serving to institutionalise the routine oversight and 
coordination of fiscal policy by the EU and, in particular, the European Commission. The 
European Semester, the annual cycle of economic policy coordination introduced as the 
central implementing instrument of the new governance system, is especially important in this 
regard. It allows the Commission to set the economic agenda, to monitor, comment upon and, 
in some cases, amend national governments’ responses to this agenda, and to take measures 
against member states whose economic situation is deemed to present a threat to the stability 
of the European economy. First introduced in 2011, the Semester is now in its sixth cycle and 
is a broadly accepted feature of EU governance – as such, the EU can be understood to have 
successfully institutionalised the leverage it gained after the economic crisis and to have 
established a central role for itself in national economic and fiscal policy.  
The Semester touches upon almost every field of national policy, including health. It assesses 
the burden and effectiveness of health expenditure and makes recommendations – which may 
be binding or not depending upon the status of the country involved – to each member state on 
how the financial sustainability of their health systems can be improved. The range of topics 
covered in these country specific recommendations (CSRs) now includes the balance between 
primary and secondary care, access to and availability of services for different population 
groups, trends relating to the health workforce and professional migration, provision of 
prevention and health promotion programmes, the effectiveness and sustainability of specific 
funding models and the potential gains to be made from implementing eHealth technologies 
and health-friendly taxation.  
In addition to influencing health policy, the crisis and the mechanisms introduced as part of 
the EU’s response to it have had a significant and, in some cases, devastating impact upon 
health systems and population health. Research in this area is hampered by the inherent time-
lag in health data but concerning trends have been identified across the continent. Cuts to 
health expenditure have resulted in decreased service provision, fewer healthcare 
professionals, disruption in the supply of medicines and difficulties in accessing care in many 
regions. In Greece, which has received the greatest attention and suffered the sharpest decline 
in population health, rates of suicide, homicide, mental disorder, substance abuse and 
infectious disease prevalence have all increased, whilst the health system has struggled to 
provide care with the limited resources available to it (Kentikelenis et al., 2014; Kondilis et 
al., 2013).  
The post-crisis acceleration of health’s inclusion in the economic governance framework has 
significantly eroded national autonomy in the organisation and financing of health systems, 
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bringing EU influence into building block five. As such, it has ushered in a ‘third era’ of EU 
health policy, where health is understood as an economic sector and the EU’s role, though 
filtered through a fiscal lens, is extended to areas where supranational intervention was 
previously unthinkable.  
Challenges to the established narrative and gaps in the existing 
research 
The latest era in the evolution of the European project and its implications for health and 
health policy raise a number of questions and challenge established understandings. EU 
involvement in national health policy has not only extended into building blocks one and five 
– those protected in the treaties as national competences – but the nature of its role in those 
areas where it was already active has changed considerably. Since health is such a significant 
economic sector, with implications for jobs, growth and fiscal sustainability, there is no longer 
any area within it which is immune from EU interference. The balance between primary and 
secondary care, the prescription of generic rather than brand-label drugs, the financing of 
hospitals rather than care-in-the-community programmes and the provision of universal health 
insurance rather than out-of-pocket payments all have substantial implications for the cost-
effectiveness and sustainability of health systems and thus are now exposed to EU 
intervention. Furthermore, the economic governance framework operates at an overarching 
level, setting the parameters of policy before the traditional or established processes formulate 
policy content. At the most fundamental level, all policy is designed and restricted according 
to the budget assigned to it – the economic governance framework allows the EU to influence 
the spending priorities and budgetary plans of member states during their construction, thus 
delimiting the policy options which might follow at the most upstream point. Strangely, this is 
generating a dynamic of centralisation – and even federalism – at a time when the discourse 
surrounding the EU is pulling strongly in the opposite direction.  
The EU’s changing role in health has challenged the prevailing narrative. Far from an instance 
of competence creep, the institutionalisation of new powers under the economic governance 
framework might better be seen as crisis politics, with justification and support for new 
powers drawn not from the Court or from the EU’s strong consumer protection mandate, but 
from the global climate of austerity, fiscal conservatism and the tacit understanding that the 
continuing rise in health expenditure across the continent threatens stability. The tension 
between economic and social priorities has been exacerbated by this shift in focus and 
divisions between national and EU responsibility have been blurred within new governance 
structures. More fundamentally, such debates have been transcended by discussions of 
economic significance. Whether the treaties permit a government to unilaterally approve the 
reimbursement of a new drug or the construction of a new hospital is now of secondary 
interest – where such decisions have implications for the financial sustainability of the health 
system, as most do, they are now issues of European concern.  
Finally, the governance of health policy at the EU level has undergone unprecedented change. 
Strengthening of the EU’s hard law competence, contingency in its soft law mechanisms and 
formalisation of peer review and benchmarking practices in economic governance has meant 
that the instruments which influence health policy are now more rigid. Whilst the 
recommendations made under the European Semester are non-binding for most member 
states, the EU has constructed a continuum of power and interference, ranging from 
unprecedented binding control over states in receipt of financial assistance to voluntary 
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guidelines for those with robust economies and low levels of debt. Furthermore, the range of 
actors, institutions and interests involved in health policy has changed dramatically. Whilst 
health used only to concern health officials and the public health community, its major policy 
decisions are now influenced by actors and agendas from the economic and finance sectors. 
These officials tend to have little experience in health but have been given a central role in the 
upstream decision-making which shapes eventual health policy content.  
The post-crisis development of health policy, understood as the emergence of a ‘third era’, 
does not fit comfortably with what came before. Almost every aspect of how it was 
established and how it now operates diverges from the trends and patterns identified in the 
prevailing literature, not least of all because the changes which are happening were not called 
for and are not being driven by health actors. Whereas previous extensions of the EU’s role in 
health – insofar as this latest episode can be considered an example of that – were exploited 
and pushed forward by the Commission’s health directorate and various other health actors, 
the influence gained under the economic governance framework has come out of the blue. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that it does not consistently work to the advantage of health 
interests or outcomes; though the principle of health in all policies (HiAP) still applies, it is 
less rigorously enforced here than in the case of health-related policies which originate in the 
internal market. From a policy output perspective, a cross-section of interviewees describe the 
EU’s contemporary health activity as in decline; poor leadership, a lack of political will, a 
restrictive political climate and an increasingly conservative central executive are cited as the 
primary reasons for stagnation (European Commission, Health Directorate A; C). Models of 
Commission entrepreneurialism and opportunistic expansionism do not, therefore, readily 
apply and the future direction of this new avenue of health influence is not easily foreseen.  
The research question 
The strengthening of the economic governance framework which has taken place in the post-
crisis era marks a significant change in how health policy is governed at the European level. 
The instruments, process, actors and institutions now involved suggest a new direction for EU 
health policy and test the existing understandings of how health policy has developed. This 
thesis studies the evolution of EU health governance over time, mapping the changing 
institutional structures which have emerged and how they have affected the instruments used 
to pursue health policy. In particular, it focuses on the inclusion of health in the economic 
governance framework as representing a new and under-researched turning point. It should be 
noted here that ‘the crisis’ is referred to and used as a chronological marker, rather than a 
variable of the analysis. The thesis does not seek to examine the micro-level relationship 
between health policy and the sovereign debt crisis or the economic recession, but rather to 
explore how the nature of health governance has been affected by changes in the political 
climate of the EU project since 2008. It aims to put this latest ‘chapter’ into context and 
explore its implications for the future of EU health policy. As such, the thesis is concerned 
with three central research questions:  
 How did the pre-crisis integration and Europeanisation of health policy unfold? 
 What mode(s) of governance dominated in this period? 
 How have these characteristics and dynamics changed in the post-crisis period? 
These questions – all being concerned with the modes of governance employed by the EU 
when pursuing its goals in health – are used in the chapters which follow to inform the 
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methodology and to determine what kind of theoretical framework can best focus the research 
and provide insight.  
The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I (chapters one, two, three, four and five) explains 
how the research will be conducted, its tools, scope and parameters, and its context within the 
wider history of health policy in the EU. Part II (chapters six to 11) contains a series of six 
case studies, each highlighting a different strand of or issue within health policy, as well as a 
number of ‘horizontal themes’ which explore cross-cutting trends and dynamics. It finishes 
with an account of the economic crisis, the strengthened economic governance framework 
which has emerged from it and the impact of this framework upon health policy. Part III 
(chapters 12 and 13) draws upon the findings of the case studies to discuss post-crisis 
expectations for EU health policy, bringing the various strands of the analysis together to offer 
conclusions on the central research questions.  
Chapter two outlines how the thesis will explore the research challenge and answer the 
research questions discussed above. It identifies the central aims of the project – to ‘update the 
textbook’ on health, to map the modes of governance employed by the EU and to push beyond 
the traditional theoretical models by applying a governance typology to health – and explains 
the choice of historical comparative research approach. It introduces the three main tools used 
to complete the research – literature review, case studies and interview data – and examines 
what they involve, why they were selected and how they are operationalised. Finally, a brief 
discussion of limitations is undertaken, in which the constraints and weaknesses of the project 
are recognised and considerations for future research highlighted.  
The third chapter situates the research within a conceptual and theoretical framework which 
emphasises the institutions and governance of EU health policy. A conceptual exposition 
explains and defines the core terms used – governance, health policy, integration, 
Europeanisation – and thus provides parameters for the scope of the study. A review of the 
mainstream theories of EU studies is then offered, covering integration theory, 
Europeanisation and the ‘governance turn’, before a more detailed exposition of the latter, as 
the most suitable framework for reference in the research, is presented. The chapter also 
introduces the ‘stems’ heuristic, which emerges from the prevailing literature and structures 
the rest of the thesis. Finally, it operationalises the theoretical framework, adopting a typology 
of EU governance for application in the case studies and establishing a series of hypotheses to 
structure the analysis.  
Chapter four reviews the EU health policy literature and looks at how the mainstream theories 
presented in chapter three have been employed in the health policy debate. It is structured 
according to the stems categorisation and, drawing on the health, social and legal literature, 
examines the development of the public health, free movement and macroeconomic 
governance elements of EU health policy. A final section of the chapter summarises the use of 
the main theoretical frameworks and the dominant narrative of health policy evolution; this 
understands health to be driven by legal-neofunctional dynamics and governed as part of a 
multi-level polity, but commonly subject to crisis politics and assertion of subsidiarity. 
The fifth chapter provides a brief history and context of EU health policy. It explains how 
public health came to be an EU policy competence, maps the legal basis of health as it has 
evolved through the founding treaties, and looks at the models of policy-making and 
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governance which have developed to exercise the health mandate. It then offers a short 
chronological overview of the evolution of health policy at European level. This spans the 
early activity in occupational health safety, through the creation of the public health mandate 
and the application of free movement law, to the post-crisis climate of contemporary health 
policy. Finally, the chapter brings together the narrative strands identified across the previous 
three chapters and presents a characterisation of EU health policy on a ‘bell-curve’ – the latter 
part of the thesis explores the descending slope of this curve and the possible trajectory of 
post-crisis health policy.  
Chapter six is the first of the six case studies. It examines the development of EU policy on 
blood, tissue and organ (BTO) products and discusses the specific characteristics of regulatory 
policy and crisis politics. It explores the role of perceived EU added value and common 
technical barriers in the success of hard law and binding regulation in this area and notes the 
more recent introduction of soft law to address issues of ethical standards and cultural 
practice. The horizontal theme of this case study explores the EU’s regulatory policy-making 
style and the kind of technical health policy content that it generates, as well as the political 
leverage produced by crisis situations as a driver of health policy.  
Chapter seven, exploring the use of soft law in cancer prevention policy, presents a contrast to 
the previous case study. It finds that the EU’s activity in cancer prevention is almost entirely 
based upon soft law and was founded long before the explicit public health mandate in the 
Maastricht Treaty was introduced. This has not resulted in weak compliance or low 
participation, however, and the chapter discusses the factors which determine national 
commitment to non-binding EU governance. The horizontal theme explores the potential 
strengths and weaknesses of soft law and its value in facilitating genuine health policy, as 
opposed to health policy constructed around internal market or fiscal goals.  
The provision of medicines information to patients (ItP) and the influence of the internal 
market upon health is examined in chapter eight. Here the use of consultation, the role of 
interest groups and the balance between the health and market goals of EU legislation are 
considered as factors which determined the outcome of attempts to overturn the ban on direct-
to-consumer advertising of pharmaceutical drugs (DTCA-PD) and set the direction of future 
developments in the field. The horizontal theme explores the tension between the social and 
market imperatives of the EU and how these have shaped health policy, particularly via the 
application of the HiAP principle.  
Chapter nine explores the politically-charged history of tobacco control policy and the 
successful use of binding policy instruments in such a sensitive issue area. It finds a similar 
but more ‘intensive’ experience as the medicines ItP case; strong interest groups and an 
entrepreneurial European Commission have resulted in a degree of ‘opening up’ and use of 
more participatory policy-making modes, but hard law and coercive governance have 
remained the dominant structures. The horizontal theme draws on the implications for 
governance of more ‘politicised’ health policy, discussing the open method of coordination 
(OMC), the ‘new modes of governance’ (NMGs) and the use of comitology in health and 
what these tools mean for the development of the policy area.  
Chapter 10, a case study on patient mobility and the role of the Court in health policy, 
examines the debate and resulting Directive on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare. It 
describes the momentum which built behind the case law of the 1990s and how this facilitated 
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the design and adoption of binding EU law in this area. It explores the various elements of the 
Directive and role of the Commission as an ‘opportunistic entrepreneur’ in opening up new 
avenues for EU activity and involvement. Focusing on the role of the Court, a final section 
discusses the prevalence of judicial intervention in health policy.  
A final case study chapter presents the various tools and instruments of the strengthened 
economic framework and their impact upon health policy. This chapter is slightly longer than 
the other case studies, taking account of the departure which this new stem takes from the 
established models. It reviews the causes, effects and legacy of the economic crisis in relation 
to the health, wealth and governance of EU member states. It then explores the kind of health 
policy being made under the EU’s newly strengthened powers, the scale of binding force 
behind it, the use of sanctions against non-compliance and the varying flexibility of 
implementation. It focuses particularly on the European Semester and the use of CSRs to 
guide national policy in the service of EU priorities.  
Chapter 12 summarises the findings from the case studies and discusses the trends, patterns 
and common factors seen. It brings together the theoretical and the empirical elements of the 
thesis, analysing the latter from the perspectives explored in the former. After a review of the 
main dynamics and characteristics which arise from the case studies, the hypotheses outlined 
in chapter three are each examined individually. The changing modes of governance seen in 
health are thus explored within the context of the dynamics and drivers identified in the 
literature and case studies.  
The final chapter of the thesis offers some preliminary answers to the three central research 
questions identified in the introduction. To do so, it draws on the analysis conducted in the 
preceding chapter, linking the politicisation of health and the increasing relevance of soft law 
to changes in modes of integration, Europeanisation and governance. It goes on to discuss the 
implications of the project for the EU health studies field and the future development of EU 
health policy and governance, highlighting potential avenues for future research.  
Chapter 2 | Methodology 
10 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter explains how the research problem identified in the introduction is translated into 
a research project. It outlines the design of the project, the tools and methods used and the 
limitations faced.  
Aims, objectives and research design 
The thesis aims to put the most recent developments in EU health policy into context and to 
examine their implications for future policy development in the field. Beyond this overarching 
aim, the research objectives can be defined as: 
1. To push beyond the dominant theoretical approaches – understood as integration and 
Europeanisation theory – and focus on changes in health governance 
2. To map the modes of governance employed in health at the European level 
3. To ‘update the textbook’ on health policy in the EU. 
The research takes a qualitative approach and is deductively designed. The observation of 
changing governance structures in EU health policy, prompted by the particularly significant 
change occurring under the new economic governance framework, led to a first search for 
possible explanations within the theoretical literature. Having identified an appropriate field of 
theoretical literature from which some explanatory propositions could be adopted, the research 
project was designed so as to allow for empirical testing and identification of causal factors. 
Pollack (2005: 36) observes that research into governance structures, of which this study is an 
example, ‘…tend[s] to eschew hypothesis-testing and generalization in favour of thick 
description and a normative critique’. Though adopting some illustrative hypotheses to 
structure the research, this project reflects this trend, taking a broadly descriptive approach. It 
proceeds by applying an adopted governance typology to a number of different health issues 
and tracing backwards to identify which characteristics determine the type of governance 
used. The patterns observed are then used to offer propositions about which forms of 
governance might prevail in the future and what might determine them.  
The study takes an historical comparative approach, employing a descriptive and an analytical 
element. The descriptive element of the research reviews the history of health policy at 
European level, highlighting relevant changes and interesting features, and providing context 
for the analysis which follows. It facilitates a temporal dimension in which changes in 
governance can be considered in light of the ‘maturity’ of the policy area, increasing the 
potential for application of the results beyond the health sector. The analytical element of the 
research uses a comparative case study approach to identify patterns and examine the 
endogenous and exogenous factors which influence them. Applying the typology to a series of 
case studies allows for analysis and comparison of the role of legal competence, political will, 
‘technical’ framing of the issue, perceived crisis or opportunity, political entrepreneurship, 
institutional barriers and other factors in determining the mode of governance employed. 
Particular attention is given to the post-crisis governance of health, since this represents a new 
era in health policy and analysis of how it works and what it means remains limited.  
The case studies seek to discover what effect particular characteristics of a given health issue 
are likely to have on the mode of governance assigned by policy-makers. They do not, 
however, purport to uncover an ‘X results in Y’ causality. This would be almost impossible, 
given the complexity of combined factors which play a role in governance design – rather, the 
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research aims to identify the different factors which can influence the choice of policy 
instrument and nature of governance and looks at the strength, relevance and outcome of their 
effect.  
The immediate goal within the thesis is internal validity of the research – i.e. ensuring case 
studies produce results which are comparable enough to facilitate a discussion of the future of 
health governance. This is achieved by highlighting the variable factors between the cases 
chosen – the ‘stem’ from which they originate, the role of various actors and institutions, the 
strength of their legal basis etc. However, the project prioritises a ‘most different system 
design’ approach, deliberately selecting issues within health which present different dynamics 
and characteristics to examine how these influence governance (Pennings et al., 2006: 10). As 
such, it also retains an element of external validity in that other EU policy areas, made up of 
similarly diverse issues and policy strands, might find the results applicable.  
Research tools and methods 
Three main tools are used in the research. This section discusses the choice, purpose and 
design of the literature review, the case studies and the interview data.  
Literature review methodology 
The main literature review, conducted in chapter four, examines the theoretical and policy 
debates in the EU health field. Smaller reviews – of the role of the Court, for instance – also 
inform specific portions of the research and touch upon a broader range of literature. 
Wherever possible, the literature is restricted to application in the EU setting, though work 
from other fields is referenced where directly relevant and instructive.  
The thesis reviews primary, secondary and tertiary sources. These include primary, secondary 
and supplementary sources of EU law – founding treaty articles, directives, regulations, 
communications and other unilateral acts and agreements, and case law – as well as first-hand 
interview data, academic literature, EU policy literature, newspaper reports, online resources 
and other grey literature. Literature was restricted to English language sources, except where a 
specific item was identified in the research or by interviewees, in which instance a generic 
online translation tool was used. For each topic, broad search terms were used – ‘tobacco 
policy EU’, ‘austerity health EU’, ‘governance EU’ – and the first 10 pages of results in each 
catalogue explored. The catalogues used included the British Library catalogue, the Lancaster 
University catalogue and the Google Scholar search engine; after each search, the 
bibliographies of relevant sources were combed for additional resources. Interviewees were 
also asked to identify helpful sources of data.  
The main literature review is organised around three ‘stems’ of EU health policy, relating to 
the legal and political basis of various policy issues. It distinguishes between health issues 
which are rooted in the explicit public health mandate contained in the treaties, those justified 
by the EU’s pursuit of a single European market and those emerging from its powers under 
the recently strengthened economic governance framework. These stems are replicated 
throughout the thesis, providing a structure for the historical narrative, context for each of the 
case studies and a framework for the analysis.  
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Case study methodology 
The historical narrative constructed by the literature review provides a context from which six 
case studies are drawn to highlight particular features of EU health governance. Figure 1 
presents these case studies on a continuum, illustrating the different stems from which they 
originate and the chronological progression of EU health policy. The stems categorisation is 
explained in more detail in the next chapter but both it and the chronological framework 
implied are heuristic devices – they are not purported to be perfect. Cancer prevention policy, 
for example, was created before the existence of a public health mandate and the inclusion of 
health in macroeconomic governance began in the 1990s with the SGP, before the patient 
mobility debate. The stems heuristic and the chronological presentation are used simply as 
structuring devices, providing a central narrative in which to root the exposition and analysis.  
Figure 1: Continuum of case studies 
 
When selecting case studies, the need for a range of policies from different stems was the 
primary consideration, followed by the existence of unique or novel governance models. 
Beyond this, cases were chosen according to clarity of governance structure, prior knowledge 
of the policy area, the quality of available literature and the feasibility of access to informed 
interviewees. Considered but discarded case studies included alcohol, professional 
qualifications, eHealth and communicable diseases policy.  
For each case study, a general literature review was conducted and a background description 
of the policy’s development, within the context of broader health policy, drafted. This was 
followed by an in-depth exploration of the particular governance measures used, framed by 
the typology adopted in the theoretical chapter, and the identification of interviewees who 
might be able to provide further insight. The case studies vary in length according to the 
complexity of the governance structures involved, with the final case being granted extra 
space on account of its departure from the established narrative.  
Interview methodology 
A review of the health policy literature and an in-depth exploration of selected case studies 
provides a comprehensive basis for analysis but cannot capture the full spectrum of 
perspectives. To address the gaps in the literature, clarify any unclear features of the 
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individual cases studies and inform a discussion of the future prospects for EU health policy, 
the thesis uses data collected in interviews with professionals and officials from the EU 
health, social, legal and political affairs fields. References to interview data in the text are 
denoted using the professional label of the individual concerned, in italic font.  
Interview data was collected in two rounds, both during placements at the European Public 
Health Alliance (EPHA), a health advocacy organisation based in Brussels, Belgium. A first 
round, comprising 14 interviews, was conducted between October 2012 and June 2013. This 
early placement, falling in the first nine months of the project, was used to explore the 
dominant ‘outgoing’ theme of EU health policy, the role of the CJEU in health, and the 
emerging new theme, the inclusion of health in the economic governance framework. As such, 
interviews were arranged with officials from the various legal services of the European 
institutions and actors working with the new economic governance framework. A second 
placement, in which 27 interviews were conducted, was completed between May and July 
2015. This round was more focused, targeting participants with experience in the various case 
study issues and established policy actors who could discuss and reflect upon the historical 
evolution and trajectory of health in the EU.  
Interviewees were selected according to their particular area of work, with a preference for 
those who had been involved in relevant fields for longer periods of time, so as to facilitate a 
historical discussion where possible. Potential participants were first identified from 
experience gained and discussion with colleagues during a previous internship and an initial 
fieldwork placement at the EPHA. In each round of fieldwork an initial set of ‘scoping 
interviews’ were set up with contacts in the field, during which fruitful topics and contacts 
were discussed. A ‘snowballing’ technique was then employed to gather new contacts from 
each participant interviewed. Interviewees were given anonymity and are identified in the text 
only according to the sector or institution in which they are employed (Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Overview of interview participants 
Institution or sector No. of interviewees 
EU Health NGO 9 
EU Social NGO 3 
EU Environment NGO 2 
European Commission Health Directorate 6 
World Health Organization 2 
Social Protection Committee 1 
Member of the European Parliament 3 
European Parliament Adviser 4 
European Parliament Legal Service 1 
Council of the EU Legal Service 1 
European Commission Legal Service 1 
UK health association, EU Liaison 2 
Academic Expert (by speciality) 4 
EU Public Affairs Consultant 2 
Total 41 
 
Chapter 2 | Methodology 
14 
The interview data was collected during 39 separate interview sessions. Two interviews were 
‘joint’, meaning two interviewees were in attendance together, and one individual was 
interviewed twice, on account of the continuing relevance of their work between the two 
interview rounds. In selecting interviewees an attempt was made to gain a balanced sample 
from across institutions and sectors. The final composition presented in Figure 2 was 
influenced in some cases by lack of availability on the part of targeted individuals but is 
largely deliberate. The higher proportion of non-governmental organisation (NGO) and 
academic participants was favoured because the research, in examining modes of governance 
and the historical development of particular health policy issues, does not seek or benefit from 
a heavy political analysis. Officials from the Council of the EU (CoEU, the Council), 
Parliament and, to some extent, Commission are more likely to present an ideologically biased 
perspective. The same reasoning favoured contact with advisors and lower-level officials 
within the EU institutions, so as to remove some of the political ‘coating’ that was inherent in 
interviews with Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), for example. Where MEPs and 
their advisors were interviewed, a spread of political groups was achieved, with participants 
from the European People’s Party (EPP), the Socialist and Democrats (S&D), the Liberal and 
Democrats (ALDE) and the Green/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) groups.  
In each case, a semi-structured approach was taken, with questions emailed ahead of interview 
where requested – in approximately one quarter of cases – and the topics of discussion kept 
open. This allowed for flexibility and deviation onto interesting tangents where the 
opportunity was presented, whilst maintaining cross-case study comparison. A process of 
triangulation was used to ensure the validity of the data collected. Findings from the literature 
review and exploration of the case studies were corroborated and elaborated in the interviews 
and later interviews were used to clarify and expand upon data collected from previous 
participants (though always anonymously). The latter process was also helpful in highlighting 
potential cases of bias in accounts received from different actors.  
Most interviews were conducted in person in Brussels or London, with a handful conducted 
via telephone or Skype. The first round was conducted without recording equipment and notes 
were made by hand during the discussion, whilst second round interviewees all agreed to live 
recording of the discussion and notes were made afterwards. Full transcripts were not 
produced but all direct quotations were checked against the original recording. The complete 
set of interview notes were reviewed shortly after the second round of fieldwork finished, at 
which point a basic coding process was undertaken. This involved scanning the full data set 
for common themes and language and then tagging data according to the particular case study 
to which it applied and to any themes referenced. The notes were then referred to throughout 
the writing process using keyword searches of the data where necessary.  
A full list of interviewees can be found in Annex I and a sample of the questions and logistical 
information sent to them is given in Annex II.  
Research limitations 
Though the research was carefully designed a number of flaws remain. Some of these are 
preventable and might be considered when conducting similar research in the future; others 
are largely unavoidable but can be managed in different ways.  
In the literature review, time and resource constraints impose limits upon what can be 
included – these relate to language, accessibility of materials, the breadth of the academic 
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field scanned and the exploration of multi-disciplinary contributions. The thesis is mostly 
restricted to English language sources which are readily available via the stated library 
catalogues or online databases. It also stays broadly within the EU studies field of research. 
These parameters were set in light of resource constraints, but adjusting the focus of the 
literature review might produce additional or alternative results.  
The selection of case studies requires trade-offs and rejection of certain options in favour of 
others. Adherence to the stems structure, which played an early role in dictating the choice of 
cases, can be questioned on the basis of its simplistic division of health policy. The structure 
used is adopted for the purposes of simplicity and operationalisation, but very few policy 
issues fit neatly into one or the other stem and in most cases, different parts of the same policy 
belong to different stems. Criticism might also be levelled at the number of case studies used 
– fewer cases investigated in more depth, or more cases giving a broader sample of health 
policies, might increase the internal and external validity of the research.  
The interview process was limited by language constraints, the availability of participants and 
the bias or perspective of their accounts. When interviewing actors in the political process the 
latter problem is magnified, since each is likely either to hold a strong personal viewpoint or 
feel that they should present the viewpoint of their institution or employer. Conducting 
anonymous interviews went some way to alleviating this issue but all interview data should be 
understood within the political context in which the participants operate. Further limits are 
imposed when the topic of interviews is chosen – since interviews were generally capped at 
30 to 40 minutes, a decision had to be made in advance as to what questions and topics to 
prioritise. In some cases, the scope of an interviewee’s relevant knowledge was very broad, or 
not fully known, meaning that potential data may have been missed. Finally, interviews which 
seek to gather historical data are automatically limited by bias or human-error in recollection. 
When examining the evolution of EU health policy from the Community’s founding in 1957 
through to the present day, interview data is exposed to flaws in memory and recording.  
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CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter presents the main concepts employed in the thesis and the theoretical framework 
which is used to focus and structure the research. The conceptual exposition explains how the 
relationship between European integration, Europeanisation and governance is understood and 
what this means for the parameters of the project. It then defines EU health policy and the 
activities, instruments and competences which it entails. This is accompanied by a 
categorisation of health policy issues – into their various legal and political ‘stems’ – which is 
replicated throughout the thesis to structure the discussion and provide an additional dynamic 
of analysis. Finally, the distinction between technical and political health policy issues, drawn 
from the existing literature and interview data, and used in the case studies and analysis, is 
elaborated.  
The second section of the chapter outlines the main theoretical approaches used in EU studies. 
It briefly reviews the mainstream neofunctional-intergovernmental dichotomy, the impact of 
the governance turn and the Europeanisation framework, and the more recent wave of 
constructivist approaches. This overview places the thesis within its academic context and 
illustrates the toolbox of theoretical approaches available to EU studies research. After 
explaining why the EU governance theories were selected as the most appropriate in this 
instance, the section goes on to examine this body of literature in more detail.  
A final section links the conceptual and theoretical frameworks with the research problem 
identified in the introduction and explains how the former aids and structures exploration of 
the latter. It develops a series of hypotheses which can be tested against the individual case 
studies and comparatively analysed. As such, this section makes the central question of the 
thesis – how the governance of health policy has changed and might change further – 
operational.  
Conceptual exposition 
Defining integration and Europeanisation 
The thesis understands European integration, Europeanisation and the body of EU governance 
theories to be interested in different phenomena. Their definition and relationship to one 
another is explained here because numerous understandings have been adopted by various 
scholars and, consequently, there is a tendency within the EU studies literature for these key 
terms to be conflated or insufficiently differentiated.  
Early literature defined integration as a process whereby political actors ‘…shift their 
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre’ and, as a result, forgo their 
ability to make policy independently (Haas, 1958: 145; Lindberg, 1963: 155). In more recent 
literature, integration is a process where member states pool sovereignty and establish 
supranational institutions, themselves being either strengthened or weakened as a result 
(Radaelli, 2000). The health literature reflects the consensus that integration reduces a state’s 
‘capacity to act’ and notes ‘the European Union’s penetration into the national health policy 
arena’ as evidence of the process (Lamping, 2005: 19). Exploring the potential end-point of 
integration in the health sector, Steffen (2005: 3) concludes that this would consist of the 
creation of a true ‘European healthcare system’ where decisions on the financing, organisation 
and delivery of health services are taken at the EU level. Based on these definitions, the study 
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of European integration is concerned with why states chose to cooperate in particular areas 
and to create a European Union. The main schools of thought differ on the driver of such 
cooperation, usually identifying either supranational entrepreneurialism or the rational self-
interest of national governments as responsible for the pace and direction of integration. 
Consequently, the change examined by integration theory – be it a treaty revision, the creation 
of a new policy or the veto of a European initiative – is broadly framed as either ‘state 
strengthening’ or ‘state hollowing out’ (Börzel, 1999). Progress in the European project is 
understood to be pushed forward by supranational forces and periodically limited by resurgent 
member state interests.  
Four decades after the creation of the European Communities prompted the development of 
European integration theory the term ‘Europeanisation’ became ‘extremely fashionable in the 
social science literature on Europe’ (Olsen, 2003: 334). Many variations and dimensions have 
been extrapolated and their focus and characteristics are examined in the next section, but they 
have in common their concern with the interaction between the EU and its member states. As 
such, they are concerned with the impact of integration upon member states. Degrees of 
Europeanisation are observed in the literature on the EU’s response to the HIV/AIDS (Human 
immunodeficiency virus, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome) epidemic, pharmaceutical 
regulation and drug policy (Bergeron, 2005; Permanand and Mossialos, 2005; Steffen, 2012). 
Within the thesis, Europeanisation is understood as a process in which change in the content 
of domestic policy and the structures used to govern it is derived from and influenced by 
European-level developments. Europeanisation theory examines how EU outputs affect 
domestic systems and how member states work to shape EU policies. As such, 
Europeanisation is understood as ‘post-ontological’ – it can only occur if the process of 
integration has already taken place and an EU policy has been constructed (Caporaso, 1996). 
Once integration has occurred, member states work to affect policy direction and adapt in 
response to supranational legislation.  
A first important point to note about these concepts is that they are used in the extant sense. 
Health policy, and indeed the European project as a whole, is not considered to be integrated 
or Europeanised; these processes are understood to be ongoing, perhaps without any end-point 
at all. Secondly, though concerned with different things, these two concepts are not 
understood to operate on different ‘levels’. Political theorising is often categorised as being 
macro-, meso- or micro-focused, referring to whether it studies global interactions between 
nations, the operation of mid-level state or community units, or local level behaviour amongst 
individuals. Both integration and Europeanisation are understood here as macro-level theories 
– the former examines interactions between states and the latter interactions between a 
supranational state and its constituent members, which are also states
1
.  
Understanding and observing governance 
A third body of theory, that studying EU governance, is more heavily drawn upon in the 
thesis. By contrast to integration and Europeanisation, governance theory operates at the 
meso-level, being concerned with how the EU pursues its objectives. This type of inquiry 
does not study the EU as a phenomenon in itself, but rather uses it as a case study to test 
                                                          
1
 It is also possible and valid to assert Europeanisation as a meso-level theory, concerned with intra-
state dynamics. However, it is understood as a macro-level theory here to help differentiate it from 
meso-level governance theory.  
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existing theories and models of how states govern. For example, EU governance theory might 
help to identify the range of actors involved in negotiation of the Tobacco Products Directive 
(TPD, Directive 2001/37/EC) or the impact of the voting procedures in the CoEU on the 
adoption of the Working Time Directive (WTD, Directive 2003/88/EC). Thus, governance 
theory treats the EU as a new and emerging polity (Pollack, 2005: 36). Though different 
definitions are used by different authors, all generally emphasise that governance is broader 
than government and involves continual exchange of information between networks of non-
state actors, conducted through ‘game-like’ interaction and maintaining a significant amount 
of autonomy from the state (Rhodes, 1996).  
The understanding of governance adopted in the thesis can be defined by narrowing first the 
dimension and second the breadth of the term. Firstly, governance can be framed in the polity, 
politics or policy dimension (Treib et al., 2005). The polity dimension understands 
governance as the system of rules which shape the action of social actors, being concerned 
with institutions, laws and processes, whilst in the politics dimension, governance is about 
how citizens’ interests are translated into policy via the relationship between public and 
private actors. The policy dimension, with which the thesis is concerned, understands 
governance as a mode of political steering, where policies are distinguished according to their 
steering instruments and where these instruments define how particular policy goals should be 
achieved.  
Within the policy dimension, the understanding of governance can be further refined by the 
adoption of a broad, rather than a restricted, approach to political steering. Héritier (2002) 
describes the restricted understanding of governance as one which comprises only non-
hierarchical modes of governance, in which both public and private actors engage in 
persuasion and negotiation – these are the instruments and modes commonly labelled in the 
literature as the NMGs. By contrast, the broad definition of governance utilised in the thesis 
encompasses both the ‘new’, non-hierarchical and the traditional, public actor-led modes of 
government.  
Based on this understanding of governance, the thesis is concerned with how the modes of 
governance in EU health policy have changed over time. This might involve a shift in the 
balance between legally binding and soft law governance, rigid and flexible approaches to 
implementation, the use of sanctions, the role of norms or the creation of material, as opposed 
to procedural, regulation (Treib et al., 2005: 7-8). A typology to classify modes of governance 
is adopted and explained in the next section but in order to observe or measure which mode is 
in use a more concrete object of analysis is needed. The thesis mirrors Bähr (2010: 11) in 
surmising that if governance is understood as political steering, policy instruments are the 
‘manifestation of ways of political steering’. Whilst the term governance remains somewhat 
‘woolly’, policy instruments are concrete and precise enough objects of analysis to observe 
modes of governance in different policy areas. Therefore, in order to study the changing 
governance in EU health policy, the thesis examines the policy instruments used in six 
specific policy areas and categorises the mode of governance used in each case. A 
classification of policy instruments is given in the next section.  
Defining and categorising health policy 
Drawing on the health article in the treaties, European health policy can be defined as all EU 
activity and legislation which seeks to improve public health, prevent physical and mental 
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illness and obviate sources of danger to physical and mental health (Art 168(1) TFEU). The 
Health Programme, the only instrument with which the EU can direct financial resources in 
pursuit of its health goals, states that these include promoting health, preventing disease, 
fostering healthy lifestyles, protecting from cross-border health threats, contributing to well-
functioning health systems and facilitating access to healthcare (Regulation 282/2014). A vast 
body of policy and legislation exists within these parameters but for the purposes of the thesis, 
the scope of EU health policy is limited to those aspects which most affect health systems in 
Europe, leaving aside the EU’s work in global health and those policies that affect health 
indirectly, such as transport or environmental protection. From this starting point, EU health 
policy can be divided into two categories: provisions with a direct health objective, rooted in 
health-related powers conferred by the treaties, and provisions in the treaties which pursue 
other objectives but have a major impact upon health (Greer et al., 2014: xi). This 
classification is used by the majority of the literature – commonly referring to the ‘faces’ of 
health policy (Greer, 2014) – and is adopted in the thesis to structure the discussion and 
analysis. However, in the post-crisis period, a third ‘face’ has emerged. This new category 
contains treaty provisions on fiscal governance and budgetary oversight which, whilst not 
entirely new, are having an increasingly significant impact upon Europe’s health systems.  
This three-strand classification of health policy is replicated throughout the thesis but the term 
‘stems’ is preferred to better reflect the sense of origin. The categories are commonly 
differentiated by legal base – the public health legal base being used for policy with a direct 
health objective and the internal market legal base being more useful to achieve health goals 
in non-health areas – and the various strands of health policy are seen to be rooted in these 
bases. Though individual elements of health policy can draw on and be shaped by multiple 
stems during their development, most are rooted in one more than the others.  
The three stems of EU health policy 
The first stem of EU health policy – the public health stem – concerns those actions which 
have a direct and explicit health objective. They are generally based either on the health article 
or on the health-related powers included under the treaty provisions on the environment, 
health and safety at work and consumer protection. The EU’s powers in this first stem are 
relatively weak but it is the only area where activity is supported by financial resources under 
the Health Programme. Though it is not exclusively the case, most of these actions target 
public health; they cover the major determinants of health, such as tobacco, alcohol, diet and 
nutrition, environmental and social determinants, as well as various disease specific strategies 
on cancer, communicable diseases, rare diseases and chronic conditions. First stem activity 
also includes legislation on substances of human origin, the development of data and 
indicators and some small areas of health systems policy, such as health technology 
assessment (HTA), quality of care and patient safety. As such, it broadly corresponds to EU 
action in building blocks three and six of the WHO classification discussed in the 
introduction.  
The second stem of EU health policy – the free movement stem – is comprised of those EU 
actions which do not have health as a primary objective but which nonetheless have a 
significant impact on health. Actions in this stem generally seek to facilitate the free 
movement of goods, services, people and capital and contribute to the creation and 
functioning of the internal market. The EU’s powers are much stronger here but from a health 
perspective utilisation of this power can be difficult:  
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‘In practical terms…whilst internal market legislation can provide a powerful basis for 
establishing free movement in ways that also achieve health objectives (e.g. setting 
standards for pharmaceutical products), internal market legislation is harder to use where 
the health objective is to prevent or restrict something being sold (e.g. in relation to 
tobacco or alcohol)’ (Greer et al., 2014: 23).  
Second stem health policy encompasses action on pharmaceuticals, medical devices, food 
safety, cross-border healthcare, professional mobility and qualifications, structural and 
cohesion funds, state aid and competition. Beyond the internal market, it also includes health-
related activity under the EU’s research programme and via European social policy, where it 
targets education, social protection, equal opportunities and employment. It is important to 
note that this kind of health policy can be both proactive and reactive – the EU’s health 
agenda has been shaped as much by the application of the free movement principles to the 
health sector as by the strategic use of the internal market legal base in the pursuit of health 
goals. This activity corresponds to building blocks two, four and, more recently, one in the 
WHO classification.  
The third and final stem of EU health policy – the macroeconomic governance stem – is born 
out of the post-crisis strengthening of the EU’s fiscal governance system. Prior to this 
strengthening, fiscal governance was included in the second category of health policy, 
affecting health less but doing so in pursuit of economic objectives. Since European leaders 
voted to increase the EU’s powers in this area, its impact upon health has also magnified and 
it has been assigned a category of its own in the health literature. Historically it was based 
upon dialogue about national expenditure, including health expenditure, as part of the SGP 
and the euro zone convergence criteria. Since the crisis, the health-related action in this stem 
has expanded to include detailed overviews of national health systems cost-effectiveness and 
sustainability, sanctions and contingency upon health expenditure, and unprecedented EU 
oversight of national budgets. Each of the instruments and processes involved has a 
significant impact upon health systems, creeping into building blocks one and five of the 
WHO classification.  
These three stems are used throughout the thesis to structure the discussion and as a point of 
analysis when comparing modes of governance. The categorisation is a heuristic device and 
does not expect to accommodate every strand of health policy comfortably or without overlap. 
Tobacco policy, for example, has both public health and internal market elements and, if 
pursued in future macroeconomic policy as a revenue-raising taxable good, might also have 
claim to inclusion in the third stem. The stems are used to allow a mapping of EU health 
policy in which the ad hoc development of competences and policy can be clearly 
demonstrated, and to provide an additional characteristic upon which analysis can be based.  
Technical versus political health policy 
A final conceptual tool used in the thesis is a distinction between health policy issues which 
are more technical and those which are more political in nature. Though it is difficult to 
maintain below surface level – upon closer examination, technical issues commonly become 
political, political issues have their technical elements annexed and addressed separately, and 
many issues are labelled differently by different actors – it has proven an enduring, if 
subconscious, distinction in both the literature and the characterisations described by 
interviewees. In order to explore the idea that the framing of an issue as technical or political 
Chapter 3 | Conceptual and theoretical framework 
21 
can affect the mode of governance employed, the parameters of the distinction are outlined 
below. 
Hooghe and Marks (2001) identify two ‘styles’ of decision-making. ‘Politicised’ decision-
making, they state, involves contested policy goals, the continual need for political choice and 
negotiation across interconnected political arenas, whilst ‘technocratic’ decision-making is 
based on shared policy goals, objectives which can be achieved via problem-solving rather 
than political choice and issues which are dealt with in compartmentalised policy areas (2001: 
121). This distinction builds upon Peterson’s (1995: 74) observation of the sub-systemic level 
of EU decision-making, in which technical and specialised knowledge dominates the policy 
process, the administrative capacity to implement decisions is carefully crafted and consensus 
between predominantly non-political actors is sought ahead of presentation to decision-
makers. Radaelli (1999: 4) considers this kind of technocracy to hold the potential for 
‘enlightened public policy’ and contrasts it to the ‘logic of politicisation’, where politics play 
a greater role in decision-making than evidence or expertise.  
Technical policy areas are most closely linked to regulatory policy, understood as a primarily 
technical exercise, devised by epistemic communities of experts and, in the commonly 
accepted preferable model, conducted by independent bodies and decentralised agencies 
(Christiansen, 2006: 108; Thatcher, 2006: 314). Wallace (2005: 81) describes regulatory 
policy as able to ‘escape some of the constraints of politics’ on account of its technical, 
consensual and rational nature. By contrast, ‘political’ policy issues are those which are 
particularly sensitive, attract a lot of attention from interest groups, national governments and 
other stakeholders, and involve disputed policy goals or principles. Expenditure policies, 
interior policies and foreign policies are all characterised by these kinds of issues and as a 
result, the EU finds itself both financially and politically limited in these areas (Hix and 
Høyland, 2011: 3; Majone, 1996: 63).  
The core idea within this distinction is that a different kind of policy process tends to apply to 
health policy issues with high EU-added value, low political or cultural sensitivity and mostly 
functional content, than to those which are highly sensitive, contested and have a significant 
impact upon individual interests. The thesis hypothesises that health policy issues are 
amenable to different modes of governance depending upon the degree of technocracy or 
politicisation they involve. This is particularly interesting in light of the macroeconomic 
policies emerging in the third stem, which address political issues within technical instruments 
and thus further blur the distinction between these concepts. Though the distinction is far from 
watertight, the technical and political elements of particular policy issues are picked up 
throughout the thesis and discussed in the analysis.  
Theoretical framework 
The definitions and understandings outlined above are drawn from the bodies of theoretical 
literature which accompany the EU studies field. This section reviews these frameworks for 
understanding the EU and identifies the body of theory most appropriate for exploring the 
governance of EU health policy. It first presents the mainstream theories of European 
integration before examining the EU governance literature in more detail and outlining the 
typology of EU governance which is to be applied to the case studies.  
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The theories of European integration 
This section reviews the broad range of literature known as the theories of European 
integration. This label is itself misleading – the literature which falls into this category covers 
theoretical contributions from the schools of international relations (IR), comparative politics, 
legal theory, domestic governance, public policy and many more, as well as regional 
integration. Though only the latter are ‘true’ integration theories – in that they address the 
process of integration of states – the EU studies field has come to understand all of these sub-
disciplines to fall under one broad umbrella. This section reviews the lifespan of EU 
theorising, from the formation of the central dichotomy, through the comparative, governance 
and constructivist turns, to the current trends in theorising the unique EU polity.  
Explaining integration 
The first era of EU theory, which sought to explain states’ decision to integrate, built upon the 
dominant IR approaches and treated the early European institutions as traditional international 
organisations – the frameworks applied to the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance and the Western 
European Union were replicated and used to explain the creation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) and its High Authority. The resulting ‘grand theories of integration’ 
– neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism – form the central dichotomy of integration 
theory.  
Neofunctional theory holds that functional integration in one area, such as coal production, 
will overflow into other areas and prompt the creation of supranational institutions, attracting 
political attention and resulting in the formation of European-level interest groups (Haas, 
1958; Lindberg, 1963). As this ‘spillover’ takes place across various sectors, so a centralised 
EU-level polity will emerge, necessitating further cooperation and making war between 
member states infeasible. Subsequent variants of neofunctionalism have identified three forms 
of spillover: functional, where cooperation in one sector requires and results in cooperation in 
another; political, where national level actors shift their expectations to the European level; 
and cultivated, where supranational institutions facilitate and manipulate cooperation as a 
means to furthering their own agendas (Jensen, 2010; Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991).  
Intergovernmentalism, responding to institutional changes and assertions of national 
autonomy which challenged the neofunctional model in the early 1960s, represents a revival 
of IR scholarship (Pollack, 2010). Based on state centrality, zero-sum bargaining and rational 
self-interest, it posits that integration is not a process, but rather occurs sporadically when the 
interests of states are directly served by collective action (Cini, 2010; Hoffman, 1964). 
Cooperation is thus more likely in areas of ‘low’ than ‘high’ politics, and reflects patterns of 
commercial advantage and bargaining power (Hoffman, 1982; Moravcsik, 1998). Building on 
Putnam’s two-level game model (1988), liberal intergovernmentalism asserts that states form 
preferences at the national level, before seeking to maximise them in the European arena; 
when the credibility or efficiency of interactions can be increased, sovereignty may be 
delegated (Moravcsik, 1991; 1993; Schimmelfennig, 2004).  
The central dichotomy provided by these two schools continues to underpin modern EU 
studies. The tenets of neofunctionalism have been absorbed into supranational governance 
frameworks (Niemann, 2006; Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989; Stone Sweet and Brunell, 2004; 
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998) and studies of the CJEU (Burley and Mattli, 1993), whilst 
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intergovernmentalism remains a leading model for assessing the balance of realist factors in 
EU integration (Moravcsik, 2013; Pollack, 2010).  
Analysing governance 
With the Single European Act (SEA) and the revival of the ‘grand theories’ in the 1980s, a 
second era of theorising introduced governance and comparative approaches to EU studies. 
This move to ‘middle range’ theorising treated the EU not as an international organisation but 
as a political system, allowing for application of models from the pre-existing toolbox of 
political science (Bache and George, 2006; Rosamond, 2000). A common feature is its 
embracing of the ‘deliberative turn’ – moving from the logic of consequences, found in 
rationalist models, and of appropriateness, found in constructivism, the deliberative turn 
embodies a ‘logic of arguing’, emphasising the roles of persuasion and dialogue in shaping 
behaviour and decision-making (Pollack, 2010; Risse, 2000).  
Following Hix’s ‘call to arms’ to comparativists, studies of the executive, legislature and 
judiciary multiplied (Hix 1994; 1999; Pollack, 2010). Federalist research examined the fiscal 
and regulatory imbalance, whilst the functional allocation of decision-making power was 
analysed alongside rational-choice and principal-agent models of Commission and Court 
behaviour. Institutional analyses also proliferated during this period, refuting actor-centred 
models and instead asserting that ‘institutions matter’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Lowndes, 
2010). Rational-choice institutionalism (RCI) understands that institutions can produce 
‘structure-induced equilibrium’ which frames outcomes and is often combined with principle-
agent analysis (Pollack, 2003; Scharpf, 1988; Shepsle, 1979; 1986; Tseblis and Garrett, 1996). 
Historical institutionalism is concerned with the effect of institutions on actors over time, 
since sequencing is crucial in determining outcomes, particularly at critical junctures, and 
early decisions are perpetuated in a cycle of path dependence (Hall, 1986; Pierson, 1996; 
2000; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Finally sociological institutionalism takes a constructivist 
approach, asserting that actors behave in accordance with acceptable norms and practices, 
understanding that the EU shapes behaviour by diffusing such norms (Checkel, 2001; March 
and Olsen, 1989; 2004; Risse-Kappen, 1996). Multi-level governance (MLG) and networks 
theory, a central strand of ‘governance turn’ literature, is examined in more detail in the next 
section but emerged alongside these schools of thought as a meso-level approach to EU 
studies.  
Constructing the EU 
Just as the EU’s status as a ‘supplier of authoritative policy outputs’ prompted the application 
of the political science toolkit in the governance turn, so too its ambiguous non-state 
characteristics soon led to a reconsideration of what the EU is (Rosamond, 2000). This third 
era of theorising challenges the assumptions of the ‘old debate’ and brings together a range of 
critical perspectives on the fundamental nature of the EU’s existence (Bache and George, 
2006; Pollack, 2010).  
Social constructivism broadly understands that, in addition to formal rules and institutions, 
actors are constituted of informal norms and their preferences are shaped by, and in turn 
shape, their social environment (Pollack, 2010). Behaviour is guided by a logic of 
appropriateness, meaning that EU norms and practices have constitutive effect (Hay and 
Rosamond, 2002; March and Olsen, 1989; 2004; Risse, 2004). Another critical approach, 
labelled ‘critical political economy’, examines the link between globalisation and the 
European project, the model of capitalism likely to emerge in the EU and the role of social 
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and economic class in integration (Bache and George, 2006; Holland, 1980; Rhodes and van 
Apeldoorn, 1997). Drawing on ‘new regionalism’ and the EU’s role as a global actor, it 
critiques the EU’s governance capacity and democratic legitimacy (Pollack, 2010; Rosamond, 
2000). Finally, an interdisciplinary body of constructivist approaches is found in the 
‘integration through law’ literature (Haltern, 2004). The wide range of contributions to this 
field examine the EU’s constitutionalism, the judicialisation of policy-making, the integration 
of Europe’s legal systems and role of the law in the process of integration (de Búrca, 2001; 
Rasmussen, 1986; Shaw, 1996).  
Theorising consequences 
A final era of theorising is understood as one which moves beyond the creation, development 
and functioning of the EU to theorise its outcomes and consequences (Bache and George, 
2006). The first major strand of this work is Europeanisation – studying the impact of the EU 
on member states and vice versa. This literature is reviewed in the following section. A 
second stream of ‘post-integration’ theorising is concerned with the democratic structure of 
the EU, in light of its transformation from an elite-governed economic union to a political 
union governed across multiple levels. On one side of this debate, the need for EU policies to 
derive from citizens and be made by a popular authority is made difficult by the absence of a 
coherent ‘demos’ or identity (Scharpf, 1997; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). On the other, 
appeals to a ‘utopian’ standard of deliberative democracy are considered unnecessary, since 
the EU does not perform the functions of a state and such standards serve only to obscure the 
practices of the political system (Moravcsik, 2002). This generation of studies accepts the EU 
as an established entity and seeks to theorise the consequences of its existence for democratic 
governance and member states.  
The Europeanisation framework 
Whilst the term Europeanisation is also used to describe the export of the EU’s political model 
to third countries, changes in its external territorial boundaries and the creation of new EU 
powers, it is most commonly used to explain the relationship between the EU and its member 
states (Bache and Jordan, 2004; Buller and Gamble, 2002; Olsen, 2002). As noted in the 
conceptual exposition, Europeanisation is understood here as a post-ontological concept, in 
that it presupposes the integration of states and the creation of supranational institutions. Such 
developments at the EU level form the independent variable; changes in domestic systems are 
the dependent variable, responding to pressures from above (Olsen, 2003; Radaelli, 2000).  
In the early literature on Europeanisation, this top-down model was the most commonly 
adopted, resulting in an emphasis on ‘downloading’ (Falkner, 2000; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005). Research focused on the effect of EU membership upon domestic political 
systems in France (Ladrech, 1994), Britain (Bulmer and Burch, 1998; 2005), Scotland (Smith, 
2001), Greece (Featherstone, 1998), Germany and Spain (Börzel, 1999) and looked at how 
member states downloaded EU practices and absorbed them into their national systems (See 
also Héritier et al., 2001). Subsequently, scholars developed analytic tools to explain observed 
variations in member state responses to European integration. The ‘goodness of fit’ hypothesis 
posits that pressure to adapt to European norms and practices will be refracted through 
institutions – where the difference between existing national systems and imposed European 
ones is not so large or so small as to cause inertia, change in the domestic structure will occur 
and the relevant European process or model will be downloaded (Börzel, 1999; Börzel and 
Risse, 2007; Cowles et al., 2001; Olsen, 2002).  
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Focus on the downloading of EU inputs was shortly followed by a body of theorising which 
examined the complementary dynamic of ‘uploading’. This highlights member states’ 
capacity not only to receive input from the EU, but to upload their interests to the EU level 
(Börzel, 2002; Bulmer and Burch, 2001). Uploading allows member states to minimise the 
changes which have to be made at the national level by ensuring that the prescribed European 
model is as close to their existing system as possible. Most observers now acknowledge that 
Europeanisation is comprised of both downloading and uploading processes.  
As well as distinguishing between downloading and uploading, Europeanisation frameworks 
identify two types of mechanism through which Europeanisation might occur: vertical and 
horizontal. Vertical mechanisms operate through positive integration to ‘demarcate clearly the 
EU level (where policy is defined) and the domestic level, where policy has to be 
metabolized’ (Radaelli, 2003a). Here, a pressure of adaptation is applied, since member states 
must change domestic structures in response to the prescribed European model – this is the 
mechanism used in areas such as health and safety and consumer protection policy (Knill and 
Lehmkuhl, 2002). Horizontal mechanisms do not involve an EU policy model – instead 
negative integration utilises mutual recognition and socialisation to trigger adjustment 
(Radaelli, 2003a). The key mechanism here is change in the domestic opportunity structure, 
rather than compatibility between EU and national models (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002). More 
recently, Börzel and Risse (2012) have combined this distinction with the literature on 
diffusion, to identify both direct and soft processes by which common norms and practices are 
dispersed between and across states. Direct processes, reflecting the vertical mechanism of 
Europeanisation, involve legal coercion, regulations and harmonisation, whilst soft diffusion, 
like horizontal Europeanisation, utilises capacity-building and socialisation to promote 
common adherence to successful policy models. This paradigm has been used widely to 
assess the importance and effectiveness of the OMC, understood as a crucial soft, horizontal 
mechanism in the Europeanisation of public policy (Radaelli, 2003b).  
The theories of European integration and the Europeanisation framework represent the 
dominant approaches and the mainstream ‘toolkit’ available to EU studies research. The thesis 
makes use of both in analysing the changing pattern of health governance but focuses upon 
the theories of EU governance, commonly considered part of integration theory but concerned 
with the EU as a polity, as the most appropriate and insightful framework in this instance.  
Theorising EU governance 
The term governance emerged to reflect the shift towards neo-liberal policies in Europe and 
the United States (US) in the 1970s and ‘80s. During this time, public sectors shrank and the 
model of cooperation between state and private actors in the provision of services was 
replaced by a new dynamic, where governments sought to offload responsibility for policy 
implementation to networks of private actors which could instead be managed by the state 
(Pollack, 2005: 37). This prompted an understanding of governance as ‘more than 
government’ and a will to push beyond the ‘high politics’ relationship between the EU and its 
member states – the focus of integration and Europeanisation theory – to study day-to-day, 
‘mid-range’ processes (Richardson, 1996).  
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Figure 3: Levels of analysis, adapted from Peterson (1995) 
Level Decisive variable Best model 
Super-systemic 





Systemic Institutional change New institutionalism 
Meso Resource dependencies Policy network analysis 
Peterson’s classification (Figure 3) is illustrative of the realisation that EU studies could 
choose from more than one level of analysis. Theories of EU governance can thus be 
understood as ‘dropping down a level’ from the approaches taken by integration and 
Europeanisation theory. The research within this field is divided into five main strands – these 
are briefly reviewed here and elements of each are drawn upon in the construction of the 
hypotheses and the analysis of the case studies.  
Multi-level governance 
MLG theory has its roots in Marks’ study of the EU’s Structural Funds, where he identifies 
two dimensions in the making and implementing of EU policy (Marks, 1992; 1993; Marks et 
al., 1996; Pollack, 2005: 38). In the vertical dimension, supra- and sub-national actors become 
more empowered, prompting territorial reform of the power balance. In the horizontal 
dimension, transnational and transgovernmental actors gain importance and, operating as part 
of policy communities and expert networks, create informal rules and processes which shape 
policy-making and implementation. Rosamond (2000: 110) characterises MLG as an approach 
which seeks to combine ‘a reading of the EU in policy process terms with an 
acknowledgement of its peculiarities’, moving away from ‘zero-sum’ discourse to depict the 
complexity of sovereignty transfer.  
Policy networks and epistemic communities 
For Rosamond, the value of MLG is not as a predictive theory but as a framework for the use 
of policy network analysis (2000: 111). Policy network analysis starts from the assumption 
that, in modern governance and particularly in modern European governance, linkages 
between organisations and actors is more important than the organisations or actors 
themselves (Peterson, 2004: 117). Policy networks are understood as ‘cluster[s] of actors, 
each of which has an interest, or ‘stake’ in a given…policy sector and the capacity to 
determine policy success or failure’ (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 8). A related body of 
literature, focused on epistemic communities, uses a similar network model but concerns a 
particular sub-group of actors. An epistemic community is a group of experts who share 
common beliefs and understandings within their field of expertise and supply knowledge to 
states on technical issues, thus giving them an agenda-setting role (Haas, 1992). For 
Richardson (2006: 25) the proliferation of these networks has increased the importance of 
both the ‘politics of expertise’ and the ‘politics of ideas’.  
Globalisation and legitimacy 
A third major strand of governance theory examines how ‘negative integration’, reflecting 
broader globalisation dynamics, undermines the governance capacity of member states 
without providing a legitimate alternative structure at the supranational level (Pollack, 2005: 
41). The internal market and the EU ‘regulatory state’, with support from the CJEU, erode 
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national social regulations, threatening a ‘race to the bottom’ in standards and undermining 
the social aims of governments (Streeck, 1996). Meanwhile, the EU’s inherent constitutional 
asymmetry and the absence of a ‘European demos’ throws the legitimacy of compensatory 
European action into doubt, prompting debate about the ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy of the 
EU’s institutional structure (Scharpf, 1999). Richardson (2006: 8) finds this crisis of 
legitimacy to have further fuelled the role of private actors in EU policy-making, since the 
Commission has responded by introducing more participatory mechanisms.  
Deliberative democracy 
A fourth strand of governance research has sought to find a solution to the problems 
highlighted above by framing the EU as a deliberative democracy. Drawing on work by 
Habermas (1985; 1998) and popularised by Risse (2000) this research embraces the 
constructivist and, latterly, the deliberative turns in EU studies to suggest that actors do not 
only bargain and follow institutional rules but also argue, opening their beliefs and positions 
to persuasion (Pollack, 2005: 42). The deliberative model has found support in the 
development of mechanisms such as the OMC, which fosters extensive dialogue between 
stakeholders both to improve problem-solving capabilities and to provide a greater degree of 
democratic legitimation (Scott and Trubek, 2002: 6). Similar deliberative properties are 
identified in the comitology procedure, though these discussions are more technical and, 
occurring behind closed doors, offer less in the way of legitimacy (Joerges and Neyer, 1997).  
New institutionalism 
New institutionalism, a final branch of governance theory, brings together the concepts and 
premises above to study the functioning of institutions, based on the premise that these ‘act as 
intervening variables between actor preferences and policy outputs’ (Rosamond, 2000: 114). 
Given that the EU is ‘without question the most densely institutionalized international 
organisation in the world’ it provides a promising testing ground for models which seek to 
explain how institutions shape preferences and outcomes (Pollack, 2004: 137). The three 
variants identified above – rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalism – 
emphasise different aspects of this relationship but are in broad agreement that institutions can 
be both formal and informal, encompassing both traditional, legalistic rules and the 
conventions, norms and ‘standard operating procedures’ which structure interaction 
(Rosamond, 2000: 115; Hall, 1986). As such, policy outcomes are affected as much by non-
binding, social factors as by legislative action, and the role of the Commission is determined 
as much by its various internal working methods as by the rules of procedure laid out in the 
founding treaties.  
Making the theoretical framework operational 
The thesis studies  the  evolution  of  EU health  governance over  time,  mapping  the  
changing institutional structures which have emerged and how they have affected the 
instruments used to  pursue  health  policy. Drawing on the prevailing narrative whilst taking 
account of the newest stem of health policy, it tests the notion that factors such as the 
technical or political nature of a health issue, the presence of strong interest groups or the 
onset of a crisis, among others, determine the type of governance which is used to pursue the 
EU’s goals in a given area. This section uses the conceptual and theoretical framework to 
identify the premises, tools and heuristic devices upon which the thesis is based. First, it 
employs a classification by Schimmelfennig and Rittberger (2006) to illustrate the extent of 
integration in health, as the starting point for the exploration of governance which follows. It 
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then presents Treib et al.’s (2005) typology of modes of governance and a series of 
hypotheses – these draw upon the ideas contained in the theories of EU governance and make 
their explanations ‘testable’ against the health policy experience.  
The state of health policy integration 
In accordance with the definition given above, the thesis understands integration as a process 
rather than an outcome and posits that, whilst integration has clearly reached the health sector, 
it has not progressed uniformly within it. To illustrate how far health can be considered to be 
‘integrated’, three dimensions of integration can be identified: sectoral, vertical and horizontal 
(Schimmelfennig and Rittberger, 2006: 74; Figure 4). Sectoral integration is a process through 
which new policy areas or sectors become increasingly regulated at the EU level; exploring it 
involves asking why and under what conditions new policy sectors become subject to EU 
regulation. Once sectoral integration has ‘extracted’ a policy area from exclusive national 
competence, vertical integration refers to the distribution of competences between EU 
institutions and member states and asks why cooperation at the EU level is stronger in some 
policy areas than others. Finally, horizontal integration is a process of territorial expansion of 
the previous dimensions to new member states. This occurs both as part of enlargement and in 
the creation of different ‘circles’ within the EU structure, such as the euro zone, the European 
Free Trade Area and the Schengen area.  
Figure 4: Degrees of integration, adapted from Schimmelfennig and Rittberger (2006) 
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In their assessment of vertical integration across the major policy areas, Schimmelfennig and 
Rittberger (2006: 75) give each sector a numerical grading according to the degree of 
integration achieved over time; ‘public healthcare’ receives a score of one (all policy 
decisions taken at national level) for the period 1950 to 1993 and a score of two (some 
decisions taken at EU level) from 1993 to 2004, where the measurement ends. By comparison, 
all sectors involving the free movement principles score four (most decisions at EU level) 
from 1993 onwards.  
The thesis takes this classification and assessment as a starting point but offers a refined 
definition of ‘sectoral’ integration in order to narrow the level of analysis. It works from the 
premise that, as Schimmelfennig and Rittberger assert, sectoral integration has reached the 
health sector but notes that it has not progressed at the same rate across all health issues; 
alcohol policy has not reached the same degree of integration as pharmaceutical policy, for 
example. As such, the thesis distinguishes between ‘macro-sectoral’ integration, where health 
has joined energy, environment, trade and a host of other policy areas in becoming subject to 
EU regulation, and ‘micro-sectoral’ integration, where different issues within health policy 
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have become integrated to different degrees. Once micro-sectoral integration becomes the 
focus, vertical integration research can examine the dispersal of competences in different 
health issues.  
A typology of modes of governance 
As noted in the conceptual exposition, the thesis seeks to observe changes in modes of 
governance, using policy instruments as the main object of analysis. Policy instruments are 
understood as tools available to policy-makers in the pursuit of policy objectives (Bähr, 2010). 
The European Commission divides the policy instruments available to it and the other 
European institutions into four groups: ‘hard’, legally binding rules (regulations, directives 
and decisions), ‘soft’ regulatory instruments (recommendations, technical standards, self-
regulation and the OMC), education and information tools (training, guidelines and 
campaigns) and economic- or market-based instruments (taxes, subsidies and tradable 
permits) (European Commission, 2015a).  
The modes of governance that these instruments collectively form are also grouped into four 
categories, by Treib et al. (2005), according to their legal basis and the rigidity of 
implementation (Figure 5). Modes of governance can be categorised as coercion, voluntarism, 
targeting or framework regulation.  
Figure 5: Modes of governance, adapted from Treib et al. (2005) 
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Coercion is the least flexible and most intrusive form of governance, using binding legal 
instruments which contain detailed and highly prescriptive standards and leave little room for 
flexibility or member state leeway. This is the governance approach taken in the authorisation 
procedures for medicinal products, for example. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 
voluntarism is based on non-binding instruments and sets out broad goals, allowing member 
states maximum flexibility in implementation. The OMC is a good example of this kind of 
governance, setting broad objectives rather than compulsory reforms and providing space for 
discussion and deliberation. Much of health is governed using a voluntarist approach, as can 
be seen in the many communications, recommendations and opinions on nutrition and 
physical activity, patient safety and healthy environments. Targeting uses similar non-binding 
instruments to voluntarism but is slightly more intrusive – this might be because the 
recommendations made are more detailed or because a mechanism for reporting or 
performance measurement is built in which puts pressure on member states to implement in a 
certain way. The amount of pressure felt by member states is difficult to accurately assess but 
examples of targeting can be seen in the technical standards on cancer screening and the 
follow up to Council recommendations on smoke-free environments (SFEs). Finally, 
framework regulation uses binding instruments but allows member states flexibility in their 
implementation. Directives are the primary instrument here, setting overarching policy goals 
but leaving governments to decide how they should be reached. This is has been the approach 
most commonly taken in tobacco policy, as well as BTO policy and cross-border healthcare.  
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The two sets of categorisations – of policy instruments and of modes of governance – do not 
overlap or fit together perfectly. Education and information instruments are inherently soft but 
can be targeted at particular knowledge gaps. Hard law can be used in coercion or framework 
regulation and economic- or market-based instruments are best used coercively but are 
commonly part of voluntary co- or self-regulation. Soft instruments are the most complex – a 
decision might be non-binding and voluntarist but also highly prescriptive or detailed, thus 
falling into the targeting category, or even contained within a hard law instrument. Thus, 
whilst the policy instrument categorisation is a useful heuristic device, the instruments within 
the case study areas are each examined individually to determine their legal basis and 
approach to implementation.  
Within health policy, the EU makes use of all the instruments and modes of governance 
above, and a single issue might be governed by a number of different instruments 
simultaneously or sequentially (Hervey and McHale, 2004: 43). The weak competence and 
limited budget in health has forced the Commission to utilise ‘creative tools’ such as 
comparable information, benchmarking and multi-stakeholder platforms, becoming a ‘master 
of ‘soft’ governance and strategic variability’ (Greer et al., 2014: 36; Lamping and Steffen, 
2005a: 193). The health agenda has been founded on and underpinned by voluntarist 
instruments since the early 1990s and contemporary health policy is dominated by 
mechanisms of ‘Commission-sponsored cooperation’ (Hervey and Vanhercke, 2010: 107; 
127). Coercive governance is less common, with binding measures more often taking the form 
of framework regulation, on account of the sensitivity and disparity in national health systems. 
The EU has also made good use of market-based instruments, through targeted funding of 
research projects and policy initiatives via the Health Programmes. In describing the broad 
trend of health governance, Hervey and Vanhercke (2010: 130) note that the crucial recent 
innovation has been the linking of voluntarist and coercive modes, using soft instruments as 
precursors and supplements to hard law.  
Research hypotheses 
The conceptual exposition clarifies the focus of the thesis and the theoretical framework 
identifies the primary objects of analysis. In order to apply these tools within the individual 
case studies, a series of hypotheses are now constructed – these are referred to throughout the 
analysis and their testing serves to address the research questions identified in the 
introduction. The first four hypotheses pose questions about the modes of governance 
identified in the typology above, whilst the last two provide an overall statement on the nature 
and status of EU health policy. The latter are based on the prevailing narrative of EU health 
policy found in the literature and described by interviewees. This characterisation provides the 
context for hypotheses one to four, which should be read in relation to the health sector. 
 Hypothesis 1: Crisis politics results in coercive forms of governance.  
 Hypothesis 2: Framework regulation, as embodied in the EU regulatory state and the 
integration of the internal market, is declining in relevance.  
 Hypothesis 3: Governing by targeting is more commonly employed where there is 
strong political will.  
 Hypothesis 4: Voluntarist governance is becoming increasingly coercive.  
 Hypothesis 5: EU health policy has become increasingly political and, as a result; 
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 Hypothesis 6: Health policy-makers have increasingly relied on soft policy 
instruments.  
Hypotheses one to four build on the historical role of crisis politics in health policy, the shift 
away from the internal market as the dominant stem, the increasing sensitivity of detailed and 
prescriptive policy instruments and the growing use of contingency to make soft instruments 
harder. The thesis explores these hypotheses through its six case studies and revisits them in 
the analysis to inform conclusions about the changing nature of EU health governance.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review examines the body of academic research in EU health policy and how it 
employs the theoretical approaches reviewed in the previous chapter to explain the evolution 
and development of this policy area. It is structured according to the three stems of health 
policy – public health, free movement and macroeconomic governance.  
The first section, corresponding to the first stem, reviews the literature concerned with early 
European action on public and occupational health and safety. It is quite fragmented and is 
mostly made up of work in tangential areas. For instance, health is referred to in volumes 
examining social (Geyer, 2000; Hantrias, 2000; Leibfried and Pierson, 1995) and employment 
(Rhodes, 1995) policy whilst a patchwork of individual articles charts the technical elements 
of specific initiatives, such as the Europe Against Cancer (EAC) programme (Boyle et al., 
1995) and EU action on HIV/AIDS prevention (Dubois-Arber and Paccuad, 1994).  
The second section, aligning with the second stem, reviews the proliferation of literature 
which followed the extension of free movement law into health. In 2001, the Belgian 
Presidency of the Council instigated the publishing of two books – The impact of EU law on 
healthcare systems (McKee et al., 2002) and EU law and the social character of health care 
(Mossialos and McKee, 2002). These ‘marker’ publications put a spotlight on the impact of 
recent CJEU rulings on national health services and, most importantly, acknowledged the 
existence of a collection of coherent ‘health in all policies’ measures at the EU level, if not 
quite the emergence of a genuine European health policy (Belcher and Berman, 2001). In the 
decade which followed, the debates raised in these two books were explored and extrapolated 
in a number of volumes providing comprehensive legal and political overviews of the field 
(Greer, 2009a; Hervey and McHale, 2004; McKee et al., 2004b; Mossialos et al., 2010; 
Randall, 2001; Steffen, 2005). These works now exist as a small but well established set of 
‘core texts’ in EU health policy. 
These two bodies of literature formed the core of health policy research until 2010 when the 
explicit inclusion of health in macroeconomic policy began to take the policy area in a new 
direction and reignited academic interest. A foundation for this third strand of research is 
presented in The Lancet’s ‘Health in Europe’ series, a set of seven articles published in early 
2013. The primary focus of this literature is the public and population health impact of the 
economic crisis and austerity politics (Greer et al., 2013; Mackenbach et al., 2013), but the 
series also acknowledges the unprecedented level of international intervention now facing 
European health systems, reflecting a secondary theme of the recent literature (Baeten and 
Thomson, 2012; Fahy, 2012; Greer, 2014). This research notes that the growing trend for 
addressing health in the context of macroeconomic policy and structural reform has intensified 
the impact of the EU upon the organisation, delivery and management of national health 
systems.  
In using this structure, the chapter risks superimposing a chronological template onto the 
stems heuristic – as noted in the conceptual exposition, this would not be accurate, since EU 
activity and academic literature within each of the three stems has existed and continues to 
develop concurrently. However, a loosely chronological approach is taken in order to simplify 
the literature and draw a clear distinction between different ‘eras’ of EU health policy. As 
such the chapter highlights the different understandings of health policy prevalent in the early 
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period of public health activity, in the aftermath of the Court’s rulings on free movement law 
in the health sector, and in the post-crisis period.  
The EU public health literature: 1957-2000 
The first body of literature spans that written prior to the public health mandate in the 
Maastricht Treaty and in the early years after its adoption. Since health was not considered a 
‘European’ policy prior to the 2000s, the early literature makes little reference to the 
theoretical frameworks and models of integration examined in the previous chapter. The 
measures introduced and processes established in this period, however, set a precedent for the 
further evolution of health policy. The primary mode of policy-making – leadership by the 
Commission with qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council and adjudication by the 
CJEU – was later to be labelled the ‘community method’. It was used in the creation of EU 
health and safety policy, environmental health policy and the first public health action 
programme (PHAP). Action in the areas of cancer and AIDS were exceptions to this rule, 
presenting early examples of soft law and non-binding cooperation. Finally the SEA, in 
reaffirming political commitment to the single market project, provided the initial catalyst for 
the spillover of market-building policies into health.  
Both the ECSC Treaty and the Rome Treaty laid foundations for a ‘social dimension’ in 
Europe and, as such, provided early demonstration of the potential of neofunctional spillover 
as a driver of health policy.  
‘The Treaty of Paris gave the ECSC the power to ensure rational use of coal resources (a 
precursor to environmental policy), to promote improved working conditions (a precursor 
to social policy) and to promote international trade (a precursor to trade and foreign 
policy)’ (McCormick, 2011: 127).  
As coordination between member states increased, the public health research community 
began to realise the value of this new sample population. The first wave of public health 
activity thus saw research on the incidence of lung cancer in uranium miners (Wagoner et al., 
1965), the public health risks of exposure to asbestos (Zielhuis, 1977) and management of 
occupational safety and environmental protection (Eichener, 1997). Beyond occupational 
health and safety, remarkable examples of intergovernmental cooperation were seen in the 
areas of cancer (Moliner, 2013; see also Thwaites et al., 1995) and HIV/AIDS (Steffen, 2012; 
See also Pollack, 1994). Some fragmented research was even beginning to look at the 
operation of public health systems and patterns of health expenditure (Gevers et al., 2000; 
Hitiris, 1997). Though the literature was more interested in clinical medicine and public health 
than the application of theoretical frameworks, the common characterisation reflects the 
neofunctional path that seemed to be emerging, whilst recognising the importance of member 
states as the gatekeepers of integration.  
In contrast to the public health literature, the social policy literature offers a surface-level 
application of the theoretical frameworks. Most analyses understand social policy to be a 
primary example of neofunctional dynamics; the development of social regulation is 
considered to have reduced member state autonomy and to have expanded in scope and 
content far beyond the wishes of national governments (Rhodes, 1998: 45). Furthermore, the 
development of occupational health and safety policy is also seen in some accounts as an early 
instance of the ‘treaty-base game’ – the Maternity Directive (Council Directive 92/85/EEC), 
for example, took as its legal basis Article 118A of the Rome Treaty on health and safety at 
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work, stretching the boundaries of this provision further than had been attempted before 
(Mazey, 1998: 142).  
By contrast, intergovernmentalism better explained the several pieces of legislation which 
attempted to push social policy further – such as those on part time and temporary work, and 
parental leave policy – but were opposed by Germany or vetoed by the British government 
(Majone 1998: 26; Rhodes, 1995: 95). Contesting the neofunctional interpretation, some 
accounts note that the experience of social policy was narrow and somewhat unique. Streeck 
(1995: 400) concludes that its expansion in the 1980s was limited to two main areas – gender 
equality and occupational health and safety – and that ‘…success in these two areas was for 
very specific reasons that do not apply elsewhere, making spillover to other social policy 
subjects improbable’. In public health, the marked differences in national health systems were 
seen as insurmountable barriers to any prospects of European coordination and justifiable 
reason for recourse to the subsidiarity principle (Hantrias, 1995: 73).  
Towards the mid-1990s, hints as to the future direction of health policy began prompting 
debates about the implications of free movement law and the role of the Court (Pierson and 
Leibfried, 1995: 66; 433). Hantrias (1995: 74) even makes reference to the growing common 
problem of health expenditure:  
‘In some respects, it seems surprising that the Union has not devoted more attention to 
standardising public health practices across member states. Intervention could have been 
justified on both the grounds of ensuring access to a satisfactory level of social 
protection…and as a means of avoiding distortion of competition, since health care 
represents the largest proportion of spending on social protection, apart from old age’.  
This insightful premonition demonstrates the sense of potential that pervaded early social and 
health policy. Spillover dynamics were evident in many areas and the ability of the 
Commission to stretch its official mandate and act as a policy entrepreneur lent promise to the 
neofunctional model. Whilst the literature on health policy remained limited, the potential for 
policy activity had grown significantly.  
The health and free movement literature: 2001-2009 
The two books which emerged from the CoEU conference on the implications of EU law for 
national health policies marked the beginning of a new era of EU health policy research. At a 
basic level, the literature of the period concurs that health is an area which uniquely 
challenges many of the distinctions used by the main theoretical schools. It does not fit neatly, 
for example, into either of the functionalist categories of ‘technical/functional’ or 
‘political/constitutional’ policy; neither does it fall consistently into one or the other of the 
intergovernmental ‘high-’ or ‘low-politics’ boxes (Mossialos and McKee, 2002: 45; 49). 
Health is both technical and political and as such can be regarded as a highly sensitive 
national issue area or a harmless area of functional low politics, depending on the particular 
policy mechanism. Most importantly, the 1990s had seen a series of legal judgements which 
forced national governments to empower citizens to seek health care in other member states 
(Gobrecht, 1999; Greer and Rauscher, 2011; Obermaier, 2008). Consequently the approach 
taken in the literature is predominantly a neofunctional one, emphasising the role of spillover, 
via free movement, in the development of health (Greer, 2006; 2008; 2009a: 10; Lamping, 
2005: 24; McKee et al., 2004b: 12; Randall, 2001: 8). Furthermore, the arena of health policy 
is generally understood to be a multi-level one and the interconnection between the legal and 
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political framework of the EU is almost universally acknowledged (Baeten, 2005; Hervey, 
2007; Hervey and McHale, 2004). More broadly, rationalist approaches are used, in 
conjunction with typologies such as Wilson’s (1980), to explain the kind of politics likely to 
emerge in particular areas of health, whilst constructivist frameworks are employed in 
analyses of the NMGs (Mossialos et al., 2010: 9; 10).  
Taking a bird’s eye view, the grand theories of integration are used in this literature to aid 
understanding of how health policy has integrated (Mossialos and McKee, 2002). 
Neofunctionalism helps to explain how health became part of the EU agenda; spillover from 
initial coordination in coal and steel production into harmonisation of occupational health and 
safety standards, for example, demonstrates the indirect power of single market integration. 
The BSE crisis, meanwhile, saw spillover from a trade issue to the creation of an EU food 
safety agency. By contrast, intergovernmentalism is used to understand the limits of health 
policy integration. The Luxembourg Crisis imposed a provision for use of the national veto 
where ‘very important interests’ were at stake – health and welfare decisions fall into this 
category, meaning that spillover processes did not have unchecked momentum (Mossialos and 
McKee, 2002: 47). This division is further explored using the liberal intergovernmental 
framework, which finds that member states can be persuaded that some areas, such as 
occupational health and safety, are better regulated at the EU level whilst others, including 
system financing and the prices of pharmaceuticals, will be jealously guarded (Mossialos and 
McKee, 2002: 50). 
The literature of this period embraces two opposing, but not necessarily contradictory, 
positions. On the one hand, member states are acknowledged to be the most powerful actors in 
the EU system. Whilst the various interest groups and regional governments are fragmented 
and hold the power to influence but not to decide, national governments are large and well-
resourced actors which have successfully resisted the formal, if not actual, encroachment of 
the EU into health and have prevented social policy integration from catching up with 
economic (Greer, 2009a: 3; Lamping, 2005: 20). Lamping goes on to claim that ‘European 
integration does not simply restrict national policy choices; it simultaneously enhances 
strategic health policy options of governments and private actors’ (2005: 37). The main 
supranational agencies in health – the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) – were originally set up as an alternative to granting the 
Commission further powers, and have member state representatives on all boards and national 
regulatory authorities closely involved in the decision-making process (Mossialos et al., 2010: 
35). From a legal perspective, whilst the treaty-base for health has slowly expanded in the 
series of revisions which have taken place, member states have successfully set limits to 
‘competence creep’ in the Maastricht Treaty, secured a strongly worded ‘subsidiarity’ 
provision in the Amsterdam Treaty and retain both discretion and the ‘benefit of the doubt’ in 
the application of the public health derogation in Article 36 TFEU (Hervey and McHale, 
2004: 74; 79; 94).  
On the other hand, the same collection of literature is unanimous in its depiction of the 
constraints put upon member states by internal market law, the European institutions and the 
EU’s wider legal framework. Institutions limit the options for national policy-makers, 
‘…mak[ing] unthinkable forms of Europeanisation seem plausible’, whilst the single market 
limits member state competence to act in areas of health protection (Greer, 2009a: 12; Hervey 
and McHale, 2004: 90). Though they retain considerable power in the policy-making process, 
McKee et al. (2004b: 4) note the ‘…failure of member states to address health issues within 
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the legislative framework of the EU’, instead facilitating a process of case-by-case judicial 
policy-making. This loss of competence is particularly acute in indirect integration, where 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and economic integration have ‘…deprived national 
policy-makers of many of the policy options that they could and did employ in earlier decades 
in order to achieve…high levels of social protection’ (Lamping, 2005: 24). Whilst some 
governance innovations, such as independent supranational agencies, have arguably preserved 
some member state authority (or at least prevented it from migrating to the Commission), 
others such as the OMC have had the opposite effect (Mossialos et al., 2010: 35). A number 
of features suggest that national governments originally intended the OMC to be a member 
state instrument, rather than a platform for an ambitious and entrepreneurial Commission 
(Greer and Vanhercke, 2010: 204). 
The health and macroeconomic governance literature: 2010-2015 
By 2007 the health policy literature was relatively well established and its authors were in 
broad agreement about the dynamics of EU health policy, but the onset of the crisis prompted 
revised analyses of both public health and health governance narratives.  
Post-crisis public health literature 
In the early 2010s the public health literature turned to examine the impact of the crisis on 
public health policies and the health of Europeans. Increasingly negative health trends were 
soon revealed in Italy, Spain and Portugal, with devolved health powers often exacerbating 
regional health inequalities as austerity measures were introduced (de Belvis et al., 2012; 
Gené-Badia et al., 2012; Barros, 2012). By far the greatest attention, however, has been paid 
to the situation developing in Greece. Both suicide and homicide rates in men increased by 
over 20 per cent between 2007 and 2009, whilst mental disorders, substance abuse and 
infectious disease morbidity all show deteriorating trends (Kondilis et al., 2013). The same 
period has seen dramatic increases in the number of patients not seeking health services on 
account of the cost involved, as well as a decline in self-rated health status (Kentikelenis et al., 
2011; Zavras et al., 2013). Reforms of primary care are lacking, whilst broader health system 
reforms are focused upon the budget cap, a condition of the Greek bailout package, which 
requires that health care spending not exceed six per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) 
(Kentikelenis et al., 2014; Kondilis et al., 2012). 
Broader studies of the health impacts of the economic crisis find that the trends seen in Italy, 
Spain, Portugal and Greece are replicated across member states, particularly in terms of access 
to care (Eurofound, 2014). A small body of literature charts the threat to health outcomes and 
equality posed by the recession and accompanying austerity measures (Karanikolos et al., 
2013; Mackenbach et al., 2013; McKee et al., 2012; Suhrcke and Stuckler, 2012). Research 
into policy options for reducing the impact of the crisis on health has shown that investment in 
active labour market policies can mitigate increases in suicide and homicide rates, whilst a 
number of commentators have examined the political conditions in which such options are 
being considered (Stuckler et al., 2009; see also McKee, 2010; 2011, Mladovsky et al., 2012 
and Stuckler et al., 2010).   
The public health literature, being concerned with the health of populations and the 
contribution of health systems to the health of individuals, does not discuss in great detail the 
politics of health, how decisions are made or which institutions govern policy. Nevertheless, it 
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makes a number of assumptions and highlights a variety of dynamics which portray a specific 
understanding of health policy. The importance of supranational institutions is evident in 
almost all public health research but, contrary to traditional, neofunctional understanding, less 
emphasis is put on the driving role of institutions and more on their value as hubs of expertise, 
information, shared experience and best practice. The importance and added value of the 
involvement of the EU and the WHO is understood to be technical and functional, almost 
above politics, insofar as the value of supranational coordination in public health is 
undisputed. The literature on tobacco also highlights the power of interest groups and 
industry, expressing a broad consensus that tobacco companies play a far greater role in the 
development of EU smoking prevention policy than is appropriate or desirable (Fooks et al., 
2011; Fooks et al., 2014; Peeters and Gilmore, 2013; Smith et al., 2010). 
Post-crisis health governance literature 
Examining the impacts of the economic crisis from a different angle, a second stream of 
literature is concerned with the way in which the governance of health policy has changed 
since 2007. The theoretical approaches taken here are more explicit, since research looks at 
the changing roles of various actors and stakeholders, the development of policy-making 
processes and the evolution of the EU’s health policy mandate. 
The central understanding of EU health policy in the contemporary era, broadly agreed and 
shared by the majority of observers in the field, is most clearly stated in the prolific work of 
Greer (2009a; 2009b; 2010; 2011; 2014). Reflecting the pre-existing characterisation, the 
development of health is explained by neofunctional arguments – once coordination in a 
policy has begun, the development of a given arena generates a momentum of its own, 
characterised as spillover. The opposing intergovernmental argument is trumped, for Greer, by 
the emergence of a European health policy despite the absence of an explicit treaty base or 
competence (2014: 17). The EU is understood to be composed of ‘generally liberalizing, pro-
integration…institutions’ which have created an EU health policy without any real demand 
for it (Greer, 2009a: 3; 2009b: 5). The entrepreneurial Commission, despite its tendency for 
internal discord, exploits opportunities to increase its own mandate and with support from 
other actors, creates a complex and prescriptive web of health policies and networks (Greer, 
2009b: 6). The precedent set by the application of free movement law to health has opened the 
door to the extension of public procurement, competition and state aid law, leaving almost no 
area of health untouched by EU influence (Greer, 2011: 192). Finally interest groups are 
understood, alongside supranational institutions, to be instrumental in creating a stable health 
policy (Greer, 2009b: 6). Domestic interest groups appealing to the supranational level and the 
emergence of new pan-EU alliances in specific issue areas generates further integration and 
the support of these actors is vital in determining the success of both hard and soft law 
initiatives (Greer, 2011).  
The dominant understanding of member states, by contrast, ascribes formal power to national 
governments but considers the reality to be one in which member states have no reliable way 
of controlling the health agenda or avoiding defeats (Greer, 2010: 210). Their involvement in 
EU health policy is often characterised as reactive, responding to initiatives launched by the 
Commission or case law passed down by the Court, and whilst they are acknowledged to be 
more important and powerful than lobbies, regional governments or interest groups, the 
options from which member states choose are thought to be prepared by the supranational 
institutions (Greer, 2009a: 3; 11; 13). The weakness of health ministries in comparison to their 
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counterparts – economy, trade, treasury and foreign policy – creates further problems for 
member state influence in health policy, since the cooperation and support of non-health 
departments is often necessary to assert a coherent position in health issues (Greer, 2010: 
210). As such the contemporary health policy arena, particularly in the area of internal market 
and health services, is commonly presented as one in which member states work to oppose the 
expansionist agenda of the EU institutions. 
The ‘member state versus supranational institution’ narrative has been somewhat challenged, 
however, by the onset of the economic crisis and the acceleration of a reconfiguration of the 
actors involved in health policy (Baeten and Thomson, 2012). The European Commission 
remains in the driving seat, as the prevailing neofunctional model anticipates, but has adjusted 
its strategy in light of the elevation of economic concerns to use economic actors to further its 
goals (de Ruijter and Hervey, 2012; Fahy, 2012). In this way it is exploiting the constitutional 
asymmetry as it has historically done in the treaty-base game, assigning constitutionally 
strong legal bases to health policy legislation disguised as internal market or macroeconomic 
measures. The power of lobbies and interest groups in determining the degree of integration 
achieved remains strong and the number of groups involved in health policy has expanded 
quite considerably (Greer, 2009a; Greer et al., 2013). Though still retaining control through 
the working parties of the Council, national governments have been forced to change their 
response and cede further power to the EU in crucial areas (Baeten and Thomson, 2012). 
National health ministries must now be prepared to discuss and coordinate with their 
colleagues in the ministries of economy and finance, as well as with their European 
counterparts and the various departments of the Commission (Fahy, 2012). Crucially, the 
literature no longer refers to the Court as one of those driving or leading health policy. The 
importance and relevance of internal market law for health remains a key topic (see Baeten 
and Palm, 2011; Newdick, 2011; Sauter, 2011 and; van de Gronden and Sauter, 2011) but the 
role of the Court, not expected to be of particular significance within the economic 
governance framework, has faded from the literature.  
A final focus of the post-crisis literature is the change in processes and policy tools being used 
in health, in particular the OMC (Vanhercke and Lelie, 2012; Vanhercke and Wegener, 2012). 
Since its inclusion in the Europe 2020 Strategy, the Social OMC – which embodies the health 
and long-term care, pensions and social inclusion strands of the original OMC initiative – has 
enjoyed a modest revival (Barcevičius et al., 2014). Its ability to bridge the constitutional gap 
by bringing health and social concerns into the economic sphere, where the EU enjoys a 
stronger mandate and power, is of renewed interest in the post-crisis climate (de Ruijter and 
Hervey, 2012: 140). The literature revisits the debate about the competing benefits of hard and 
soft law, with some maintaining that the non-binding nature of the OMC renders it ineffective, 
whilst others point to its success when sufficiently supported and the seriousness with which it 
is approached by member states (Brooks, 2012; Greer, 2011). This discussion takes part 
within the broader dialogue about the place of social policy within Europe 2020 (Armstrong, 
2012; Bieling, 2012; Daly, 2012; Vanhercke and Lelie, 2012) and in the EU’s response to the 
economic crisis (Grahl and Teague, 2013; Vanhercke, 2013). The evolution of the economic 
crisis into a social emergency in some member states has prompted a reassessment of the 
EU’s social policies and of the constitutional asymmetry which hinders their development 
relative to economic issues (Barcevičius et al., 2014).  
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Summary 
Attempts to explain the evolution of EU health policy have traditionally drawn upon the 
neofunctional-intergovernmental dichotomy, charting the changing power and importance of 
supranational institutions and member states as drivers of integration. Later literature, 
fascinated by the patchwork of competencies which the EU enjoys in health, introduced 
legalistic and constructivist models to explain the role of soft law and innovative modes of 
governance. The conclusion of these accounts often mirrored early integration analyses in 
declaring the role of the state in health policy to be under threat from the EU and its 
institutions.  
In the aftermath of the economic crisis, much of the literature has sought to reapply and 
expand the dominant narrative, highlighting neofunctional and intergovernmental dynamics in 
the development of the strengthened economic governance framework. However, a renewed 
interest in governance has also been sparked – the range of instruments and processes now 
applicable to health has grown considerably and the nature of pre-existing policies and tools 
has been altered. Though the traditional integration theories can still offer valuable insight 
into the ‘high politics’ of integration, the changing approach to health governance in the post-
crisis period necessitates analysis at a lower level.  
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THE HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF EU HEALTH POLICY 
The development of health policy has been influenced and shaped by a variety of factors. 
Reflecting the common pattern it has, at times, been prompted and pushed forward by 
functional dynamics, with the introduction of specific health policy initiatives resulting from 
cooperation and harmonisation in other, non-health areas. At other times, the evolution of 
health has been steered and scripted by political forces – CoEU leadership in cancer policy 
and Commission entrepreneurship in the PHAPs illustrate this dynamic well. This predictable 
evolution has been accompanied, however, by a series of catalysts and developments largely 
distinct to health policy. Judicial construction of policy frameworks via the application of 
internal market law, as seen in the rulings and legislation on cross border healthcare, and 
extension of European competence in response to crisis events, as seen in the BSE outbreak, 
are two examples of such ‘uniquely health’ characteristics.  
This chapter examines the historical evolution of health policy in the EU. It firstly describes 
the context in which the development of health policy and governance should be understood, 
reviewing the evolution of the European project, its dominant policy-making models and the 
changing health provisions of the founding treaties. It then offers a short historical account of 
health policy at the European level, structured according to the stems heuristic, providing the 
background from which the six case studies are selected.  
The context of EU health policy 
The evolution of the European Union 
The development of health policy at the European level is inextricably linked to the evolution 
of the European project as a whole. This section briefly describes how the EU was created, the 
governing institutions which it has established, the processes of widening and deepening 
which have shaped its development and the challenges which have been posed by the global 
financial crisis and economic recession.  
The founding treaties of the ECSC and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
were brought together under the treaties of Rome in 1957. This created the European 
Economic Community (EEC), a supranational organisation based on the economic integration 
of a common market and political coordination aimed at ‘ever closer union’. The distinction 
between these economic and political visions has determined the progress of the European 
project throughout its history. The SEA, the first and arguably most significant treaty revision, 
introduced QMV into a raft of internal market policy areas and codified the nascent forms of 
political cooperation, advancing economic and political integration on a relatively equal 
footing. A few years later, the Maastricht Treaty was forced to acknowledge the limits of 
political union but did this by formalising them in the three pillar structure, which separated 
supranational from intergovernmental policy processes. By 1997 a democratic deficit was 
emerging in the wake of these complex institutional frameworks, challenging the framers of 
the Amsterdam and Nice treaties to address the efficiency and legitimacy of the EU. Progress 
towards political union changed form but continued in the adoption of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (CoFR) and strengthened treaty emphasis on citizenship, solidarity and 
social cohesion.  
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The peak of integration momentum came in 2004 when European leaders adopted a draft 
constitutional treaty (DCT) for Europe, enshrining the economic and political union achieved 
so far and giving the EU legal personality. However, the underdeveloped ‘European polity’ 
saw the DCT rejected by national populations and established a clear limit for the federalist 
vision. After a short cooling period, the provisions of the DCT were reframed as amendments 
and adopted as the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. Thus, whilst expansion and elaboration of the EU’s 
treaty base has been continuous, it is increasingly constrained and imbalanced, manifesting in 
a constitutional asymmetry between economic and political integration and social- and 
market-based competences.  
The changing institutional structure described by the EU treaties has resulted in a shifting 
balance of power between the main EU actors. The European Commission, long-standing 
executive of the EU, has maintained a relatively autonomous role and has successfully 
expanded its influence via establishment of numerous decentralised agencies and the creative 
use of treaty provisions and CJEU support. The Court itself has been elevated to sole 
arbitrator of the EU treaties, prompting the creation of the Court of First Instance (CoFI) to 
support its growing role. Responding the democratic deficit the European Parliament has also 
seen its powers increase, with direct elections first held in 1979 and strengthening of its 
legislative role in successive treaty revisions. The Parliament’s rise to co-legislator has 
occurred at the expense of the Council which, previously a formidable brake on speeding 
supranationalism, has seen its control moderated under successive expansions of QMV and 
the evolution of the co-decision procedure. As the scope of EU activity has increased, so too 
has the vast array of supporting bodies – the European Economic and Social Committee, 
Committee of the Regions, Social Protection Committee (SPC) and Economic Policy 
Committee (EPC) play particularly central roles and are indicative of the multi-level structure 
which now frames the EU’s development. The tension between supranational and 
intergovernmental cooperation prevails but whilst the scope of intergovernmental control has, 
at best, remained stable, the institutionalisation of supranationalism has increased 
continuously.  
In terms of scope and content the EU has undergone parallel processes of widening and 
deepening. From a founding collection of six member states it had expanded to include most 
of Western Europe by 1995. A watershed was reached in 2004 with the accession of 10 
former-communist states from Eastern Europe, posing challenges in light of their collectively 
lower GDP, weaker economies and greater reliance on EU support. Crucially, this expansion 
also changed the balance of voting procedures in the Council, shaking up the established 
power groupings and allegiances. With subsequent accessions in 2007 and 2013 the EU has 
arrived at a total of 28 member states; appetite for further expansion is markedly lower than at 
previous points in the project’s history, but seven countries remain engaged in accession 
negotiations.  
The deepening of EU policy has been a less steady process. The spillover from coal and steel 
sector coordination into related industries and horizontal policies, such as occupational health 
and safety, provided early momentum and economic integration has historically progressed 
well. Attempts at a European Defence Community, meanwhile, were thwarted in 1954 and the 
1960s saw a resurgence of intergovernmental control and the hampering of plans for political 
and social union. Against this barrier, attention shifted to monetary union – early failed 
attempts paved the way for an EMU framework, enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty and 
introducing a single currency, as well as limits on government debt and deficits. Whilst this 
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marked a significant step forward for EU integration, the separation of Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy as intergovernmental pillars of 
policy institutionalised the roadblocks to comprehensive integration and neither area has 
advanced far towards a coordinated EU policy. Outside of these intergovernmental realms, 
however, the range of EU policy activity has grown substantially. European influence is now 
felt, albeit to varying degrees, in environment, energy, education, trade, competition, 
employment, transport and maritime policy, among many others. In 2012, the UK (United 
Kingdom) government launched a review of the balance of competences between the national 
and European level which acknowledged the broad scope of EU influence but found no cause 
for transfer of powers back to national level (UK Government, 2014). Whilst attempts to 
amalgamate EU policy under centralised banners such as the Lisbon Agenda and the Europe 
2020 Strategy have faced difficulties, innovations such as the Citizens’ Initiative, the 
Schengen Agreement, the European Central Bank (ECB), the CoFR and, more recently, the 
collective awarding of a Nobel Peace Prize, suggest the ongoing relevance of a federalist logic 
in the development of the EU.  
The global financial crisis and economic recession have had two major implications for the 
evolution of the EU. Firstly, the focus of EU activity has returned to fiscal and monetary 
integration, whilst policy is guided by principles of budgetary austerity. Secondly, popular 
support for the EU has declined steeply, with public unrest and Eurosceptic sentiment 
swelling across the continent. These developments have exacerbated both the constitutional 
asymmetry and the democratic deficit which have plagued the EU since its creation. 
Policy-making and governance in the EU 
The changing powers, political climate and goals of the EU have produced, over time, a 
number of different policy-making types or models. The original form of supranational 
policy-making, used in the early days of the EEC, became known as the ‘community method’ 
and built on experiences with the common agricultural policy (CAP), which dominated the 
agenda in the 1960s. It provided a central role for the new EU executive with strategic 
bargaining opportunities for the Council of Ministers, engagement of interest groups and 
national agencies, and limited involvement of national and European parliamentarians 
(Wallace, 2010: 94). The community method aimed at positive integration and centralised 
power and, as such, there are few examples of its more recent use but it remains a point of 
reference when discussing the evolution of the EU’s policy-making processes (Wallace, 2005: 
80). Most commonly, it is contrasted to the ‘new’ modes of governance, in particular the 
OMC, which take a softer, more deliberative approach designed to circumvent the roadblocks 
which hinder the established legislative procedures (Armstrong, 2011). Institutionalised in the 
Amsterdam Treaty, policy-making via the OMC is employed in areas where full 
harmonisation is not possible, instead facilitating the exchange of information, the sharing of 
best practice, the establishment of benchmarks and the development of non-binding 
agreements and guidelines (Trubek and Trubek, 2005).  
Wallace (2010) identifies three further models of EU policy-making. Firstly and most 
prolifically, the regulatory mode of policy-making emerged in the construction of the EU 
regulatory regime. Given its weakness in distributive and redistributive policies, traditionally 
used by national executives to exert power, the EU has instead gained influence via the 
creation, implementation and interpretation of regulatory policy (Eberlein and Grande, 2005: 
89; Page, 1998). Utilising the EU’s strong mandate in ensuring the smooth functioning of the 
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internal market, national regulations have increasingly been removed and replaced with 
harmonising European measures, commonly administered by independent, expert and 
supranational agencies (Majone, 1996: 2). A second complimentary policy-making type is the 
distributional model, used in policies which involve the transfer of resources through the EU 
budget (Hix and Høyland, 2011). This embodies the various socio-economic and regional 
development policies and the division of funds dedicated to cohesion and solidarity. It is 
inherently linked to the MLG framework, since it moves away from central control, bringing 
in a plethora of groups, sectors, regions and countries (Wallace, 2010: 97). Finally, Wallace 
(2010: 100) identifies ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’, a mode of policy-making which 
occurs between national policy-makers, with little involvement of EU institutions. Such 
policy-making excludes the CJEU, the European Parliament and, largely, the European 
Commission, but is more intensive than the traditional intergovernmental model suggests, 
involving complex negotiation and cooperation on foreign, external, monetary and JHA policy 
(Wallace, 2005: 88).  
Though the creation of the regulatory state facilitated a process of ‘competence creep’ which 
enabled the EU to extend its influence into health and social policy, the regulatory policy 
model is now understood to be declining in relevance (Greer, 2006; Pollack, 2000; Rhodes, 
1995; Richardson, 2006). Thus, in light of how politically unpalatable the community method 
has become, the weakness of distributional policies and the aversion of national governments 
to engage in transgovernmental health policy-making, the evolution of the sector now rests 
largely on the softer, more innovative modes of governance.  
The EU treaties and the legal basis for health 
The early EU treaties did not reference health explicitly but laid some foundations for social 
policy coordination. The ECSC Treaty, for instance, described the EU’s duty to raise 
standards of living, whilst the Euratom Treaty was concerned with protecting workers and the 
general public from the harmful effects of regulation. These provisions were consolidated in 
the Rome Treaty, which formalised measures on occupational health and safety, permitted 
restrictions on free movement on the basis of health protection and contained provisions on 
the right to establishment and the free movement of services, which had an impact upon 
health professionals. As such, these treaties gave an early indication of the impact of the 
internal market and free movement principles upon the health sector.  
The 1987 SEA sought to speed up the completion of the internal market and was mostly 
focused on this goal, but provided in Article 100a(3) EC that EU action should take as a basis 
a high level of health protection, meaning that measures taken to facilitate the internal market 
should be mindful of their health impacts. Additionally, Article 118a EC provided for the first 
time that provisions on occupational health and safety, among other issues, could be adopted 
via QMV. However, it was not until 1992 that the EU gained a legal competence in health.  
The Maastricht Treaty introduced co-decision as a legislative procedure and laid down the 
early provisions of EMU. Article 129(1) EC stated that the EU ‘…shall contribute towards 
ensuring a high level of human health protection’ and that ‘…health protection requirements 
shall form a constituent part of the Community’s other policies’. Furthermore, Article 3(o) EC 
elevated health issues to the status of Community objective, meaning that European action 
should contribute to ‘…the attainment of a high level of health protection’. Finally, Article 
129(4) EC extended QMV to cover an even wider range of health proposals.  
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The Amsterdam Treaty reformed the institutional structure of the Union but, crucially for 
health, was being drafted just as the BSE crisis began to affect the Western continent. In light 
of the need for stronger regulatory control, the health mandate was strengthened under Article 
152 EC, elevating the EU’s role from ‘contributing’ to health protection to ‘ensuring’ health 
protection in the definition and implementation of all Community policy and action. It also 
extended the circumstances in which the EU could use the co-decision procedure into BTO 
policy, whilst offering the first statement of subsidiarity in the health context.  
The health provisions of the treaties were not changed again until the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, 
which sought to resurrect many of the provisions of the abandoned DCT. Article 3 TEU 
makes ‘wellbeing’ an objective of the Union whilst a horizontal social clause is inserted in 
Article 9 TFEU, meaning that the Commission must take greater account of social, health and 
wellbeing concerns in the legislative process. The newly numbered Article 168 TFEU 
(previously Article 152 EC) adds Union competence in cross-border threats to health, tobacco 
use and alcohol abuse, though excluding any harmonisation, and encourages member state 
cooperation in cross-border health services. It puts greater emphasis on guidelines, indicators, 
monitoring and evaluation, and adds medicinal products and medical devices as areas of 
Union competence. However, Article 168(7) TFEU also extends the reference to subsidiarity, 
reiterating member state responsibility for the definition of their health policy and clarifying 
that this includes ‘the management of health services and medical care and the allocation of 
the resources assigned to them’. Finally, the Treaty explicitly introduces monitoring and 
evaluation as an integral part of health policy, seeking to address the lack of comparable data 
and information collected amongst member states (Tsolova, 2010).  
EU health policy thus rests on an imbalanced legal basis. Whilst the protection of health has 
been raised to the level of ‘Union objective’, direct EU competence is limited to ‘encouraging 
cooperation’ and ‘support of national measures’ in all but a few, explicitly specified areas. 
Moreover, the EU’s powers to take action in pursuit of health are not neatly collected into one 
health article but are dispersed amongst provisions on the environment, health and safety at 
work, consumer protection, the internal market, the coordination of social security systems 
and fiscal governance. The type of policy pursued, the legal basis on which it rests and the 
mechanisms put in place to implement it have changed substantially as the EU has grown. The 
health policy agenda has been shaped by and made use of the evolving institutional structures, 
as well as the political climate in which they have operated. The rest of the chapter provides a 
chronological overview of EU health policy before presenting some characterisations of how 
health as an EU competence has developed.  
The historical development of EU health policy 
The genesis of EU health policy: 1957 to 1992 
The founding treaties of the EU did not make direct provisions for health policy; they were 
strictly economic in their objectives, reflecting the prevailing laissez-faire philosophy. Shaw 
(2000: 6) notes that ‘the dominant ideological premise’, 
‘…was that social progress would be the natural correlative of the economic progress 
fostered by the benefits of a common market…suggesting that an interventionist social 
policy…would in fact be counterproductive’.  
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Health measures were therefore only permitted where they were necessary for the 
harmonisation of the internal market. For the most part, this meant occupational health and 
safety and social security arrangements for migrant workers, where the Communities enjoyed 
extensive competence. However, work also began in this period on the harmonisation of 
pharmaceutical regulation – based on the inclusion of medical products among the goods 
subject to internal market rules in the Rome Treaty, this would eventually lead to the creation 
of the EMA as part of one of the most well-integrated facets of EU health policy, but at the 
time was undertaken largely as a response to the thalidomide tragedy (Anderson, 2015: 163).  
The SEA prompted an acceleration of the European project and a debate about the imbalance 
between market-orientated and social welfare policies (Leibfried, 2010: 254). The 
introduction of QMV for legislation in many areas, including occupational health and safety, 
cleared some of the institutional roadblocks and marked a first important step in the 
Europeanisation of health and social policy (Falkner et al., 2005). This spawned a mandated 
‘rush to the top’ in social policy and the use of the EMU project as a ‘Russian doll’ for the 
introduction of new initiatives and legislation (Geyer, 2000: 172; Ross, 1995: 368; 371). At 
the same time and outside of the formal mandate, targeted public health activity was already 
underway. In 1985 the European Council proposed and adopted an EU programme of action 
against cancer. The EAC initiative led to the adoption of a string of legislation on dangerous 
substances, pesticide residues, exposure to carcinogens and tobacco use (Moliner, 2013). 
Similar programmes were also established to combat HIV infection and AIDS (Steffen, 2012), 
reduce illicit drug use and coordinate health-related research (Greer et al., 2014: 38).  
Health activity to this point was undertaken without a formal mandate. Its development was 
aided by the trend for re-regulation in the single market and a shift in Community strategy 
‘…from adopting directives on specific hazards or sectors to using an overall directive in 
combination with a series of more specific “daughter directives”’ (Majone, 1996: 95). This 
new approach enabled the EU to engage in a secondary-law variant of the treaty-base game 
and meant that the significant impact of the single market project on social policy was 
achieved ‘…largely through mechanisms operating outside the welfare dimension proper’ 
(Leibfried, 2010: 257).  
The creation of a public health mandate: 1992 to 1997 
The turning point for health came with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. It gave the EU a 
role in coordinating national policies on disease prevention, drug dependence, research and 
health education, and in adopting recommendations and incentive measures to support these 
initiatives. It was at this point that the ‘win/win’ nature of public health began to bear fruit – 
‘…not politically divisive, not particularly expensive’, public health provided a timely 
opportunity for the EU to draw attention away from poor economic performance and promote 
its ‘human face’ (Geyer, 2000: 175; Gold, 1998: 117). Up until the 1990s, legislative reform 
of social issues was limited to the few areas where the single market or the Rome Treaty 
allowed latitude – namely gender equality or health and safety (Leibfried, 2010: 268). Armed 
with an official mandate, the Commission identified eight specific areas for EU-level action in 
public health – cancer, HIV/AIDS, drugs, rare diseases, accidents and injuries, pollution-
related illnesses, health data and health promotion – and built these into the first PHAP.  
By the end of the 1990s, public health was a routine feature of all social policy proposals and 
had issue areas in almost every Directorate General (DG) in the Commission (Abel-Smith et 
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al., 1995: 127). Crucial to this proliferation was Jacques Delors’ identification of the internal 
market programme as the appropriate platform from which to re-launch the European project 
whilst tying social policy convergence to economic integration (Noël, 1989: 4). In this 
strategy, the ‘added value’ of cooperation in public health was used to help promote the EU’s 
social benefits and to offset concerns about EMU and the effects of economic integration.  
Crisis, mainstreaming and case law: 1997 to 2008 
The 1990s saw the Court begin to play an important role in the evolution of health policy. The 
most significant judgements for health were those on the supremacy of EU law and the right 
to seek reimbursement for medical services received in another member state. Building on the 
Costa v ENEL, Van Gend en Loos and Factortame cases, the Court ruled in Kohll and Decker 
that, since healthcare is a service provided for remuneration, it must be regarded as falling 
under the scope of the principles of free movement. As a result, EU citizens were granted the 
right to receive healthcare services in any member state and to be reimbursed by the health 
system of their home state. The Court refined its judgements in a series of further cases, 
creating by the mid-2000s a web of jurisprudence on the operation of health services within 
the EU.  
The Amsterdam Treaty, adopted during this steady stream of case law, altered the public 
health mandate of Article 129 EC, changing the emphasis of existing provisions and adding a 
mainstreaming element to Union activity in health. Its provisions reflect the political potency 
of crisis – it is commonly understood that there was originally no intention to amend Article 
129 EC, but that the BSE crisis made it clear that some threats warrant European action and 
spurred member states to better facilitate this (Hervey and McHale, 2004: 76). The 
mainstreaming provision, in line with the commitments to raising standards of living and the 
attainment of a high level of health protection, was introduced in response to arguments by the 
UK government in UK v Commission concerning emergency measures in the BSE crisis 
(Geyer, 2000: 175). This required that all policies take health into consideration and was 
further emphasised by the Finnish Presidency’s commitment to the HiAP approach in 2006 
(Puska and Stahl, 2010).  
More broadly, the Treaty refocuses EU health policy towards health promotion and the 
broader determinants of health, expanding Community activities into promotion rather than 
just prevention, and changing the obligation of institutions from ‘requirement to contribute’ to 
‘duty to ensure’ a high level of health protection (Hervey and McHale, 2004: 77). The 
Commission quickly utilised its strengthened mandate and launched a new, simplified PHAP, 
which streamlined the previous eight-stranded strategy into a three part programme aimed at 
improving information for the development of public health, reacting rapidly to threats to 
health and tackling health determinants through health promotion and disease prevention 
(Decision 1786/2002/EC). This new approach was made possible by the creation of a 
dedicated DG for health and consumers (SANCO). The establishment of a ‘health department’ 
within the Commission was an explicit acknowledgement that a critical mass of health-related 
issues now existed at the European level and warranted coordination by a dedicated body. It 
also reflected concern about the range of EU laws and policy areas which now affected health 
and the potential for this encroachment to continue via litigation and Court judgement.  
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The response to free movement: 2008 to 2011 
Following a series of reflection processes, conclusions and consultations, the European 
Commission published a proposal for a Directive on patients’ rights in cross border healthcare 
in 2008 (Directive 2011/24/EU). The purpose of the Directive was to codify the case law 
handed down by the CJEU and to prevent further cases from imposing extra limitations of 
member states’ sovereignty in this area. The negotiations were long and difficult but the 
adoption of the Directive, with its many provisions to extend the EU’s role in health in areas 
such as eHealth and rare diseases, represented the pinnacle of EU health policy integration.  
Around the same time, negotiation began on a series of other internal market-based health 
policy initiatives, including the revision of legislation on clinical trials, the pharmaceutical 
package, the action plan on health workforce, the Joint Action on HTA, the directive on 
human organs for transplantation and others. A third PHAP, running from 2009-2013, 
expanded EU activity in public health even further, emphasising health inequalities, health 
security and the need to generate health knowledge (Anderson, 2015: 175). It also shared the 
objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy and sought to promote investment in health and 
measures to address the ageing society.  
This policy momentum was somewhat tempered, however, by the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty. Though the changes did not weaken the EU’s role in health, they were less ambitious 
than previous treaty revisions and strongly re-stated the importance of subsidiarity and the 
autonomy of member states. This provision is particular interesting in light of the 
macroeconomic governance reforms which have since taken place and which directly 
challenge the autonomy of member states in the financing and structuring of their health 
systems. EU action is focused but remains purely ‘complementary’ – the monitoring and 
combating of cross border health threats, for example, is mentioned as an area where the 
Council and Parliament may adopt incentive measures.  
As evidenced by the adoption of the third PHAP and the continuing EU activity in public 
health areas, the stream of case law handed down by the CJEU did not supplant public health 
policy, but it did signal the potential of free movement law as a basis and shaping force. The 
proportion of health policy born out of internal market law increased significantly in the late 
1990s and 2000s and it was this new ‘face’ which ignited a fresh wave of academic interest in 
health as an EU policy competence.  
Economic crisis and contemporary health policy: 2011 to 2015 
The onset of the economic crisis did not immediately, significantly or directly affect the 
content or direction of EU health policy. Rather, it might be more accurate to say that the 
crisis affected the political climate and priorities of the European project as a whole, which 
has in turn been reflected in health policy. Most of the legislative projects underway in health 
at the end of the 2000s were brought to fruition in the aftermath of the crisis and in 2013, a 
fourth PHAP was adopted. This has four thematic priorities: health promotion and disease 
prevention; cross border health threats; innovative, efficient and sustainable health systems; 
and access to high quality and safe healthcare. In addition to maintaining the EU’s leading 
role in public health and health protection, the 2014-2020 PHAP gives the EU a role in 
‘encouraging’ innovation and sustainability in health systems, and in ‘identifying and 
developing’ tools to address shortages in human and financial resources.  
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However, the impact of the crisis on health policy, as described by an official within the 
renamed DG Santé (DG for Health and Food Safety), was to severely limit the publication of 
new initiatives (European Commission, Health Directorate E). Disquiet about the decline in 
health and social policy has been widespread since the crisis hit and though some key 
legislative achievements have been made – the TPD and the Clinical Trials Regulation 
(Regulation 536/2014), for example, were both adopted in 2014 – the health community 
remains concerned (Renshaw, 2015; van den Abeele, 2015). This is partly a result of the fact 
that, more than ever before, EU health policy is determined by policies outside of the health 
sector. Policies on data protection, trade, research, professional qualifications, the Digital 
Agenda, environment, agriculture, structural funds, minority rights, Europe 2020 and taxation, 
among many others, have a significant impact upon health and the attention of the health 
community is now required in these areas as much as in ‘traditional’ public health fields. As 
such, conventional health policy ‘output’ is now diluted by the pursuit of health goals within 
other policy areas.  
This is not to say that the perceived decline in health policy described by interviewees is 
superficial. The conservative, anti-European climate embodied in initiatives such as the Better 
Regulation initiative and the REFIT (regulatory fitness and performance programme; 
Commission Decision 3261 final) has caused the Commission not only to block the 
presentation of too many new policy proposals but also to begin rolling back existing 
legislation (Schömann, 2015). Furthermore, traditional public health policies have begun to 
falter – the failure of the Commission to produce a new Alcohol Strategy in 2015 led to the 
resignation of the twenty NGO participants of the Alcohol and Health Forum, whilst the 
publication of a new proposal on taxation of tobacco products is now also uncertain (EU 
Health NGO I).  
Where policy has expanded, it has been in areas which support health’s inclusion in the 
strengthened macroeconomic governance framework and DG Santé’s role in assisting DG 
ECFIN (Economic and Financial Affairs) to monitor, measure and evaluate national health 
systems. These are mostly soft law, data collection initiatives relating to Health System 
Performance Assessment (HSPA), which examine the sustainability, effectiveness and cost-
efficiency of healthcare. The information gathered is used to inform recommendations on 
health reform in the European Semester, agreements and expenditure conditions in financial 
bailouts and broader compliance with the EU’s macroeconomic governance framework.  
Characterisations of EU health policy development 
Contemporary EU health policy is characterised by involvement of the greatest range of 
actors, activity in the greatest number of areas and inclusion in the greatest variety of non-
health frameworks to date. Policy spans traditional, EU added-value areas such as 
communicable diseases and action against cancer, second stem free movement areas such as 
cross border healthcare and healthcare professional migration, and third stem areas such as 
health expenditure and primary care reform, but is also shaped by initiatives in trade, research, 
environment and a host of other policy areas. Furthermore, an array of different health policy-
making modes and mechanisms are now in day-to-day use, ranging from the community 
method legislative procedure and intergovernmental agreement to the voluntary OMC and the 
non-binding recommendations of the European Semester.  
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Actors in EU health policy 
As health policy has developed, the number of actors involved has increased and academic 
attention has often turned to examining the impact of these different interests upon health 
policy outcomes. Essentially, health policy is understood as a ‘public park’, open to access by 
many actors and consequently at risk of policy being made or constrained by ‘…people who 
know little, and perhaps care little, about health’ (Greer, 2009a: 3). National governments and 
the European institutions are broadly understood to be the key players, but they are far from 
alone in the policy-making arena. Civil society, trade unions, NGOs, national- and EU-level 
interest groups, industry lobbies, health professionals, patient groups, service providers, social 
insurers and many others have all invaded the ‘secret garden’ of health policy (Greer, 2009a: 
1). Meanwhile, different actors within the national and European institutions have also 
emerged, sometimes leading to diverging interests within single institutions. Traditionally, 
Santé, EMPL (DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion) and MARKT (DG Internal 
Market and Services) were the most common Commission Directorates involved in health, 
each having their own agenda. Within the institutions, the agency of individual civil servants 
and officials is also considered by most observers to be of importance, exacerbating issues of 
poor internal communication, infighting, preferential treatment, overly complex bureaucracy 
and defence of (supposedly surrendered) national interests, all of which hamper the 
Commission’s leadership (Greer, 2009a: 12; 26; Lamping, 2005: 20; Randall, 2001: 4; 2002: 
18). Further conflict exists between the different committees of the Parliament, between 
national health ministries and their counterparts in trade, industry and treasury, and between 
local, regional and international levels of government.  
Studies of this complex web of interests and actors emerged alongside the second stem of 
health policy and the increasing use of the internal market to pursue health objectives.  
‘Most single market-related policies, even those relevant to health care, will be initiated 
by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Internal Market and Services, 
debated by the member states’ economic or competition ministers at their Council 
meeting, and in turn examined by the European Parliament’s committees on the internal 
market or industry, before being forwarded for approval.’ (Mossialos et al., 2010: 16) 
The increasing involvement of non-health actors is a core feature of second stem health 
policy. Greer and Vanhercke (2010: 199) gather the relevant stakeholders into three primary 
groups, each of which fight to ‘frame’ health policy at the EU level in their own terms. These 
are the ‘economic’ group, made up of DG MARKT and the internal market jurisprudence of 
the CJEU, the ‘social’ group, comprised of DG EMPL, the national labour and social affairs 
ministries and the SPC, and the ‘health’ group, which includes DG Santé and national health 
ministries. Similarly, Mossialos et al. (2010: 43) label five sets of key players as the ‘public 
health’, ‘social affairs’, ‘internal market’, ‘enterprise’ and ‘economic’ actors. Since the 
inclusion of health in the strengthened economic governance framework, a further group, the 
‘financial’ group, has entered the health arena. This is comprised of actors from DG ECFIN, 
national treasuries and macroeconomic advisory bodies, the EPC and, in some cases, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In addition to holding different goals 
and objectives, these actors influence health policy at its most upstream point, defining the 
financial resources available for use by the ‘traditional’ health policy actors.  
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Processes in EU health policy 
The literature identifies three defining features of the process by which health policy has 
emerged and developed at the European level. Firstly, it is understood that the EU’s role has 
expanded via a process of competence creep. Limited by the weak legal basis for health 
provided in the treaties but aware of the health impact of single market policies, the EU has 
engaged in a ‘treaty-base game’ (Rhodes, 1995). Led by the European Commission, this 
involves stretching the interpretation of explicit health provisions as far as possible whilst 
‘latching on’ to market policies by highlighting the economic element of a health policy 
proposal to justify action under the single market mandate. Implicit in this strategy is the 
CJEU, a policy entrepreneur in its own right, which has supported the creative interpretation 
and gradual expansion of the EU’s mandate in health (Burley and Mattli, 1993). This dynamic 
and its impact upon the evolution of health policy has been described as ‘legally-driven 
neofunctionalism’ and ‘integration via case law’ (Greer, 2006; Steffen et al., 2005: 5).  
Secondly, health is understood to be characterised and shaped by a number of interrelated 
cleavages. At the ideological level, EU health policy is defined by the tension between the 
market and health priorities of the Union. The creation of a common internal market involves 
extensive regulation and each piece of legislation adopted for this purpose has an impact upon 
health. Though the EU is obliged to ensure that its law and policies ensure ‘a high level of 
human health protection’ (Article 168(1) TFEU) the trade-off between economic and social 
imperatives has historically framed the latter as ‘market-enabling’ and ‘market-completing’ 
mechanisms rather than intrinsic goals of the Union in their own right (Lamping, 2005: 21). 
At a practical level, this tension is enshrined in the ‘constitutional asymmetry’ which 
characterises the competences assigned to the EU in the founding treaties (Scharpf, 2002). 
Whilst a powerful mandate in the creation of the internal market allows the EU to exert 
significant influence over national economic policy, the weak treaty base ascribed to social 
protection and equality has meant that integration of the ‘economic Union’ has moved at a far 
greater pace than that of the ‘social Union’. In health, this constitutional imbalance is mirrored 
in the division of national responsibility for health service delivery and organisation and the 
broad EU role in health systems’ interaction with people, goods and services (Mossialos and 
McKee, 2002: 27). This is also reflected at the level of policy integration, where health is 
defined by a final cleavage between public health – the management of collective health risks 
– and healthcare – the treatment of individual illness (Steffen et al., 2005: 5). The public 
health articles of the founding treaties have facilitated an ongoing process of policy-making, 
establishing a genuine EU policy portfolio. Meanwhile, in the field of healthcare, 
confrontation between national competence and European law has resulted in a gradual 
encroachment and patchwork of EU policy and influence.  
Finally, health is characterised by the different modes of governance employed to reach its 
various policy goals. In light of the challenges identified above, health is an area where the 
EU has had to be particularly creative when designing its governance structure; this has 
resulted in a diverse range of processes and institutions (Geyer and Lightfoot, 2010; Greer and 
Vanhercke, 2010; Greer, 2011; Hervey, 2008). Technical agencies such as the European 
Centre for Disease prevention and Control (ECDC), the EFSA and the EMA offer 
independent expertise, whilst bodies such as the senior level working party on public health 
(SLWPPH) and the expert group on effective ways of investing in health provide central 
leadership and advice. Hard legislation, constructed and adopted via the traditional 
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‘community method’ of Commission initiative, provides concrete parameters for EU and 
member state action whilst the various platforms and forums of the OMC bring together a 
plethora of interest groups and stakeholders to ‘flesh out’ the legislative framework with non-
binding policy commitments. The contrast between hard and soft law results in further 
variation in the flexibility of implementation, with CJEU enforcement playing an important 
role in binding policy fields and peer review, benchmarking and ‘naming and shaming’ 
influencing implementation where national action is voluntary.  
These commonly identified and understood characteristics have resulted in a narrative of EU 
health policy which emphasises contradiction and imbalance. Where the legal mandate is 
strong, hard law and central control have dominated the governance structure; where it is 
weak, soft law and flexible governance have come to the fore. With the strengthening of the 
economic governance framework and the inclusion of health in macroeconomic policy-
making, these narratives have been challenged – the line between hard and soft law has been 
further blurred and the distinction between technical and political health issues is addressed 
differently. Both the actors and the processes have changed, shifting the focus and direction of 
contemporary health policy.  
The EU health policy bell-curve 
Triangulating the description gathered from the literature with accounts from interviewees, the 
narrative of health policy can be expressed as a bell-curve. From small beginnings, 
momentum began to build through the 1990s and early 2000s, drawing on the internal market 
mandate, support from the Court and various crisis opportunities to gradually amass a body of 
law and policy which increasingly impacts upon national health systems. The peak of this 
integrative momentum is understood to have been reached with the adoption of the Cross 
Border Healthcare Directive in 2010 – though the body of the Directive addresses a relatively 
small and distinct set of circumstances, its impact was significantly amplified by the 
Commission’s capacity to include supplementary provisions. The final text provides for new 
EU activity in eHealth, HTA and the establishment of reference networks for coordinating 
expertise in specific disease areas, as well as the strict application of free movement principles 
in healthcare service delivery. This degree of expansionism in the Directive is largely 
unprecedented, marking the ‘high water’ point of EU health policy influence and integration.  
Essentially, the rest of the thesis explores the evolution and potential projection of this bell-
curve. How did its rise, peak and fall come about? What impact has the emergence of the third 
stem had on the direction, strength, relevance and content of EU health policy? The legal and 
political potency of macroeconomic governance could lend much-needed weight to health 
policy initiatives but, if not designed with this in mind, might otherwise undermine health 
policy efforts and exacerbate the constitutional asymmetry. The potential for a ‘second peak’ 
and a re-drawing of the bell-curve certainly exists; the thesis’ conclusion draws on the theory, 








The previous five chapters have laid out the research problem, its context within the broader 
EU and health policy debates and the tools available for addressing the questions it raises. 
They have identified the prevailing narrative of EU health policy, characterised by gradual 
expansion and creative ‘muddling through’ in the face of fundamental disjuncture, and the 
challenge posed to this narrative by the recent evolutions in the EU’s economic governance 
framework. Part I has thus clarified the aim of thesis – to explore the changing governance of 
health in the EU with a view to understanding the potential governance models which might 
come to dominate in the post-crisis era.  
Using the hypotheses and typology identified for this purpose in chapter three, the next 
section of the thesis tests the research questions by mapping the governance modes at various 
points and in specific instances of EU health policy development. Six case studies, covering 
EU policy in blood, tissues and organs, cancer prevention, medicines information to patients, 
tobacco control, patient mobility and health in macroeconomic governance, are presented. As 
noted in the methodology, each of the case studies exhibits a particularly unique or illustrative 
feature of EU health policy and, collectively, they provide examples spanning the lifetime of 
health as an EU policy issue. The specific cross-cutting features of interest – the role of 
regulatory policy and crisis, the use of soft law, the impact of the internal market, the use of 
comitology and ‘innovative’ governance models, and the role of the Court – are highlighted 
and further explored as horizontal themes of each case study. Each chapter ends with a table, 
used to inform the analysis, summarising the key health policy dynamics seen in the particular 
case study.  
The final case study, which looks at the inclusion of health in the economic governance 
framework, is longer than the others to give space for a comprehensive review of this latest 
chapter of health policy. It charts the onset of the financial crisis, the resulting strengthening 
of the economic governance framework and the inclusion of health within its new structures. 
Part III brings together the findings from these case studies and considers the research 
questions posed in the introduction. 
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REGULATORY POLICY AND CRISIS POLITICS 
The case of blood, tissue and organ policy 
Policy in blood, tissues and organs (BTO) intended for transfusion or transplant in humans is 
a small but central strand of the EU’s public health policy. It is not the oldest area of EU 
activity, nor is it commonly lauded as a ground-breaking or innovative instance of EU policy-
making. Yet from initial action to ensure the quality and safety of Europe’s blood supply in 
the late 1990s, legislation has been introduced across other materials of human origin, 
accompanied by technical directives and action plans which together provide a comprehensive 
regulatory framework. It is a case which embodies a particular set of health policy 
characteristics – prompted by crisis and constructed primarily of hard law instruments via the 
community method of policy-making, it has developed along broadly neofunctional lines but 
without a role for the Court, the creation of extensive EU bodies or significant influence from 
market forces. As such, it provides an example of decision-making and governance in an area 
of almost ‘pure’ public health policy, where clear EU-added value and the separation of 
sensitive from technical issues has allowed the development of framework regulation and hard 
law.  
What is meant by blood, tissue and organ policy? 
As the title suggests, blood, tissue and organ policy is made up of three strands of legislation 
and activity concerning blood and blood components for transfusion, human tissues and cells 
and human organs for transplantation. In each case, EU policy targets safety and quality, 
focusing on prevention of disease transmission, via a range of regulatory procedures for donor 
selection, collection, testing, storage, distribution, production of relevant medical device 
components and processing of the particular material. Within the context of the EU’s public 
health activity, BTO policy is included under the ‘health security’ strand, along with 
preparedness and response to serious health threats and policy to combat the threat to health 
from climate change. This positioning reflects its emphasis on risk management and health 
protection.  
The historical evolution of EU policy on blood, tissues and 
organs 
The evolution of BTO policy is quite linear. Following the adoption of a directive on blood 
and blood components in 2003 a similar directive was adopted for human tissues and cells in 
2004 and, after a brief pause, for human organs for transplantation in 2010. The legislative 
paths of these framework directives were very similar, constructed using the community 
method of policy-making and later supplemented with a number of technical and 
implementing directives. They can also all be attributed to the same catalyst – the blood 
contamination crises which affected countries around the world during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. These resulted in widespread distrust of national safeguards and procedures and, 
in Europe, prompted the creation of a supranational regulatory framework. The impact of 
these crises as well as the evolution of the policy which followed them is examined below.  
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Blood contamination crises and public trust 
In the early 1980s it became apparent that HIV, at this time a little-understood virus which 
over time results in a collection of symptoms known as AIDS, was being transmitted via 
blood products. Recent medical advancements had allowed for the production of a clotting 
agent, Factor VIII, for use in the treatment of haemophilia. In the prevailing manufacturing 
process, blood components from many donors were pooled and used to make Factor VIII 
concentrate, injected by haemophiliacs to aid the clotting of their own blood. At this time, 
however, there was no test for HIV and thus no way to determine whether an individual donor 
was carrying the infection. Contamination crises soon emerged in several countries, mostly 
affecting haemophiliacs and those in receipt of regular blood transfusions.  
The market for blood products during this period was severely unbalanced. Demand in Europe 
outstripped supply and as a result European governments became the biggest customers of 
commercial ‘fractionators’ – manufacturers of blood products – which sourced products 
primarily from paid American donors (Farrell, 2005: 138). A wealth of research has 
subsequently been conducted to show that the quality and safety of blood collected 
commercially is significantly lower than that of blood collected from voluntary, unpaid 
donations and linking the use of commercial blood supplies to an exacerbation of the 
contamination crises (Farrell, 2012; Healy, 2000; Hunt and Wallace, 2005; Keown, 1997). It 
is this debate which has been at the centre of the development of the regulatory framework at 
EU level.  
The French case was particularly destructive in terms of public trust in the healthcare system; 
haemophiliacs and transfusion recipients continued to receive contaminated blood for two 
years after officials first gained knowledge of the risks and by the early 1990s, half of all 
French haemophiliacs were infected with HIV (Bergeron and Nathanson, 2012: 9).. The 
hierarchical structure of its public administration, the strength of its executive and the faith put 
in those responsible for protecting the public’s health was such that the scandal shook the 
foundations of the French health system as a whole and prompted the authorities to review the 
way in which it approached public health (Steffen, 1999: 96). One account of the period 
concludes: 
‘Whatever may have been the long-term effect on the public at large, the impact on 
France’s political class was, indeed, of earthquake proportions: innumerable 
administrative and parliamentary reports testified to the government’s loss of credibility 
and the public’s loss of trust, and demanded immediate action to “cure” what was 
diagnosed as a broken public health system. Although the broken-system critique initially 
focused on the blood system, it rapidly spread to encompass the entire organization of 
public health in France.’ (Bergeron and Nathanson, 2012: 10) 
By the late 1980s, contamination crises had been uncovered in Canada, China, France, Iran, 
Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan and Portugal. Across Europe, trust in the blood supply and 
confidence in its public regulation was virtually destroyed (Bennett et al., 2011: 269). Seeking 
to shift this burden and regain some credibility and legitimacy in this most sensitive of public 
health issues, member states chose to delegate governance to the supranational level (Farrell, 
2005: 135).  
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EU policy in blood and blood components for transfusion 
EU policy relating to the blood supply was borne out of the coinciding of the contamination 
crises and the revived implementation of the single market (Farrell, 2005: 134). The EU 
adopted a Council Directive on plasma products in 1989 and this was subsequently 
incorporated into an updated and expanded EU-wide regulatory system for pharmaceuticals. 
In the early 1990s the differences between national standards of quality, inspection and 
accreditation, as well as procedures for collection, storage and distribution of blood products, 
were considerable, making exchange of products and fulfilment of the Community’s goal of 
self-sufficiency difficult (Farrell, 2005). Furthermore, the increasingly global nature of the 
blood market, in which products were coming from all over the world and risks were inherent 
at all stages of the supply chain, meant that a common system of regulation seemed to present 
the safest approach (Adamides and Maniatis, 2001). With the emergence of the blood 
contamination scandals, the European Parliament and the CoEU passed a series of resolutions 
calling on the EU to take action and when the Amsterdam Treaty came into force in 1999 it 
provided a specific competence in the quality and safety of blood products (Article 152(4)(a)).  
Utilising its new mandate, the Commission published a proposal for a directive setting 
standards of quality and safety for the collection, testing, processing, storage and distribution 
of human blood and blood components (European Commission, 2000). Negotiations on the 
proposed ‘Blood Directive’ took over two years to resolve and focused on the preferred 
procedure for sourcing blood products – paid donation or voluntary, unpaid donation (Farrell, 
2012: 464). In the end, the Recital acknowledged the higher levels of safety achieved with 
voluntary, unpaid donations but the substance of the text required only that member states 
encourage this method of collection (Farrell, 2012: 465). The Directive was adopted in 2003 
and establishes a regulatory framework for each step of the transfusion chain (Hunt and 
Wallace, 2005: 428). A series of Commission directives and implementing directives has 
since been issued, revising and supplementing various technical provisions and updating these 
in response to new health threats, such as the Influenza A (H1N1) pandemic.  
EU policy in human tissues, cells and organs for transplantation 
Remarkably similar ‘legislative stories’ can be told in EU policy relating to human tissues and 
cells, and human organs for transplantation. In the case of tissues a Commission 
communication, proposing a directive, was published in 2002 (European Commission, 2002). 
Following amendment by the legislature and the agreement of a common position in 2003 – 
wherein subsidiary was again invoked to quell ethical concerns (Kent et al., 2006: 50) – the 
Directive setting standards for quality and safety in human tissues and cells was adopted in 
2004. Since then, a number of Commission directives and decisions have been issued on 
technical aspects of the policy, such as traceability requirements, adverse reaction reporting 
and coding of tissues and cells. In the case of organs, a slightly different approach was taken. 
The catalyst communication from the Commission was accompanied by a series of ‘policy 
actions at EU level’ and, following conclusions and a resolution from the legislature, the 
proposal for a directive was published alongside an Action Plan on organ donation and 
transplantation (European Commission, 2007b; Council of the EU, 2007; European 
Parliament, 2008b; European Commission, 2008a). This meant that, as well as the usual 
implementing directives, the adoption of the 2010 Directive on quality and safety standards 
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for organs has been followed by council conclusions and a mid-term review of the Action 
Plan’s performance (Council of the EU, 2012; European Commission, 2014a).  
The integration and Europeanisation of blood, tissue and organ 
policy 
The sectoral integration of policy on standard-setting for the quality and safety of BTO 
products is clearly seen in the adoption of the three binding directives. In line with the 
neofunctional pattern, the contamination crises served as a catalyst for EU action and, in 
demonstrating the added value of collectively regulating quality and safety issues, prompted 
spillover into the realms of tissues, cells and organs. As with most policy areas, a level of 
intergovernmental influence can also be seen. There was a clear choice and political benefit to 
member states in delegating responsibility to the European level – with confidence in public 
health systems severely damaged and ongoing dispute about political liability for patient 
safety, member states engaged in a process of ‘burden-shifting’, moving responsibility for a 
sensitive issue to the EU level so as to repair national-level credibility and legitimacy (Farrell, 
2005: 135).  
With this shift came the establishment and growth of a body of European-level interest groups 
and epistemic communities. Groups such as the Thalassaemia International Federation and the 
European Haemophilia Consortium emerged to bring European and international patient 
organisations together whilst others, such as the European Haemovigilance Network, were 
established to assist in the implementation of the Blood Directive (Busby et al., 2014: 84). 
Since 2003, the EU has funded more than 50 projects in the area of transplantation and 
transfusion and the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), 
originally set up in 1991 to advise on bioethics policy in light of discord over the 
commercialisation of BTO products, remains one of the central advice committees used by the 
European institutions (European Commission, 2013: 4; Mohr et al., 2012).  
In terms of Europeanisation dynamics, the Directives clearly constrain national policy options 
in some areas but the ethical debates raised by BTO regulation did not result in the 
establishment of a European norm. Instead, they were addressed by recourse to subsidiarity 
and minimum standards. This raises the potential for an unintended Europeanisation effect in 
that, whilst minimum regulatory standards do not render higher standards unlawful, they may 
lend justification to the less desirable approach.  
‘…the acceptance of these measures and their promulgation in EU-level legal norms may 
have a destabilizing effect on principles or values in particular Member States…although 
the Blood Safety Directive mandates unpaid blood donations ‘as far as possible’, it 
implies that payment for blood donations may be lawful within the EU, a principle that is 
fundamentally at odds with health care law in Member States such as France’ (Hervey, 
2007: 2).  
In the creation of minimum standards, a process of uploading can be seen, whilst systems 
which lag behind commonly engage in downloading of such norms and adjust their structures 
to accommodate this. Furthermore, higher processes of Europeanisation might be seen in the 
similarity of the legislative cycle which each successive directive went through – following 
the precedent set by the Blood Directive, almost identical legislative steps were taken and 
outcomes reached in tissues and organs policy.  
Chapter 6 | Case study 1 
57 
BTO policy has seen a significant degree of integration and the European level is now 
recognised and accepted as both the de facto and the de jure locus of activity concerning the 
quality and safety of BTO products. Threats raised by the H1N1 pandemic and the West Nile 
Virus were both dealt with, at least in part, within the BTO policy framework. Similarly, the 
expertise harboured at the ECDC was enlisted during blood safety-related outbreaks in Italy, 
where chikungunya broke out in 2007, and in the Netherlands during its outbreak of Q Fever 
in the late 2000s (Bennett et al., 2011: 269). Europeanisation can be seen in the wake of 
integration, as member states adapt to this transfer of responsibility and adjust their 
organisational logics according to the binding directives issued by the EU legislature.  
The governance of blood, tissue and organ policy 
The EU uses a relatively small range of policy instruments in its governance of BTO policy. 
The backbone of the regulatory framework is formed by the three Directives and these are 
supplemented and made operational by a number of technical directives and decisions from 
the Commission. The Directives were often preceded by soft law instruments, such as Council 
conclusions or European Parliament Resolutions. More recently, in the expansion into organ 
policy, a non-binding Action Plan forms part of the governance framework. The instruments 
used are thus mainly hard law, with support and supplementary content offered in softer tools. 
This choice of instruments reflects the acknowledged EU-added value of centralised 
regulation and the political will behind the creation of EU policy in this area, prompted by the 
contamination crises. Meanwhile, the conclusions and resolutions of the legislature can be 
understood as statements of preferred direction, made in advance of the Commission’s 
proposals to guide their content. The stability of these factors across the three issue areas has 
resulted in logical expansion from blood into tissue and organ policy, and facilitated policy 
development along similar lines.  
Using the typology by Trieb et al. (2005), the dominant mode of governance employed in 
BTO policy can thus be characterised as framework regulation. Though the adoption of 
binding law indicates a ceding of national responsibility, the use of directives rather than 
regulations puts a limit on the influence of the EU, leaving it up to member states to decide 
the method of implementation. Some rigidity is introduced via the adoption of technical 
directives, which provide more detailed guidance on the implementation of certain provisions 
but, as a whole, BTO policy allows for considerable national flexibility.  
The latitude granted is particularly wide for ethical issues, where divergences in cultural 
approach have presented an insurmountable roadblock to integration, weathered only by 
recourse to subsidiarity. Moreover, the introduction of the ‘softer’ Action Plan to support the 
Organ Directive indicates a possible shift in the balance between hard and soft law. It suggests 
that the parameters of the EU’s mandate may have been reached and that coordination in areas 
outside of quality and safety standards – such as sources of supply, organ trafficking and 
broader public awareness – will have to be dealt with using non-binding legal instruments. 
The Action Plan itself has elements of both voluntarism, in its creation of space for discussion 
and sharing of policy experience, and targeting, in its identification of specific priority actions. 
Its mid-term review, an opportunity to encourage more rigid implementation, did not single 
out poorly performing countries or benchmark member states against each other, suggesting 
that governance of those issues going beyond quality and safety will remain flexible.  
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The clearly observed division between the political and the technical elements of BTO policy 
and the institutionalisation of this division into the policy framework is one of its unique 
features. The commercial management of BTO products is exceptionally sensitive, pertaining 
to cultural, social, religious and ethical norms, and the divergence in accepted practices across 
member states is significant (Busby et al., 2014: 85). As such, it presents a political challenge 
for EU policy-makers and the frame in which the issue is presented is crucial to determining 
the parameters of the resulting policy (Farrell, 2012: 468). In her discussion of the Blood 
Directive, Farrell (2012: 473) concludes that the strategy used and resulting outcome 
‘…call[s] into question the general assertions made by the Commission to date about the 
neutral and technocratic way in which regulation can be used to manage the relationship 
between risk and innovation’. The approach taken by EU policy-makers was to separate the 
technical from the political as far as possible; once the debates had been played out and the 
Directive adopted, the sourcing of blood products was essentially reclassified as a technical 
issue, enabling further standard-setting within the relevant institutional structures, ‘…far 
removed from the politics of the Blood Directive’ (Hunt and Wallace, 2005: 435). This 
practice is common throughout health and wider EU policy-making and involves ‘salami-
slicing’ issues into their technical and political components so as to separate sensitive 
elements from the body of technical, de-politicised policy (EU Public Affairs Consultant A; 
European Commission, Health Directorate C). In the BTO case the areas where political 
agreement could not be reached, such as the requirement for voluntary, unpaid donation, have 
been identified and addressed via the subsidiarity principle or, latterly, by use of soft law 
instruments. The tools used in these more sensitive areas mirror those seen in cancer policy, 
employing common objectives, agreed indicators, regular benchmarking and identification of 
best practice, whilst the technical facets of the policy continue to be governed by framework 
regulation (Canoy et al., 2010: 394). In the case of tissues and cells, Hoeyer (2010) describes 
the Directive as ‘highly technical’ and devised without political debate despite its significant 
implications for patients and health systems. He identifies a strategy on the part of the EU 
institutions, surmising that ‘When regulatory efforts relating to public health and safety are 
presented as technical matters they rarely cause political or public controversy’ (Hoeyer, 
2010: 1873).  
A technical framing of BTO issues is also evident in the significant degree of autonomy 
granted to the Commission via the adoption of technical directives. The tasks assigned to the 
executive align with Rosamond’s depiction of ‘low politics’, since they pertain to ‘matters of 
the satisfaction of welfare and material needs’ and are delegated for functional, rational 
reasons (2000: 57; European Commission, Health Directorate A). This element of the policy 
is also highly technocratic, relying on bodies of experts, such as the EGE, and is necessary for 
the proper functioning of a governing institution such as the EU (EU Public Affairs 
Consultant A). As such, it is a relatively typical case of regulatory policy – this also reflects 
the understanding of BTO policy as an example of the type of health issue which is now 
grouped under the EU’s public health policy, in stem one, but was in fact originally rooted in 
the internal market and the need for common safety requirements (European Commission, 
Health Directorate A; E).  
A final element which has shaped governance in BTO policy is crisis politics. BTO policy is 
an area founded almost solely on the politics of crisis response – the explicit legal mandate 
provided in the Amsterdam Treaty was created as a direct result of the contamination crises 
and perceived threats to the security and legitimacy of national regulation. It is an example of 
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a policy issue in which consensus around the nature of the problem and the need for an EU 
response was gained, and the urgency of this response was agreed, thus fulfilling the central 
conditions for the adoption of hard law (European Commission, Health Directorate A). Such 
political will and legal competence enabled the EU to govern with binding instruments, to 
delegate significant autonomy to the Commission and to frame the issue as an instance of 
technical, regulatory policy-making.  
Horizontal themes in EU health policy: Regulatory policy and 
crisis politics 
The BTO case highlights two important dynamics which shape EU health policy – regulatory 
policy-making and crisis politics
2
. The EU is fundamentally a regulatory state, since it lacks 
the competence and financial resources necessary to exercise the distributive and 
redistributive functions of a nation state and so relies on governance-by-regulation (Majone, 
1996; Radaelli, 1999). Its exclusive powers over the functioning of the internal market, 
supported by expansive interpretation by the CJEU and the doctrine of legal supremacy, have 
facilitated rapid regulatory growth (Thatcher, 2006: 312). The same dynamics mean that the 
majority of EU activity in health is regulatory; it does not act as a service provider but 
regulates the activity of other health actors (Lamping and Steffen, 2005a: 189).  
Regulation is broadly defined as state control over activity valued by the community and can 
be pursued via formal legislative rules as well as informal norms and ‘soft’ regulatory 
influence (Thatcher, 2006: 312). EU action was initially of a deregulatory nature, involving 
the removal of first tariff and then non-tariff barriers to trade, understood as negative 
integration (Hix and Høyland, 2011: 192). Deregulatory policy has the advantage of 
relocating the process of integration from the political arena to the technical/judicial one, 
focusing on product standards in pharmaceuticals, medical devices, BTO products, tobacco 
products, food produce and many other areas (Hervey and McHale, 2004: 45). Though it has 
been used with great success to extend EU activity in health, it also has the potential to make 
national laws protecting health unlawful, such as those banning certain additives in food 
stuffs, or imposing a minimum unit price on alcohol (Permanand and Mossialos, 2005: 55; 
Hervey and McHale, 2004: 46). As the single market project accelerated, EU activity became 
more re-regulatory, creating minimum standards and common competition rules in a process 
of positive integration. One of the earliest examples of positive integration in health is the 
pharmaceutical case – the manufacturing, marketing and sale of pharmaceuticals was 
progressively harmonised, culminating in the Commission’s nine-volume publication ‘The 
rules governing medicinal products within the European Union’ (Hervey and McHale, 2004: 
49). In health, however, process regulation is less common; health actors and policy-makers 
‘…know and understand the value of an EU-centred product standard for a pharmaceutical 
drug, for instance, because it stops patients dying…but they don’t attach the same value to 
coordination in services or systems organisation’ (UK health association, EU Liaison B).  
Regulatory policy-making has a number of specific characteristics which shape the kind of 
health policy it produces. Firstly, the regulatory discretion given to the European Commission 
has enabled it to act as a policy entrepreneur, driving forward the expansion of the EU 
regulatory state (Majone, 1996). The activism of the Commission, as well as interest groups 
and the Court, is crucial in the neofunctional model of regulatory growth whereas, by contrast, 
                                                          
2
 This section is used as the basis for Brooks (2015).  
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the intergovernmental model emphasises member states’ decision to delegate and their 
acceptance of EU regulation in areas of environmental, competition and social policy 
(Thatcher, 2006: 315-316; Rhodes, 1995). Both drivers can be seen in health policy, with 
member states choosing to delegate power in the wake of crises such as the blood 
contamination scandal and the Commission pushing forward regulation of pharmaceuticals 
and medical devices.  
Another important feature of regulatory policy is its requirement of expertise. Regulatory 
policy requires little budget but must be founded on a thorough knowledge of the market and 
subjects to be regulated (Radaelli, 1999: 6). This is made even more important by the speed at 
which technology and policy options advance (Majone, 1993: 165). The expansion of the ‘EU 
regulatory state’ has thus been accompanied by a proliferation of agencies and bodies which 
advise policy-makers on the technical aspects of policy. In health, the EMA, the ECDC, the 
EFSA, the SLWPPH and various other bodies play a central role in informing and 
implementing policy, particularly in ‘risk-related sectors’ such as medicines, food safety and 
disease prevention (Kim, 2014: 2; Versluis et al., 2011). Such policy thus elevates the role of 
epistemic communities and technocratic governance (Richardson, 2006: 6).  
Contemporary EU studies is generally agreed that regulatory policy was the motor behind 
early integration but that its relevance is now declining (Young, 2015: 132; Wallace and Reh, 
2015: 104). This trend is attributed to the rise of Euroscepticism and resistance to further 
integration, the weakening position of the Commission and the increasing use of alternative 
policy types, such as redistribution through the European Social Fund (ESF) and voluntary 
coordination through the OMC (Falkner, 2010: 284; Richardson, 2006: 7). As the integration 
of product standards reaches its limit, the EU has turned to less hierarchical and more 
decentralised modes of governance to tackle process, services and utilities standards (Wallace 
and Reh, 2015: 104). However, one circumstance where regulatory policy continues to be the 
default response is that created by a crisis. In health, crisis situations have periodically 
destabilised the status quo and altered the shape or direction of the policy area. The 
thalidomide tragedy in the 1960s led to the creation of a common regulatory framework for 
pharmaceuticals and the establishment of the EMA, the HIV/AIDS contamination scandal in 
the 1980s prompted the introduction of new health powers in the Amsterdam Treaty, the BSE 
crisis in the early 1990s resulted in the creation of the EFSA, the 2003 SARS (Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome) pandemic led to the establishment of the ECDC and, most recently, 
the 2010 PIP breast implant scandal has triggered a revision of the regulatory framework for 
medical devices. Crisis politics are thus considered by most to be an important driver of the 
evolution of EU health policy competences (Hervey and McHale, 2004: 78; Lamping, 2005: 
23; McKee et al., 2004b: 12; Randall, 2002: 9).  
The eruption of a crisis opens a window of political opportunity (Nohrstedt, 2008). It 
increases the political will behind the search for a solution and makes it easier to achieve 
consensus on a common response, whilst the element of urgency reduces the time made 
available for debate and obstruction (Boin et al., 2009). In health these factors are amplified 
by the presence of fear – this is easily generated around issues such as communicable disease 
and has historically proven a powerful tool for shifting both public opinion and political 
commitment (World Health Organization A; UK health association, EU Liaison B). As a 
result the introduction of hard law, the creation of new EU competences and the transfer of 
autonomy are made far easier when undertaken as instances of crisis response. Political 
commitment to health is not solely witnessed during times of crisis – commitment to 
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addressing key health concerns has been critical in the creation of EU policy on cancer and 
patient safety, for example, via the Presidency of the Council – but it is a less reliable driver 
when crisis politics are not in play (Greer et al., 2014: 35). This power is reflected in the 
degree of integration and competence transfer experienced in areas such as HIV/AIDS and 
BSE, as compared to tobacco, alcohol and nutrition policy. Smoking-related disease, alcohol 
abuse and obesity pose three of the greatest threats to health and health systems but have 
achieved only marginal centralised policy response when compared to communicable disease 
control and food safety regulation (Lamping and Steffen, 2005a: 189). This issue exists, 
according to Leibfried (2010: 279), because the social policy-making capacities of the EU 
have not been strengthened nearly as much as the capacities of member states have declined; 
such a stalemate is likely only to be broken through further crisis.  
The economic crisis which has enveloped the EU in recent years presents a different kind of 
opportunity – it is not a traditional crisis of public safety and is thus unlikely to prompt a 
revival of regulatory policy, except perhaps in the governance of financial markets (Wallace 
and Reh, 2015: 104). However, it has manifested in a social and health crisis which has 
prompted calls for greater social and health policy action at European level. It remains to be 
seen whether policy-makers will respond by recourse to market measures or work to 
strengthen social policy and integration.  
Figure 6: Summary of health policy dynamics, case study one 
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GOVERNING WITH SOFT LAW 
The case of cancer prevention policy 
Cancer is one of the oldest areas of EU activity in health. As a case study, it is of particular 
interest on account of its non-binding nature – it has developed almost entirely, discounting 
legislative action in tobacco control, via soft law mechanisms and is commonly regarded as 
one the EU’s health policy success stories. An area of clear EU added-value, it received early 
political support without extensive lobbying or interest group contention, with leading roles 
being played by individual Council Presidencies and MEPs, as well as technocratic actors 
from the national and the EU level. Even more so than the BTO policy case, it is characterised 
as a public health policy, in that it has relatively little connection to the internal market and 
enjoys a stable legal basis in the public health articles of the founding treaties. It is thus 
characterised by governance via voluntarism and targeting, enjoying sufficient political will 
and perceived EU-added value to facilitate a soft law approach.  
What is meant by EU cancer prevention policy? 
Following from this description, a distinction should be made between the public health stem 
of cancer policy and the internal market stem of tobacco control policy. The latter has formed 
a central strand of the former from the outset but can be understood as a separate policy in that 
it inhabits a different kind of policy space – highly political and subject to the critical cleavage 
between public health and internal market objectives, tobacco control policy concerns the 
composition, presentation and sale of tobacco products and is dealt with as a case study in its 
own right in chapter nine. This chapter, by contrast, explores the development of the ‘health 
promotion’ element of cancer policy, covering the creation of the EAC programme and its 
successors and focusing on EU activity in cancer prevention, screening and early diagnosis, 
research and data collection, treatment and healthcare professional training.  
The historical evolution of cancer prevention policy in the EU 
EU activity in cancer policy can be grouped into three periods: the rise of cancer up the EU 
agenda during the 1987-2002 EAC programme, the absorption and relative weakening of 
cancer policy under the PHAPs between 2002 and 2007, and the revival of cancer policy, as 
prompted by the Council and the Parliament and embodied in the 2009-2013 European 
Partnership for Action Against Cancer (EPAAC).  
The Europe Against Cancer programme 
At the Milan Summit in June 1985 European Heads of State discussed a report titled ‘A 
People’s Europe’ which contained a series of measures to better involve citizens in the 
development of the (then) European Communities. In highlighting one initiative of particular 
value, the Council pledged its support for the launch of a European action programme against 
cancer (European Council, 1985: 7). Following the recommendation of the Milan Council, the 
advice of influential cancer experts, and by way of response to the explosion at the Chernobyl 
power station, the Council established the EAC programme in 1986 and designated 1989 as 
the European Cancer Information Year (Gilmore and McKee, 2004: 224; Trubek et al., 2008: 
814). The first phase of the EAC ran from 1987 to 1989 and covered prevention, early 
screening and treatment of cancer, as embodied in the first edition of the European Code 
Against Cancer (ECAC) (IARC, 2015). It convened a series of advisory committees on 
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medical, nursing and dental training, which adopted recommendations on how cancer should 
be taught to the various healthcare professions, and established the European Cancer Registry 
(Eurocare) project, still running today, which collates data from registries across Europe to 
provide information on survival rates, prevalence and patterns of care (European Commission, 
1989). The EAC thus played a crucial role in raising the profile of health policy at a time 
when support for the EU project was wavering (World Health Organization A; European 
Commission, Health Directorate D).  
Its second phase saw cancer policy become an ongoing part of EU activity in health and be 
institutionalised within the relevant administrative and legislative structures (Council Decision 
90/238/EEC; Hervey and McHale, 2004: 369). The structure and content of the programme 
were left largely unchanged, but greater emphasis was put upon the tobacco control element 
of cancer prevention, with initiatives to target particular vulnerable groups, such as young 
women (Hervey and McHale, 2004: 370). By 1992, changes were afoot – the cancer unit was 
moved within the Commission’s public health unit in DG Social Affairs (now DG EMPL), 
constraining its relative independence and prompting several of its senior staff to leave 
(Trubek et al., 2008: 815). With the public health mandate in the Maastricht Treaty the third 
phase of the EAC was restructured, with four strands focussing on data collection and 
research, information and health education, early detection and screening, and training and 
quality control (Decision 646/96/EC). However, this was the last EAC-specific funding to be 
provided – from 2002 the EU’s cancer policy was subsumed into the PHAPs, the first running 
from 2003 to 2008.  
Cancer policy under the Health Programmes 
With the establishment of the EU’s public health mandate and the launch of the new PHAPs, 
cancer became ‘only one part of a much larger set of activities’ and a sub-set of the 
politically-directed nascent EU health policy, thus suffering from deficient long-term planning 
and commitment (Gilmore and McKee, 2004: 227; Sullivan, 2007: 2). There were fewer 
specific priorities, targets and assessments, existing projects were renamed and valuable 
connections with external partners were cut (European Commission, Health Directorate D). 
Having previously enjoyed relative independence and direct access to Heads of State, the 
EAC lost its earmarked funding and financial support was withdrawn from a number of other 
cancer programme and projects, including the European Network of Cancer Registries 
(ENCR) – responding to these drastic cuts, the European Cancer Patient Coalition (ECPC) 
was formed in 2003 (Trubek et al., 2008: 826; 833). In justifying its decisions the 
Commission stated that it wanted to extend the successful model used in cancer policy to 
other areas, requiring the diversion funding, and noted that in light of the many years of 
dedicated funding cancer policy had received, it should now be able to continue with support 
from the member states (Trubek et al., 2008: 827). However, national governments rejected 
this idea and, as described in the next section, were instrumental in reviving cancer policy as a 
European initiative. 
The period from 2002 to 2007 was not entirely without progress or achievement in the fight 
against cancer. In 2003 the Council published its first recommendation on cancer screening – 
these recommendations have been continuously revised and supplemented and, though some 
disparities in implementation remain, EU-level guidelines now exist for the screening of 
breast, cervical and colorectal cancer and have been endorsed by the WHO (Anttila et al., 
2009; Arbyn et al., 2010; Perry et al., 2008). Furthermore, 2005 saw the launch of the 
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EUROCAN+ Plus project, with the goal of exploring how best to coordinate cancer research 
in Europe, and the Eurocadet project, which examined the impact of various prevention 
policies on cancer incidence across the EU. However, activity lacked coherent central 
leadership and as a result struggled to access funding and resources as successfully as it had in 
the past (Sullivan, 2007: 3).  
The revival of cancer policy and the EPAAC 
The revival of cancer as a core area of EU activity was prompted by a confluence of events. 
The new public health mandate, the growing importance and scope of EU health policy in 
general, the accession of new member states whose health systems were substantially weaker 
than those of the EU15
3
, the launch of a dedicated group on cancer issues within the European 
Parliament, the rise of patient organisations such as the ECPC and the efforts of individual 
Presidencies of the Council all played a significant role (Trubek et al., 2008: 828). From the 
mid-2000s the Parliament, latterly led by a group of 44 MEPs under the banner ‘MEPs 
Against Cancer’ (MAC), pushed cancer policy up the agenda, passing resolutions on breast 
cancer and ‘combatting cancer in an enlarged EU’ (Andrejevs et al., 2009: 21; European 
Parliament 2003; 2006; 2008a). Furthermore, between January 2007 and June 2008, the 
German, Portuguese and Slovenian Presidencies of the Council collaborated on a health 
policy programme emphasising cancer control. At a high level roundtable in Lisbon, a set of 
recommendations to inform EU cancer policy was developed and in 2008, the Slovenian 
Presidency made cancer a main priority and established a new umbrella for action at the EU 
level, known as FACT (Fighting Against Cancer Today) (Gouveia et al., 2008: 1461). An 
international collaboration co-funded by the Commission and the Slovenian government, the 
platform was credited with accelerating and improving Slovenia’s own, as well as a number of 
other, national cancer plans and is considered one of the most successful projects run by the 
Commission (Alexe et al., 2008; European Commission, 2012c).  
Finally, the work done under FACT led to the establishment of the EPAAC, which ran from 
2009 to 2013 and bore many similarities to the original EAC programmes, setting a short-term 
objective for all member states to have national cancer plans by the end of the Partnership and 
a long-term goal of reducing cancer incidence by 15 per cent by 2020. It harnessed the 
provisions of the Cross Border Healthcare Directive relating to reference networks and 
collaboration, and its final report concluded, similarly to evaluations of the EAC programme, 
that whilst it had not fully achieved its goal it had made a valuable and significant 
contribution to furthering member state strategies in the fight against cancer (Ringborg et al., 
2008; Boyle et al., 2003: 1322; European Commission, 2014b). In 2014, the EPAAC was 
replaced by a three year Joint Action on Cancer Control (CANCON), aimed at developing 
guidelines on quality improvement in cancer care, and the Commission created the Expert 
Group on Cancer Control, to support and coordinate the exchange of best practice between 
member states.  
                                                          
3
 EU15 is the term used by the OECD (2015b) to denote the membership of the EU prior to the 2004 
expansion. It includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.  
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The integration and Europeanisation of cancer prevention policy 
The most significant feature of EU cancer policy is its non-regulatory nature. In contrast to the 
BTO policy case, it is comprised almost entirely of soft law. Whilst this does not preclude 
integration or Europeanisation, it implies different forms of these processes.  
Little sovereignty or authority has been ceded in cancer policy, even with the introduction of 
the public health mandate in the Maastricht Treaty. Member states have played the driving 
role, putting cancer policy on the agenda in the mid-1980s and prompting periodic revivals of 
activity via Presidency priority-setting (Gouveia et al., 2008; McKee et al., 2010). They have 
also imposed limits on the far-reaching goals of the European Parliament (Member of 
European Parliament A). Integration has not been entirely intergovernmental, however. Both 
the European Parliament and the Commission have played central roles and evidence of 
cultivated spillover can be seen in the proliferation of guidelines to cover different forms of 
cancer, elements of treatment and the more recent extension from a public health to a ‘quality 
of care’ agenda (Vollaard et al., 2013). A large and strong group of EU-level cancer 
organisations has developed, with NGOs such as the European Cancer Leagues (ECL) and the 
ECPC exploiting gaps in the information network to become key players in the policy-making 
process (Gilmore and McKee, 2004). In fact, so many European bodies have emerged that, 
when added to the network of member state actors, the resulting discussions have been 
described as a ‘Tower of Bable’ (Sullivan, 2007: 3). It remains the case that the EU level does 
not possess or demand jurisdiction in cancer policy; member states retain responsibility for the 
design and delivery of national programmes, as well as providing by far the majority of 
funding (Jungbluth et al., 2007: 15). With the onset of the economic crisis, this control has 
been reasserted in the cutting of budgets for cancer policy in many member states, 
highlighting one of the core weaknesses of soft law (Aggarwal et al., 2014: 3). Using the 
typology by Schimmelfennig and Rittberger (2006) cancer prevention can be described as a 
policy area of high sectoral integration, meaning that the EU engages in activity in almost 
every aspect of cancer prevention policy, but almost negligible vertical integration, since no 
binding transfer of domestic competences has taken place. Thus, a form of quasi-integration 
might be identified, characterised by a high level of coordination founded on non-regulatory 
instruments.  
Once this distinct form of integration has been acknowledged, a variety of Europeanisation 
dynamics can be identified. First and foremost, national policy content clearly reflects that 
designed at the EU level. The recommendations on training of healthcare professionals, the 
guidelines on cancer screening programmes, the ECAC and benchmarking via the ENCR are 
all key examples of instruments which have at least contributed to, if not provided the 
framework for, national policies (Arbyn et al., 2010; Virgo et al., 2013: 2194). This is not to 
say that coordination is perfect – there is evidence that work is still to be done in ensuring 
consistent implementation of the screening guidelines, for example (Anttila et al., 2009; 
Schrijvers et al., 2012). However, whilst the non-binding EU mechanisms in cancer do not 
constrain member state action, they have been extremely successful in changing behaviour – 
the creation of the UK’s National Cancer Plan, for instance, is credited to the prior publication 
of a Eurocare report which found the UK to have some of the poorest cancer survival statistics 
in Europe (Virgo et al., 2013: 2194). Furthermore, national cancer policy structures have 
adapted to accommodate EU-level structures. Following the creation of the ENCR, for 
example, member states which previously did not have registries have been encouraged to 
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establish them, and existing national bodies have adjusted their operating processes to feed 
into the European-level (Virgo et al., 2013).  
The direction of Europeanisation is a little harder to establish. Since the EU began engaging in 
cancer policy, its role has been and remained one of support – national actors have retained 
central control, with the EU facilitating exchange of best practice and shared learning in areas 
where its competence is strong, thus indicating that cancer policy Europeanisation is not 
exclusively top-down (Albreht et al., 2008: 1453). Downloading dynamics can be identified 
for some individual member states – generally those with weaker or less developed health 
systems or cancer programmes – whilst uploading can be observed by those with a strong 
tradition of cancer care and research. Though health promotion and disease prevention 
policies remain national competences, the extent of the Europeanisation of cancer was 
demonstrated when the Commission sought to revoke its funding and support of coordination 
in 2002 and pass responsibility back to the member states. National governments rejected this 
idea, since ‘…the fight against cancer had been effectively Europeanized and individual states 
no longer felt it imperative to control the parameters nor take responsibility for the 
maintenance of registries and research’ (Trubek et al., 2008: 827). Thus, at least in the areas of 
registration, data collection and research, cancer policy is fully Europeanised, with similar 
dynamics observed in the setting of guidelines and the benchmarking of national progress.  
Cancer policy is a unique case in that EU-level policy content is as important and influential 
as it is in BTO policy but, unlike in the latter case, such content is non-regulatory. No transfer 
of competence or formal structural change to the organisational logic of domestic policy-
making frameworks has taken place, yet cancer is considered one of the most successful areas 
of coordination and cooperation in health.  
The governance of cancer prevention policy 
In 2008 Trubek, Nance and Hervey published an article in which they offered an alternative 
view of health governance in the EU, using cancer policy as the illustrating case study. The 
model that they describe – a form of networked governance – is based on the emergence of a 
policy community ‘coalescing’ around EU action in the fight against cancer. This community, 
Trubek et al. (2008) assert, has acted over the years as the leading force in shaping and 
directing EU cancer prevention policy. They identify ‘…a web of doctors’ and patients’ 
organizations [which] has worked to develop a comprehensive program for cancer control’ by 
creating an ‘iterative and reflexive system of networked governance’, where the work of 
physicians, health professionals and cancer experts has been supported by ‘technocrat-driven 
Commission decisions’ and by a cooperative mode of policy-making (Trubek et al., 2008: 
816). Taking a consensus- and evidence-based approach, ‘significant impact [has been] 
achieved without funding expensive, invasive and unwanted monitoring mechanisms and 
without extended legal and political battles about competence’ (Trubek et al., 2008: 821).  
The policy mechanisms that have been established focus upon knowledge sharing and policy 
learning, using modest financial incentives to encourage cross-border research projects and 
multi-country collaborations. In turn, they have led to the creation of indicators, monitoring 
initiatives and benchmarking, facilitating peer review and targeted guidance without 
encroaching upon national prerogatives in service delivery or organisation of care. The multi-
level networks of experts and activists responsible for these mechanisms and initiatives, 
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Trubek et al. argue, have been far more significant in the development of EU cancer policy 
than the Commission or the Court as individual agents.  
The characterisation presented by Trubek et al. is a product of the ‘governance turn’ and is 
also indicative of a shift from principle-agent modes of governance to peer review and 
dynamic accountability (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008). It offers an alternative to the dominant 
‘institutional expansionism’ narrative of health policy, whereby the Commission and the 
Court support one another in actively pushing the boundaries of the EU’s mandate and 
progressively expanding its powers. It also highlights a number of central features of 
governance in cancer prevention. Firstly, the role and importance of expert groups and policy 
communities is clear. The original EAC sought to engage as many external experts as possible 
(European Commission, Health Directorate D) and, as a result, cancer experts now wield 
considerably more influence over EU health policy objectives than, for instance, lung disease 
experts (EU Health NGO C).  
Secondly, the governance of cancer prevention is based largely on an understanding that the 
necessary EU activities are technical in nature. EU action is ‘rational and consensus-based’ 
(European Commission, Health Directorate A), reflected in the assertion that ‘…even the 
most Eurosceptic of [UK] ministers understands the value of Europe in [cancer] research’ (EU 
Health NGO B). A successful distinction has thus been created between the technical, clinical 
and added-value goals of cancer prevention policy and the political, cultural and highly 
sensitive goals of tobacco control. In the former, a vast array of platforms and projects has 
been established without overt political entrepreneurship, controversy or disagreement. 
Decision-making follows Hooghe and Marks’ (2001) technocratic model, in that the goals of 
cancer policy are not commonly contested, since they are largely clinical and evidence-based, 
and objectives are achieved by problem-solving, rather than by political choice. As such, 
cancer policy is ‘beyond politics’ in its day-to-day implementation and evolution. Over the 
longer term, it is broadly majoritarian in its politics – both the costs and benefits of EU 
coordination are diffuse, presenting a role for an entrepreneurial actor in leading policy 
change. However, in cancer policy this role has rarely been played by the Commission; its 
role has historically been a supporting one, ‘creating an environment…where cancer control 
activities [can] flourish’ (Boyle et al., 2003: 1322). The EU has been instrumental in 
establishing a comprehensive system of information sharing and financial support – via 
mechanisms such as the Structural Funds – to help member states reduce inequalities in 
cancer survival and care (Alexe et al., 2008: 14). When cancer was revived as a European 
priority in 2007, it was the Council Presidency and the MAC grouping in the European 
Parliament which led the charge – indeed the Commission had actively tried to reduce its 
responsibility in cancer policy (Trubek et al., 2008: 828). As such, there is little evidence of 
an ambitious, self-serving agenda on the behalf of the executive. 
Finally, the style of policy instrument established by network governance and evidenced in 
cancer prevention policy is inherently soft and educational in nature. Recommendations, 
guidelines, best practice for health professional training, Council conclusions and other such 
tools lend themselves to governance by voluntarism or targeting. Policy is non-binding but 
remarkably well adhered to, lending weight to the implementation of targeted governance 
measures and illustrating the power of political will within this governance mode. 
Significantly, the creation of a public health base in the treaties did not change the governance 
style of cancer prevention policy, even in the most recent activities of EPAAC and CANCON, 
further demonstrating the potency of political will as a lever for implementation (Member of 
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European Parliament A). Whilst such commitment can be highly constructive, however, it 
also places limits on policy activity. EU action has extended to all major forms of cancer but 
has made little impact on prevention policies, for example, and the recent moves towards a 
‘quality of care’ agenda and discussions of palliative care models within the CANCON 
framework are perceived as an overstepping of the EU’s mandate (European Commission, 
Health Directorate D; EU Health NGO B). Furthermore, whilst the existing guidelines and 
recommendations are considered largely technical and uncontroversial by national 
governments, it is likely that any attempt to introduce binding requirements would quickly 
transform them into highly political dossiers (European Commission, Health Directorate A).  
Reflecting on the distinction between cancer prevention and tobacco control policy and the 
limits put on the former in terms of the quality of care and prevention agendas, it might be 
concluded that EU activity in this area has reached its limit. Most of the areas falling under the 
‘public health’ umbrella of cancer prevention now have established EU processes in place, 
with recommendations and guidelines periodically reviewed in light of new technologies or 
research findings; activity has not extended beyond these areas in recent years and much 
contemporary activity serves largely to maintain the status quo. Meanwhile, the focus of the 
cancer prevention community is increasingly moving outside of the health sector to target 
policies on data protection, clinical trials, air pollution, the TPD, research funding under 
Horizon 2020 and tobacco taxation (EU Health NGO B). Interestingly, the interest groups 
now active at European level are no longer the technical or clinical minded stakeholders, such 
as the oncologist professional associations, but rather the political advocates representing 
patients in the ECPC, ECL and others (UK health association, EU Liaison B). Such trends 
suggest that those areas where EU-added value was clear and collective action easy to agree 
have now been exhausted and what is left are those more sensitive areas where consensus is 
harder to reach (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy A).  
Horizontal themes in EU health policy: The use of soft law 
The most striking difference between cancer prevention policy and the BTO case is the type 
of legal instruments within which they are contained
4
. From a theoretical perspective, soft law 
is one half of the answer to the fundamental conundrum of EU health policy (Steffen et al., 
2005: 3): how has health continued to integrate in the absence of a legal basis in the treaties? 
One explanation is the use of non-health treaty articles to expand health policy competence – 
this is examined in the case studies which follow, in particular chapter eight. Another is the 
proliferation of soft law instruments. The cancer prevention case is noted as a textbook 
example of the potential influence and role of soft law in health (Brooks, 2012: 93).  
Attempts to define soft law have revealed a number of different interpretations, each trying to 
untangle the central contradiction of the concept – ‘soft law without legal effects is not law 
and soft law with legal effects is hard law’ (Senden, 2004: 109). The three main components 
of soft law – concern for rule of conduct, lack of legally binding force, and an element of 
practical effect – lead Senden (2004: 112) to define it as: 
                                                          
4
 This section is based upon the dissertation submitted as part of the candidate’s previous degree of 
MA/LLM in Internal Relations and International Law in September 2011, and published in Brooks 
(2012).  
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‘Rules of conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed 
legally binding force as such, but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal effects, 
and that are aimed at and may produce practical effects.’ 
Hard law, as the conceptual antonym, is understood as the ‘traditional’ or ‘community’ 
method of legislating. Regulations, directives and decisions are the binding legal acts which 
result from the community method, whilst the EU treaties list recommendations and opinions 
as non-binding, and thus soft, law (Article 288 TFEU). Other non-binding measures, which do 
not appear in the Treaty texts but which are commonly used and identified by the Court as 
sources of soft law, include: conclusions, declarations, peer review, monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms, Green and White papers, communications, resolutions, codes of conduct, action 
plans, frameworks and guidelines (Cini, 2001: 195; Di Robilant, 2006: 500; Falkner et al., 
2005: 52; Hervey and McHale, 2004: 61). As such, the presence of soft law instruments is a 
key indicator of the voluntarism and targeting modes of governance
5
.  
In health, soft law provides an alternative to the community or regulatory policy-making 
modes and allows actors to think of health as health, rather than as an element of the internal 
market or the macroeconomic system (Greer and Vanhercke, 2010: 191). Soft law tools now 
greatly outnumber hard law instruments and are used to steer or supplement EU activity in 
almost every area of health. Though seen most prolifically in the 1990s – a period Flynn (cited 
in Cini, 2001: 193) identifies as the ‘era of soft law’ – voluntary, non-binding instruments 
were first notably employed in the EU’s activity in cancer in the 1980s. As part of the OMC, 
soft law is used to encourage upward convergence in hospital waiting times, universal 
insurance coverage, integrated care pathways, generic medicines use and a variety of other 
areas (Greer et al., 2014: 31). It is also the approach now taken in organ donation and 
transplantation policy, nanoscience and nanotechnology, eHealth, obesity and cancer 
screening (Greer and Vanhercke, 2010: 197). In clinical trials policy, soft law guidelines are 
made binding by the requirement for compliance when applying for permission to conduct 
trials or to receive certain EU funding (Hervey and McHale, 2015: 58, footnote 193). 
Essentially, in addition to offering a framework for activity in the absence of a legal base in 
the treaties, soft law functions as a supplementary and supporting tool alongside binding 
health legislation.  
The value of soft law has been widely debated in the EU studies and legal theory literature 
(see, for example, Trubek et al., 2005; Snyder, 1993; Di Robilant, 2006; Falkner et al., 2005 
and Senden, 2004) and it is generally recognised as a more influential tool than its non-
binding nature suggests. Among the health community, the dominant opinion can be 
characterised as sceptical, with most considering soft law to be most effective when used as 
part of ‘hybrid’ strategies (Di Robilant, 2006: 508); one health advocate describes it as ‘all 
motherhood and apple pie’, citing its value as a tool to target hard law but its inability to 
induce real change in chronic disease policy (EU Health NGO G). Officials from DG Santé 
perceive a similar role and, during interview, were quick to note that soft law options such as 
the Alcohol Forum and the Diet Platform are ‘never the Commission’s first choice…you do it 
because you can’t do hard law’ (European Commission, Health Directorate A; E). The 
European Parliament takes an even stronger view. In a 2007 report, it stated that,  
                                                          
5
 Soft law received increasing attention in the context of the turn to ‘new’ modes of governance in the 
late 1990s (Hervey and McHale, 2004: 62) – these instruments are explored in chapter nine. The current 
section is concerned with the nature of soft law and how it has influenced the development of health 
policy.  
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‘…use of soft law is liable to circumvent the influence of the other (democratic) 
instruments, may flout the principles of democracy and legality and may result in the 
Commission's acting ultra vires’ (European Parliament, 2007: Point N). 
On a practical level, Parliamentarians do not see soft law as a sufficient tool for generating 
change; an MEP remarked during interview ‘Does [soft law] have an impact? It might have, 
but if I want to change Europe I need [hard] legislation’ (Member of European Parliament C).  
Though health actors are reluctant to rely on soft law and are sceptical of its capacity to 
produce change in areas such as alcohol, obesity and tobacco control, there is also a 
recognition that it is fast becoming the only available tool. Building on the notion that soft law 
is used where political constraints preclude the use of hard law, and the reality of the 
conservative political climate currently facing health policy-makers, soft law may increasingly 
be the tool of recourse (European Commission, Health Directorate A). The options under the 
current assignment of competences have been mostly exhausted; ‘if there were more hard law 
bases, they’d [health actors in the Commission] have found them by now’ (UK health 
association, EU Liaison A). As soft law instruments proliferate, however, their objective of 
promoting convergence and coordination at the highest political levels opens them up to the 
inevitable risk of politicisation (Radaelli, 2003b: 8). As demonstrated in the recent collapse of 
the Alcohol Forum, when soft mechanisms are the only instruments available to steer a given 
policy area they acquire a stronger importance, greater sensitivity and closer resemblance to 
hard law structures. 
Figure 7: Summary of health policy dynamics, case study two 
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HEALTH IN ALL POLICIES AND THE INTERNAL 
MARKET 
The case of medicines information to patients policy  
Pharmaceutical policy is a prime example of a strand of health policy which is steered, in 
large part, by internal market policy. The European institutions and national governments 
alike have sought to find the appropriate balance between supporting a competitive 
pharmaceutical industry and ensuring a supply of safe, affordable medicines, under pressure 
from strong interest groups on both sides. Moreover, much of pharmaceutical regulation was 
established to facilitate the trade of goods in the single market, rather than in pursuit of 
specific health objectives. In medicines information to patients (ItP) policy, the ‘market versus 
health’ dynamic and the diversity of stakeholder interests have required policy-makers to 
work outside of the health mandate and go beyond pure regulation to embrace more inclusive 
forms of governance.  
What is meant by medicines information to patients policy? 
ItP policy refers to a series of legislation and policy which seeks to regulate how and by 
whom information about medicines is provided to patients. This includes information about 
ingredients, dosage, therapeutic indications and any possible side effects or interactions. 
Pharmaceutical companies hold the most comprehensive information about their products but 
also have an interest in presenting them as positively as possible, creating a conflict of 
interest. The debate about how best to balance this conflict has historically drawn heavily on 
the US and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand experiences with DTCA-PD.  
DTCA is the promotion of a product, in this case medical devices and pharmaceuticals, to 
their end-user, in this case the patient or consumer. It can be distinguished from advertising to 
health professionals, insurance providers or health authorities, for which a separate body of 
legislation exists. It can also be divided into two categories: direct-to-consumer advertising of 
prescription drugs, currently prohibited in most countries, and direct-to-consumer advertising 
of ‘over the counter’ drugs, which is commonly permitted. As such, DTCA-PD can be defined 
as ‘an effort (usually via popular media) made by a pharmaceutical company to promote its 
prescription products directly to patients’ (Ventola, 2011: 670). DTCA-PD has never been 
permitted in the EU but the arguments for and against it have been a central part of the debate 
on ItP, since they concern the balance between the public health value of informed patients 
and the commercial value of information provision.  
In both the US and New Zealand, DTCA-PD has been permitted in mainstream media outlets 
since the late 1990s. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) relaxed the existing US rules 
in 1997 and again in 2004, following heavy pressure from industry. The law now permits 
DTCA-PD on the conditions that all information be accurate and not misleading, that it make 
claims only when supported by substantial evidence, that it reflect the balance between risks 
and benefits and that it be consistent with FDA-approved labelling (DHHS, 2010). However, 
implementation and oversight of these provisions has been criticised (Lexchin and Mintzes, 
2002). Advertisements do not require prior approval and so are only monitored ex post facto, 
and studies have found that adherence to the voluntary guidelines adopted by the 
Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) are routinely violated 
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(PhRMA, 2008; Arnold and Oakley, 2013: 533; Frosch et al., 2007: 12; Hoek and Gendall, 
2002).  
Proponents of DTCA-PD commonly state that the provision of information leads to 
empowerment, strengthening the doctor-patient relationship, improving compliance, reducing 
the stigma attached to certain conditions and increasing patients’ ability to manage their own 
care (Auton, 2009; Ventola, 2011: 672). Similarly, it has been claimed that creating a health 
system where health professionals hold all the information creates fear, misunderstanding and 
drives patients to seek information from unreliable sources, particularly via the internet (UK 
House of Commons, 2005: 67; Shaw, 2011b; Bonaccorso and Struchio, 2002: 911). 
Opponents of DTCA-PD note that it has no public health rationale, it is simply a tool for 
increasing demand and raising pharmaceutical industry profits (Mintzes and Mangin, 2009; 
Mintzes et al., 2002). The information provided by pharmaceutical companies in their 
advertisements often ‘medicalises’ or ‘pharmaceuticalises’ common, non-essential health 
issues or ‘lifestyle’ conditions, considered to be part of the normal range of human experience, 
such as variation in sexual activity and performance or natural fluctuation of mood (Abraham, 
2011; Applbaum, 2006; Mintzes, 2002; 2006; Moynihan and Henry, 2006). As such, DTCA-
PD may lead consumers to believe that adopting healthier behaviours is unnecessary and that 
they can instead rely on a ‘pill for every ill’ to address their particular concerns (Busfield, 
2010; Heath, 2006). This in turn encourages society and industry to misdirect its health 
expenditure and promotes a belief in new drugs that are much more expensive but no more 
effective than existing or generic medications (Law, 2006; Medawar, 2008; Vedantam, 2006).  
Since 1998 the pharmaceutical industry, with support from various other stakeholders, has 
sought to overturn or weaken the EU ban on DTCA-PD, via the ItP debate. During this 
process the rhetoric, strategy and governance approaches employed have evolved to 
accommodate the broad and forceful interests found in this policy area.  
The historical evolution of EU medicines information to patients 
policy 
At the end of the 1990s EU pharmaceutical policy was entering its third phase – having laid 
down a common framework for authorisation in Directive 65/65/EEC and subsequently 
developing the multi-state procedure governed by Directives 75/318/EEC and 75/319/EEC, 
the EU was now focused upon the establishment of the decentralised, centralised and national 
registration procedures for market authorisation (Matthews and Wilson, 1998; Permanand, 
2006). The ban on DTCA-PD was embodied in Directive 92/28/EC, which prohibited 
advertising of prescription medicines to the general public and stated that any other 
advertising must not be misleading. However, prompted by the relaxation of the rules on 
DTCA-PD in the US, two main attempts to circumvent the EU ban have been made and the 
fundamental issue of providing unbiased, reliable and accessible information about medicines 
to patients remains a core debate in EU pharmaceutical policy.  
1998-2002: Attempting to overturn the DTCA-PD ban 
In 1998, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) published an assessment criticising the 
EU ban on DTCA-PD in light of the recent relaxation of US regulation, noting an 
‘inconsistency in the regulatory treatment of industry in the transatlantic marketplace’ and 
asserting that the existing EU legislation ‘deprives EU citizens of the right-to-know compared 
Chapter 8 | Case study 3 
73 
to their US counterparts’ (TABD 1998 cited in Medawar, 2001). A few months later, the head 
of the pharmaceuticals unit at DG ENTR (Enterprise and Industry, now DG GROW) raised 
the possibility of reviewing the ban on DTCA-PD at a meeting of the Internal Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations – TABD welcomed the statement and invited 
the Commission to convene a working group on DTCA-PD. Reflecting the interests of the 
substantial UK pharmaceutical sector, the Pharmaceutical Industrial Competitiveness Task 
Force (PICTF) was established by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1999, paving the way 
for a series of subsequent ‘high level working groups’ at the European level. The first of these 
was the ‘G10’ – the Medicines High Level Group on Innovation and Provision of Medicines – 
which was instrumental in pushing the DTCA-PD debate forward in the early 2000s.  
The legislative package which sought to consolidate EU regulation of pharmaceuticals for 
human and animal use, adopted by the Commission in 2001, upheld the DTCA-PD ban 
(Directive 2001/83/EC, Article 88). However, before the proposal was sent to the legislative 
institutions, Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry, Erkki Liikanen, inserted an 
amendment to the text, weakening the legal restriction and suggesting that pharmaceutical 
companies should be permitted to disseminate information directly to patients on three 
specific disease groups – asthma, diabetes and HIV/AIDS. The changes were rejected by a 
ratio of 12:1 in the European Parliament and by majority in the CoEU but, as a compromise, 
the legislature asked that a report on current practices be published within three years (HAI 
Europe, 2015). It later became clear that the amendment requiring a report was inserted at the 
behest of officials in DG ENTR as a strategy to keep the debate on DTCA-PD alive (Baeten, 
2010: 177).   
2006-2009: Shifting the debate to patient information 
Thanks to the reporting requirement the debate on DTCA-PD resurfaced in 2005. The 
establishment of the Patient Information Network, led by five MEPs in support of renewed 
efforts to address the provision of ItP, and the creation of the High Level Pharmaceutical 
Forum, the successor of the G10, were soon announced (HAI Europe, 2015). Chaired jointly 
by the Commissioners for Enterprise and for Health and Consumers, the Forum hosted a 
series of debates on ‘patient information’, as the issue had now come to be known, and a 
public consultation on its conclusions. These fed into the 2007 DG ENTR report on current 
practice which noted that ‘the pharmaceutical industry has the potential to be an important 
source of information’ (European Commission, 2007a: 14). The final report reaffirmed 
commitment to the ban on DTCA-PD but emphasised the industry’s position as a better-
informed supplier of information than member states (European Commission, 2007c: 9).  
In December 2008 the Commission presented three formal proposals – collectively known as 
The Pharmaceutical Package – on ItP, falsified medicines and pharmacovigilance (European 
Commission, 2008b). The latter two files made their way through the legislative process 
relatively smoothly, whilst the former, suggesting the creation of a framework within which 
industry could provide information on its medicines, proved to be much more controversial. 
The accompanying public consultation on ItP, undertaken by DG ENTR, produced predictable 
results, finding that 96 per cent of pharmaceutical companies and 72 per cent of media 
organisations agreed that industry could be a good provider of information, whilst only 7 per 
cent of healthcare organisations, 11 per cent of regulators, 0 per cent of consumer 
organisations and 0 per cent of social insurance organisations drew similar conclusions 
(Geyer, 2011: 596). Furthermore, independent health and consumer organisations campaigned 
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vigorously against the new proposals, citing conflict of interest, the potential for escalating 
health costs and the need for comparative and reliable drug information (HAI et al., 2009). 
These actors were also instrumental in lobbying for the relocation of responsibility for 
pharmaceutical policy from DG ENTR to DG SANCO (now DG Santé), which finally took 
place in 2009, greatly reducing the former’s role in the legislative process (EPHA, 2008a).  
The Rapporteur for the ItP proposal in the European Parliament, MEP Christofer Fjellner 
(EPP, Sweden), struggled to achieve consensus on the text and when a majority was finally 
gained in September 2010, it had been modified so significantly and discussion had been so 
divisive that the Commission opted to re-draft the proposal from scratch rather than 
proceeding to the Council stage. An amended proposal was adopted in February 2012 but, 
following indication by the Council that it was not willing to accept the new text and that 
qualified majority was unlikely to be reached on the issue, this was formally withdrawn in 
May 2014 (European Commission, 2012a; 2012b)
6
.  
Literacy, empowerment and contemporary medicines information policy 
With the withdrawal of the Commission’s second proposal on ItP the issue once again 
subsided. However, debate on the appropriate way to inform patients continued, shifting its 
focus in the late 2000s to ‘health information’, understood as a more holistic provision of 
guidance, resources and information to help patients improve and manage their health (Brooks 
and Geyer, 2012). More recently, the language has evolved again. Discussions of ‘health 
literacy’ and ‘patient empowerment’ seek the creation of informed and autonomous patients 
via a number of policy initiatives, including the better provision of information on therapeutic 
treatments and medicines (Baeten, 2010: 191; EHFG, 2013). In May 2015 the European 
Patients Forum (EPF), a pharma-funded NGO of patients’ organisations, launched a campaign 
to put patient empowerment on the EU health agenda. The pharmaceutical industry is no 
longer publicly seeking a repeal of the EU’s DTCA-PD ban but, aware of the commercial 
value of reaching consumers with guidance on its products, it continues to advocate itself as 
the most appropriate provider of clinical and technical information about medicines.  
The integration and Europeanisation of medicines information 
to patients  
EU pharmaceutical policy is comprised of intensely integrated areas, such as market 
authorisation, and fiercely defended national competences, such as pricing and 
reimbursement; in medicines ItP, the value of coordination at EU level is widely 
acknowledged and there is a high degree of both sectoral and vertical integration, but 
balancing the health-promoting and market-based elements of policy has proven difficult. 
Like all pharmaceutical policy, it is characterised by three competing interests: health care 
interests, concerned with cost containment and efficiency; industrial interests, concerned with 
employment, trade and growth; and public health interests, concerned with safe, high quality 
medicines (Permanand and Altenstetter, 2004: 39). The initial catalyst and on-going basis for 
EU involvement in pharmaceuticals is the single market. Since the subsidiarity principle puts 
health- and financing-related policy elements beyond the EU’s reach, its goal has been one of 
deregulating national markets and spillover from this central aim has provided it with a strong 
regulatory remit in areas including advertising, common packaging, product licensing, 
                                                          
6
 Withdrawal published in the Official Journal OJ C L153 21.05.2014.  
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wholesale distribution and patent protection (Baeten, 2010: 173; Permanand and Altenstetter, 
2004: 42).  
Drug advertising and information policy exhibits many of the traditional characteristics of EU 
health policy but there are some dissimilarities. There is little role for the Court, for instance, 
though the CJEU has issued a number of important rulings on the definition of advertising
7
. 
Crisis events have not played a prominent role in creating or extending powers, though the 
thalidomide tragedy was a catalyst for the original establishment of broader centralised 
licensing (Brooks and Geyer, 2012: 1236; Permanand, 2006: 50). However, insofar as there is 
a ban on DTCA-PD and common EU rules on the content of relevant communications, 
medicines ItP policy can be considered an integrated area of EU health policy. Prompted by 
the single market programme and developed via the community method, it quickly produced 
an established set of EU-level stakeholders and, for the most part, can be understood as a 
classic example of neofunctional integration, where single market pressures and the passivity 
of member states have caused stakeholders to shift their attention to the European level.  
However, whilst neofunctional spillover goes some way to explaining the market basis of the 
policy, it does not provide much indication as to why a health basis did not evolve 
concurrently – here, intergovernmentalism is needed (Permanand, 2006: 56). There is clear 
added-value for the market in regulating pharmaceutical advertising at EU level and it might 
therefore be considered in the interest of member states to permit coordination (Brooks and 
Geyer, 2012: 1236). However, subsidiarity is the primary roadblock to a health-focused drug 
advertising and information policy and national governments have consistently fought to 
assert their interests in pharmaceuticals as a component of health systems and a vital industry 
sector (Hancher, 1990: 13). This reflects the broader division in pharmaceutical policy, 
whereby industry and market elements are considered ‘low politics’ issues whilst health 
aspects, along with pricing and reimbursement procedures, remain ‘high politics’ concerns 
(Permanand, 2006: 56). 
Many member states had advertising bans in place well before the introduction of an EU-wide 
prohibition on DTCA-PD, suggesting a process of uploading. This dynamic is also evident in 
the most recent legislative developments on ItP, where Sweden successfully utilised the 
assignment of a Swedish MEP as Rapporteur in the leading Committee to facilitate a proposal 
which closely resembled the existing national system (Mulinari, 2013: 762; Shaw, 2011a). 
Though countries with large pharmaceutical industries were periodically vocal in opposition 
of the DTCA-PD ban – the British government, for instance, set up the PICTF, a stakeholder 
platform through which national industry representatives could put pressure upon the EU – 
most had bans in place at national level. This suggests that though policy output was 
downloaded from the EU, in that it was contrary to what these countries had lobbied for, the 
‘goodness of fit’ of the final legislation was strong.  
The interaction of trade and industry ministries with health and consumer ministries is a key 
dynamic in pharmaceutical policy-making, in particular advertising and information policies, 
and indicates a process of horizontal Europeanisation and diffusion (Börzel and Risse, 2012; 
Radaelli, 2003a). In the current status quo, national regulatory agencies are well networked, 
working closely with the EMA and each other, and as a result the differences between national 
                                                          
7
 See cases C-316/09 MSD Sharp & Dohme GmbH v Merckle GmbH [2011] OJ C 186/03; C-249/09 
Novo Nordisk AS v Ravimiamet [2011] OJ C 186/02 and; C-421/07 Criminal proceedings against 
Frede Damgaard. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Vestre Landsret – Denmark [2009] ECR I-2629.  
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regulatory systems have decreased considerably since the 1990s (Permanand and Altenstetter, 
2004: 47). Policy on the advertising and ItP of medicines might therefore be described as 
integrated and subject to ongoing circular and horizontal Europeanisation dynamics.  
Medicines ItP is the issue within pharmaceutical policy where the clash between the EU’s 
market and health competences is most pronounced (Baeten, 2010: 173). An important feature 
of this conflict, however, is that it is based entirely upon the content and direction of EU 
policy. It is not a conflict about subsidiarity or competences – medicines ItP is accepted as an 
integrated and Europeanised policy area.  
The governance of medicines information to patients policy 
The medicines ItP case offers several insights into the governance of health policy. Firstly, it 
is an illustrative example of how conflict and politicisation affect the mode of governance 
employed in a given issue area. The range of actors involved in the ItP policy process is wide 
and the division between them stark, oftentimes resulting in different positions within single 
institutions. This is particularly evident in the European Commission – the literature is 
generally critical of the Commission’s approach to the ItP debate but this criticism is aimed 
primarily at DG ENTR, which was responsible for the file until 2009. The cleavage between 
the DG for industry and the DG for health is a historic fault line (European Commission, 
Health Directorate A) which had a significant impact upon the way governance developed in 
medicines ItP policy. Rather than pursuing a strategy of competence expansion, DG ENTR 
sought to further the interests of its industry stakeholders and raise the profile of its role in 
ensuring competitiveness in the single market, consistently overruling DG SANCO (Baeten, 
2010: 173; 190). An expansionist agenda was not promoted by the latter either; indeed 
SANCO officials were unaware of the reassignment of the pharmaceutical portfolio until the 
last minute, the campaign having been quietly driven by an alliance of public health NGOs 
and senior individuals within the Commission (World Health Organization B)
8
.  
The political activity of stakeholders also affected the policy instruments selected and their 
operation. The pharmaceutical industry funded and manipulated patients’ organisations, 
policy networks and MEPs, turning traditionally technical exercises, such as public 
consultations, into political battles (Baeten, 2010: 175; EU Health NGO H). This created rifts 
within civil society; since this was one issue where industry and patient interests were clearly 
not aligned, any patient organisation support of information from pharmaceutical companies 
was likely to have been influenced by pharma-funding, as in the case of EPF (EU Health 
NGO D; Mulinari, 2013: 763). The variety of interests and the difficulty in achieving 
consensus made adoption of hard law instruments impossible – this was starkly evidenced in 
the Commission’s eventual withdrawal of the ItP proposal in 2012. Instead, softer, more 
participatory and consultative modes of governance had to be employed, reflecting the 
broader post-Lisbon trend for experimental governance to accommodate interests beyond 
those of the Commission and industry alone (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008: 279). By comparison to 
cancer and BTO policy, where EU proposals met little opposition, medicines ItP policy is a 
highly politicised and contested arena where agreement on the fundamental direction of policy 
and the importance of health as a consideration is difficult to achieve.  
                                                          
8
 It should be noted that the Juncker Commission attempted to reverse this reassignment in 2014 but 
was forced to abandon its plans under fierce criticism from the same broad alliance of public health 
NGOs and experts. See Brooks (2014a; 2014b).  
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Medicines ItP is also an example of how the use of a market legal base affects the governance 
of a health policy issue. Both Directive 92/28/EEC and 2001/83/EC rested on the treaty 
articles providing for approximation of laws in the internal market (Article 100A EEC, later 
95 EC). After the first attempt to overturn the DTCA-PD ban on the basis of market and 
competitiveness arguments failed, the Commission began to employ health arguments 
(Baeten, 2010: 189). This drew it, however, into an area of far weaker competence, forcing it 
to utilise different policy mechanisms and governance tools, legitimising its continued action 
by recourse to questionably-worded public consultations and the conclusions of selective 
‘high level working groups’ (Carboni, 2009; Permanand, 2006). Whilst market-based policies 
are more likely to enjoy hard law support, because of the stronger legal competence here, they 
are also more likely to favour industry or commercial interests, and thus be presented as 
framework regulation, or even self- or co-regulation. Though the ban on advertising contained 
in the Directives is absolute, member states are given latitude in the monitoring and 
enforcement of the ban and, since the debate turned to information provision, the role of 
industry guidelines, voluntary self-regulation and governance by targeting has increased (see, 
for instance, ABPI, 2015).  
The division between technical and political issues is harder to identify in the medicines ItP 
case. Permanand (2006: 55) describes pharmaceuticals as ‘…both a constitutional and a 
functional matter’ and the logic of coordinating pharmaceutical regulation at EU level is well 
recognised. However, the medicines ItP case demonstrates a unique level of politicisation 
within pharmaceutical policy (Brooks and Geyer, 2012). This is reflected in the Commission’s 
decision to proceed with the falsified medicines and pharmacovigilance strands of the 
pharmaceutical package, which were recognised as technical and largely uncontroversial, 
whilst dealing separately with the more sensitive ItP file. Medicines ItP also highlights the 
impact of internal market influence upon the characterisation of technical or political policy. 
As one interviewee noted, ‘…the line between technical and political policy began to blur 
after 1992’ because health was no longer only about health (UK health association, EU 
Liaison B). The increasing involvement of non-health actors and interests in health policies 
has altered the understanding of health issues; presented as a market issue rather than a simple 
case of patient safety or consumer protection, medicines ItP policy was not able to enjoy the 
‘technical’ label assigned to most elements of the rest of the pharmaceutical package.  
The Lisbon Treaty added an explicit competence for the EU in ‘measures setting high 
standards of quality and safety for medicinal products and devices for medical use’, meaning 
that, in future, measures such as the DTCA-PD ban could, in theory, be based on a public 
health mandate (Article 168(4)(c) TFEU; Baeten, 2010: 194). Seen alongside the transfer of 
responsibilities to DG Santé, this suggests a fundamental shift in the EU’s approach to 
governing pharmaceutical policy. However, agreement on revised regulation of the provision 
of information has still not been reached and a concrete distinction between advertising and 
information, vital to underpin any regulatory effort, has still not been adopted.  
Horizontal themes in EU health policy: Health in All Policies and 
the internal market 
The medicines ItP case is an illustrative example of the role of the internal market and of how 
the location of many determinants of health outside of the health sector affects health policy-
making. The internal market has played a central role in furthering the integration and 
Europeanisation of health policy, as well as shaping its content and governance. Its role 
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became so important in the late 1990s, in fact, that the Belgian Presidency of the CoEU 
commissioned two books (McKee et al., 2002; Mossialos and McKee, 2002) to examine its 
implications. These works and those which followed them identify two primary dimensions of 
the impact of the internal market on health. 
A first dimension involves the application of the free movement principles to the health sector 
in pursuit of an ‘internal health market’. This might be considered the ‘direct’ impact of the 
internal market requiring, for instance, that national authorities not discriminate between 
medicines produced domestically and those imported from other member states, or between 
nurses of national origin and those trained in other EU countries. Broadly speaking, the 
creation of an internal market in health goods – meaning pharmaceuticals, medical devices 
and other health technologies – or in ‘health people’ – understood as health professionals – is 
not an insurmountable challenge. Difficulties in implementation remain but the structures for 
these markets have been in place for many years and national health systems have, for the 
most part, adapted to them (Hancher, 2002; 2010; Peeters et al., 2010). This has enabled the 
integration of health policy to move far beyond that facilitated by the health articles contained 
in the treaties. The more problematic issues, which have come to the fore in the last two 
decades courtesy of the CJEU, concern the creation of internal markets in health services – 
meaning the provision of treatment and care – and in health consumers or patients (See Greer 
et al., 2014: 83-95; Gekiere et al., 2010). Opening service tenders to foreign providers and 
enabling patients to receive care in other EU countries whilst being reimbursed by their 
domestic insurance package challenges the central structures and financial sustainability of 
national health systems far beyond what is envisaged in the founding treaties. It moves 
towards the establishment of a European health system and integration here is patchy, having 
been driven by a combination of case law and reluctant political initiative (Greer, 2008).  
A second dimension concerns the impact of ‘non-health’ internal market policies upon health 
policies and outcomes. This is the ‘indirect’ effect of free movement on health created by, for 
instance, the common regulation of tobacco product advertising, limits on emissions from 
automobiles or rules on maximum daily working hours. Laws which prohibit barriers to free 
movement also have a health impact by, for example, making unlawful national regulation 
which imposes minimum unit prices on alcohol. Indirect internal market impact is also felt 
through the EU competition regime and its rules on state aid and public procurement. These 
challenge the principle of ‘solidarity’ underpinning European health systems and impose EU 
law upon the activities of health insurers and providers (Lear et al., 2010; Prosser, 2010). 
Non-health features of the internal market can thus serve to undermine national or European 
health policies and are less accessible for health actors or policy-makers seeking to influence 
them (Hervey and McHale, 2004: 90).  
Recognising the health impact of non-health policies and the difficulty of representing health 
interests within the relevant processes, the EU provided in the Amsterdam Treaty for the 
mainstreaming of health into all other policy areas. This notion was elaborated by the Finnish 
Presidency of the CoEU in 2006, which produced a paper on the HiAP principle. HiAP is an 
approach which acknowledges the need for horizontal, cross-sectoral coordination in order to 
foster good health and, as such, is closely linked to terms such as ‘healthy public policies’ and 
‘intersectoral action for health’ (Ståhl et al., 2006: 4). In the EU context, HiAP has three 
elements. Firstly, it requires the inclusion of health in headline policies, such as the Europe 
2020 Strategy, the Horizon 2020 research framework and the cohesion policy. Secondly, it 
means ensuring that health policies are designed and coordinated with non-health sectors, 
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such as taxation, education, environment and research. Finally, it requires that all policies put 
forward by the European Commission have adequately assessed their impact upon health. The 
latter objective has traditionally been pursued via impact assessment, though a dedicated 
health impact assessment does not yet exist and the effectiveness of the ‘general’ impact 
assessment in identifying health impacts has been criticised (Ståhl, 2010; EPHA, 2012).  
Honouring the HiAP approach and applying internal market law to the health sector have a 
significant impact upon health policy-making and governance. At the most fundamental level, 
it increases the number of actors involved in the construction of a health-promoting EU. This 
has led to the transformation of EU health policy from ‘secret garden’ to ‘public park’ (Greer, 
2009). Increasing the number of actors in turn increases the diversity of interests and 
objectives which must be taken into account, often making the achievement of consensus 
more difficult. This can preclude the use of hard law and coercive governance, instead forcing 
the EU to employ more innovative, participatory and inclusive mechanisms. However, the 
power of alternative legal bases also presents opportunities for health policy-makers. So long 
as health aims are incidental to the primary objective, measures with health implications can 
be adopted using non-health legal provisions – this strategy has seen utilisation of the treaty 
provisions on the facilitation of the internal market, the CAP, social policy, environmental 
policy, the common commercial policy and many others (Hervey and McHale, 2004: 85). The 
increasing role of non-health sectors and the growing influence of internal market law have 
thus both expanded and challenged the scope of EU health policy, promoting health interests 
where they were not previously taken into account but also undermining them in the name of 







Figure 8: Summary of health policy dynamics, case study three 
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COMITOLOGY, THE OMC AND NEW MODES OF 
GOVERNANCE 
The case of tobacco control policy  
Tobacco control is part of the EU’s health promotion policy and has historically been linked 
with the EAC programme. However, since the EU is not allowed to harmonise laws for the 
purpose of public health, measures to control tobacco can only be introduced if they facilitate 
the functioning of the internal market. Those in place take a hard law form but have been 
threatened by ongoing legal challenges from industry interests and national governments, 
giving the Court a pivotal role in the development of the policy framework. Like the 
medicines ItP case, tobacco control is an example of a policy which has the goal of protecting 
public health but which utilises the stronger internal market mandate. However, unlike in the 
ItP case, the EU has managed to adopt binding tobacco control measures in the face of 
multiple opposing interests and high political sensitivity. In fact, the governance of tobacco 
advertising and products has made relatively scant use of soft law mechanisms. Furthermore, 
it is a primary arena for the battle between the EU’s social and economic objectives and the 
judicial rulings it has provoked are considered some of the most important ever on the 
competence of the EU (Tridimas and Tridimas, 2002). 
What is meant by tobacco control policy? 
It is helpful to first clarify what is meant by tobacco control and how it can be distinguished 
from the EU’s action against cancer. The two areas are closely interlinked but whereas the 
earlier case study dealt with activity to combat cancer as a chronic disease, such as prevention, 
screening, research and training, tobacco control concerns five main strands of policy relating 
to tobacco as a commercial good and a determinant of health: regulation of tobacco 
advertising, regulation of tobacco products, the creation of SFEs, the organisation of anti-
tobacco campaigns and various other policies concerning taxation, illegal trade and subsidies 
for tobacco producers. This case study focuses on the first two of these areas – regulation of 
tobacco advertising and tobacco products – since these are the issues which have generated 
the most political debate and which present an insight into the role of the Court, the 
politicisation of health issues and the use of internal market law to govern health.  
The historical evolution of tobacco control policy in the EU 
Tobacco control policy has its origins in the EAC programme. The preamble to Decision 
88/351/EEC, which established the first EAC action plan, stated that ‘the fight against cancer’ 
includes ‘the fight against tobacco’. Subsequent phases of the EAC strengthened the role of 
tobacco control as a facet of cancer prevention and it has since become a substantial body of 
policy in its own right. Unanimous voting initially proved a major hindrance to tobacco 
control but the extension of QMV under the SEA meant that, so long as a measure was framed 
in terms of removing barriers to the completion of the market, it could avoid the difficult 
unanimity framework (Richonnier, 2012: 20). This resulted in the speedy adoption of 
directives on labelling and maximum tar content in 1989 and 1990 respectively, and even 
generated enough political momentum to secure adoption of a non-binding resolution on the 
danger of smoking in public places in 1989. However, whereas legislation adopted 
unanimously can only be challenged in court by ‘interested parties’, QMV implies no such 
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restriction, thus broadening the pool of potential plaintiffs and the risk of legal challenge 
(Boessen and Maarse, 2008: 83).  
Tobacco control policy now uses the co-decision procedure of community method policy-
making almost exclusively – only in cases concerning subsidies, which fall under the CAP, is 
unanimity required (Gilmore and McKee, 2002: 335). The tobacco legislation which has 
developed from the internal market legal base has followed two main lines – firstly on 
advertising of tobacco products and secondly on consumer protection via the regulation of 
health information and lawful composition (Hervey and McHale, 2004: 374). The history of 
these two areas is interlinked but for clarity is examined separately below. 
Legislating tobacco advertising 
The advertising of tobacco products on television has historically been prohibited in the EU 
within the broader regulation of television broadcasts – from 1989 this was found in the 
Television Without Frontiers Directive (TWFD) and since 2007 has been embodied in the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive. Regulation of other kinds of tobacco advertising was 
proposed soon after the TWFD was adopted but, because of QMV, was blocked by member 
states until 1997, when government changes in key countries facilitated a break in the 
deadlock (Gilmore and McKee, 2002: 336). The Commission published a proposal for a 
Tobacco Advertising Directive (TAD) in 1998. It banned advertising on the radio, internet and 
print media, in cinemas, on posters and ashtrays, as well as via indirect methods such as logos 
on clothes and sponsorship of events. The Directive’s rationale made reference to the 
divergence in tobacco advertising restrictions which exist in different member states, forming 
a barrier to the free movement of tobacco products and distorting competition between 
advertisers and tobacco companies (Tridimas and Tridimas, 2002: 172). The TAD was 
adopted by the EU in 1998 but was soon the subject of a series of legal challenges. Many were 
dismissed by the CoFI but two, brought by the German government and by Imperial Tobacco, 
were taken before the European Court of Justice (now CJEU).  
The two cases dealt with many of the same issues but the ruling handed down in Germany v 
Council (which became known as the Tobacco Advertising case) is considered one of the most 
important ever by the CJEU. The challenges made by the German government and Imperial 
Tobacco contained many grounds for invalidity of the TAD but focused upon the 
inappropriate use of Articles 100a, 57(2) and 66 EC (now Articles 114, 53 and 62 TFEU 
respectively) as legal bases for the Directive. The Court found in favour of these claims, 
annulling the TAD on the basis that the legislature could not rely on either free movement or 
distortion of competition arguments to justify the measures it laid out. Fundamentally, this 
was not an issue of competence, but of overstepping the mark – the ruling was carefully 
worded to make clear that it was not the banning of tobacco advertising which the Court was 
opposed to, but rather the sweeping generality of the ban (Tridimas and Tridimas, 2002: 174).  
A Revised Tobacco Advertising Directive (RTAD) was adopted in 2003 and is significantly 
narrower in scope. It prohibits much tobacco advertising, excluding that intended for trade 
publications, but has been criticised for not going far enough to protect public health. In 
particular, it fails to regulate indirect advertising via non-tobacco products and it applies only 
to mediums which are cross-border in nature (Hervey and McHale, 2004: 383). Soon after its 
adoption another legal challenge was brought, again by the German government, which 
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sought to annul the Directive. The Court rejected the application and the RTAD remains the 
governing piece of legislation on tobacco advertising in the EU. 
Legislating tobacco products 
The packaging, labelling and ingredients of tobacco products have been subject to consumer 
protection regulation for the same amount of time as tobacco advertising. The 1989 Labelling 
Directive regulated the health warnings which must appear on the packaging of cigarettes, 
stating that they must cover at least four per cent of the pack’s surface and requiring that the 
pack display the tar and nicotine yields. In 1992, this was extended to cover all tobacco 
products and amended to include a list of 17 specific health warnings for use on packages, of 
which two were mandatory – ‘smoking causes cancer’ and ‘smoking causes heart disease’.  
In 2001 the Labelling Directive, along with other directives concerning design and 
manufacture, was subsumed into the Tobacco Products Consolidation Directive (TPCD), 
which aimed to provide an overarching approximation of laws on the manufacture, 
presentation and sale of tobacco products. It was strongly influenced by both the content and 
political significance of the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), 
which was under negotiation at the time, seeking to provide the first legal basis for 
international cooperation on tobacco control. The original draft of the TPCD, following its 
predecessors, made recourse to public health objectives in justifying the scope and content of 
its measures. However, once the Tobacco Advertising ruling had been issued and the Court’s 
position on this approach made known, the Commission revised its proposal to remove all 
references to public health. When the final proposal was published, it was assigned to the 
European Parliament’s internal market committee; the health and environment committee 
made known its disappointment at the lack of health consideration but acknowledged that, in 
light of the TAD ruling, the adoption of the TPCD could not take place in a vacuum (Boessen 
and Maarse, 2008: 84).  
The TPCD was adopted in 2001 and was almost immediately challenged in the CJEU. A case 
referred by the English High Court attempted to replicate the arguments made in Tobacco 
Advertising, adding that the required health warnings distorted brands and infringed upon 
intellectual property rights. The Court responded by ruling that the use of an internal market 
legal base does not become inappropriate just because there are public health factors in the 
regulatory choices made. The TPCD was thus upheld. 
The revision of the TPCD 
In September 2011 the European Parliament (2011) adopted a resolution on non-
communicable diseases which called for an immediate and effective review of the TPCD, 
which had now been in operation for over 10 years. The review presented the opportunity to 
bring the tobacco products regulation in line with the FCTC, which had been adopted after the 
TPCD came into force and which recommended much stricter requirements than existed in 
EU regulation (Alemmano, 2012: 202). It also allowed the legislative framework to be 
updated in response to innovations such as electronic cigarettes, oral tobaccos and flavourings 
(Hiilamo and Glantz, 2015: 58). After 18 months of consultation and discussion the 
Commission finalised a proposal for a Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) in 2012 but this 
soon became one of the most politically difficult files in the history of EU health policy. The 
draft proposal, which had not yet been published, was twice postponed during the inter-
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service consultation phase and work was suspended altogether when it was alleged that the 
Commissioner for Health at the time, John Dalli, had been involved in a deal with 
manufacturers of oral tobacco to remove the draft provision banning the substance
9
.  
With the arrival of a new Health Commissioner the TPD was finally adopted in early 2014. It 
contains a new article pertaining to e-cigarettes and, crucially, allows member states to go 
further in their national regulation than EU law requires, which the TPCD did not (EU Health 
NGO I). The industry was again awarded the right to challenge its provisions in Court, but 
was not successful in delaying the implementation of the Directive, which comes into force in 
May 2016. Legal challenges are again pending decision by the CJEU – one using the 
‘traditional’ arguments about intellectual property and legal basis, one targeting the provisions 
on menthol cigarettes, which are considered a ‘cultural product’ in Poland, and one seeking to 
annul the article on e-cigarettes
10
.  
The integration and Europeanisation of tobacco control policy 
Insofar as tobacco products are understood as goods for trade on the internal market, both 
sectoral and vertical integration have been achieved and member states acknowledge the 
necessity and value of EU-level product regulation. The neofunctional model is dominant 
here, explaining the functional spillover from trade across borders to regulation of advertising, 
packaging, ingredients and other features. Where moves to harmonise are justified on the 
basis of health arguments, however, national governments have ferociously resisted EU 
competence. Neofunctionalism might still offer some insight here, particularly in relation to 
the cultivated spillover generated by the Commission’s entrepreneurial use of the internal 
market mandate and its leadership role (Joossens et al., 2004: 102). During the adoption of the 
early directives, the Commission worked largely on its own; interest groups were small and 
poorly resourced, leaving them unable to counter industry attacks or take advantage of 
favourable institutional conditions such as QMV or the role of Presidencies, whilst the CJEU 
has been less supportive in tobacco control than in other policy areas (Adamini et al., 2011: 
50; 80; Duina and Kurzer, 2004: 59). It was thus, particularly in the early stages of EU 
activity, primarily the Commission which was responsible for pushing the issue up the EU 
agenda.  
The dominant model of integration in tobacco products, however, has been 
intergovernmentalism. National governments, whilst conceding the logic and rationality of 
coordinating some elements of tobacco advertising and product standards at the European 
level, have ceded minimal authority and put constant limits on the extent of integration. Initial 
advances were made possible only by a change in the institutional environment with the 
introduction of QMV and the weakening of the Council’s position. Even after QMV was 
instated, a small group of opposing states was able to block the proposal for a tobacco 
advertising directive for almost 10 years and when the TAD was finally published, it 
prompted an ‘intergovernmental battle’ (Duina and Kurzer, 2004: 71). In its seminal Tobacco 
Advertising ruling, the Court set the boundaries of the Commission’s attempts to stretch the 
treaty base to its advantage, putting the power firmly back into the hands of national 
governments. As such, in the case of the TAD the Commission ‘…fell into a classic 
intergovernmental trap: a group of member states offered unwavering support while a second 
                                                          
9
 The Commissioner resigned under pressure, though maintaining his innocence and later 
unsuccessfully challenging the circumstances of his dismissal. 
10
 At the time of writing, the outcome of these cases is unknown.  
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staged unremitting opposition’ (Duina and Kurzer, 2004: 59). The impact of this deadlock was 
such that in a study of the factors determining the level of tobacco control in European 
countries, membership of the EU was found to be an indicator of a weak tobacco regime 
(Gallet and Catlin, 2009: 144). Thus, like most of health policy, different elements of tobacco 
control policy are best explained by different schools of integration theory.  
Studies of the Europeanisation of tobacco control have focused upon the level of ‘fit’ between 
national and European policies. Instances of poor implementation or strong opposition are 
understood to be the result of insufficient fit between the imposed EU policy and the pre-
existing status quo in the member state (Duina and Kurzer, 2004: 59). The multi-level nature 
of tobacco control also plays a key role in determining the extent of Europeanisation – 
national governments, the Commission, the Parliament, European and national interest 
groups, the WHO, the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation, among others, all 
play a role in policy-making and diffusion (Joossens et al., 2004: 99). The primary 
Europeanisation dynamic in tobacco control policy, identified by Studlar et al. (2011: 728), is 
top-down. Here ‘vertical policy diffusion through the EU has aided domestic policy adaption 
[sic]’, but much of this policy learning also comes from the international level, with the FCTC 
playing a core role in changing national approaches (Bosdriesz et al., 2015: 193). Crucially, 
Bosdriesz et al. (2015: 194) find that, since the introduction of tobacco control policies at 
European and international level, ‘the influence of national political factors has decreased’. In 
addition to EU directives and the FCTC, national governments are strongly influenced by 
developments in other countries, in particular in relation to legal challenges – many 
governments are watching the cases currently underway against Australia and Uruguay, both 
of which introduced tough laws on packaging and health warnings and are being sued by 
industry consortiums (Mackey et al., 2013). As such, whilst EU directives are generally – 
though not uniformly – built into the policy structure and organisational logic of national 
tobacco control frameworks and evidence of policy learning and diffusion can be seen, the 
process of Europeanisation runs concurrently with a process of ‘internationalisation’ (Princen, 
2007).  
The governance of tobacco control policy 
In terms of the factors which determine the mode of governance used in a given policy area, 
tobacco control might be understood as a more ‘intense’ example of many of the 
characteristics exhibited in the medicines ItP case. High political sensitivity, strong lobbies 
and interest groups, reliance on the internal market legal base and conflict within individual 
parts of the European Commission are common to both cases but are amplified in the fight to 
regulate tobacco products.  
Tobacco control is governed almost exclusively by European directive. Soft law measures are 
taken where the issue at hand begins to stray out of the EU’s internal market competence, 
such as in the case of SFEs, and some market-based instruments are employed in product 
taxation and for smoking cessation programmes via the PHAP, but binding regulation is used 
in all other areas (EU Health NGO I). Interestingly, the intense political divisions and 
resulting difficulty in gaining consensus have done little to affect the Commission’s reliance 
on hard law, or its ability to secure it. Policy-makers have consistently opted for legislative 
solutions which are developed as ‘escape routes’, designed to overcome the specific 
roadblocks which have been presented, rather than maintaining the contested provisions in a 
non-binding instrument (Adamini et al., 2011: 67). A small concession is made in the choice 
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of framework regulation or ‘new harmonisation’, which sets minimum standards and leaves 
member states with considerable discretion in implementation, but hard law remains the 
primary tool (Hervey and McHale, 2004: 379). This may in part be because policy-makers 
doubt the ability of soft law to ensure implementation in the tobacco sector, but mostly it is 
indicative of the strength of the EU’s internal market competence. So long as a measure can 
be justified in terms of its contribution to borderless trade, it can be presented as a binding 
instrument.  
The power at the disposal of the Commission in this area has made ‘expansionism’ a recurring 
theme in the tobacco control literature. Duina and Kurzer (2004: 57) identify the ‘ambiguous 
language of the treaties’ as the catalyst for Commission action and surmise that: 
‘The European Commission has repeatedly attempted to expand its regulatory authority. 
Driven, as all bureaucracies, by a natural desire to broaden its sphere of influence and by 
a vision of an ever more influential European Union, it has mobilized to produce 
legislative frameworks in areas beyond the mandate set by the founding treaties and their 
subsequent revisions.’ 
Similarly, Alemanno and Garde (2013: 3) conclude that: 
‘…this field of EU policy has been at the forefront of a ‘federal’ experimentation, helping 
delineate the limits of EU competences and the relevance of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality for EU law and policy-making…the EU has not hesitated…to push 
the EU agenda.’ 
The use of the internal market article is understood as political strategy on the part of the 
Commission – the other option at the time, Article 235 EC, reduces the role of the Parliament 
and requires unanimity, making legislation much harder to pass (Boessen and Maarse, 2008: 
5). The historical use of Article 100a (Art 114 TFEU) is understood by many as a ‘creative 
response’ to the absence of a public health basis, used to frame a market-correcting activity as 
a market-making one (Boessen and Maarse, 2008: 3; Joossens et al., 2004: 102; EU Health 
NGO I). This playing of the treaty-base game has led some to question the EU’s ‘almost 
limitless authority to harmonise pursuant to the internal market legal basis’ and demonstrates 
the ongoing conflict between the expansionist agenda and the limited treaty mandate 
(Adamini et al., 2011: 73; Alemanno, 2012: 240).  
The depiction of an entrepreneurial and expansionist Commission masks the presence of deep 
internal divisions, however. Tobacco control is a stark example of inconsistency and 
contradiction in EU policy – in the early 1990s, the EU spent around EUR 1,000 million 
subsidising tobacco producers whilst dedicating approximately EUR 1.5 million, 0.15 per cent 
of this amount, to smoking prevention policies (Gilmore and McKee, 2002: 339). The various 
Commission departments – trade, agriculture, industry, health and finance – each pursue a 
different objective, seeking conflicting subsidies, taxes, regulations and market freedoms. 
Direct subsidies for tobacco under the CAP have now been abolished but the new system 
offers a blanket payment per hectare, maintaining tobacco as a lucrative crop, and use of 
historic-payment systems in some countries peg subsidies to the higher payments received 
under previous structures (EU Health NGO F). Similar legal and policy inconsistencies exist 
at national level and, in most member states, health ministers find themselves at odds with 
their counterparts in the treasury and economic ministries.  
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Adding intensive and well-funded lobbying to these institutional divisions creates a tobacco 
control policy which is in constant flux. It has a ‘shifting nature’ (Alemanno, 2012: 240), 
wherein it tries to balance free trade and public health imperatives, and at any one time it is 
determined by ‘the balance between the tobacco industry effort to maintain a policy 
environment that promotes and supports tobacco use and public health authorities seeking 
policies designed to reduce tobacco consumption’ (Hiilamo and Glantz, 2015:57). 
Governance is inclusive and participatory, and a large and well-established community of 
NGOs and interest groups play a significant role in the policy-making process.  
The high political sensitivity of tobacco control often takes precedence over the established 
evidence base. Whilst there are technical aspects to the legislation proposed – such as the need 
to update in response to developments such as electronic cigarettes, slim-style designs and 
new flavourings – they take secondary importance to political factors in most cases. This is 
clearly seen in the rules on nicotine yields – by the time of the drafting of the TPCD research 
showed that yields were misleading and ineffective indicators of the danger of cigarettes, yet 
they remained a requirement because the industry favoured their inclusion (McNeill et al., 
2012: 2). In this way, tobacco control reflects Radaelli’s ‘logic of politicisation’, whereby 
politics plays a greater role in decision-making than evidence or expertise (1999: 4). This is 
partly explained by Toshkov’s assertion that tobacco control ‘does not map well’ on the 
traditional, left-right, liberal-authoritarian political scale (2013: 448). This implies that, rather 
than being the result of the will or preference of the executive, the determinants of tobacco 
control policy-making are found outside of political ideology, in sources such as public 
opinion, policy diffusion and ‘the fundamental socio-economic characteristics of different 
polities’ (Toshkov, 2013).  
Tobacco control policy is an illustrative example of the power of the internal market legal 
base and the potential of regulatory policy as a lever for achieving health objectives. Though 
there are clear limits to the use of the internal market base in pursuing health objectives, 
potential for tobacco control exists in other areas of EU policy – a new directive on tobacco 
tax is planned for 2016, for example, though this offers limited health advocacy opportunity 
and will require unanimity in the legislative process (EU Health NGO B; I). By contrast the 
BTO case, where more recent policy developments in the areas of ethical sourcing and supply 
have taken a non-binding form on account of their political sensitivity, policy-makers in 
tobacco control have continued to govern by framework regulation. In fact, use of the internal 
market base facilitated the introduction of tobacco control measures as a health tool prior to 
the introduction of a public health mandate. Moreover, according to one interviewee, the 
achievements made during this period were ‘radical’ and extremely effective by comparison 
to those secured since 1992 (European Commission, Health Directorate A).  
Horizontal themes in EU health policy: Comitology, the OMC 
and ‘new’ modes of governance 
As the scope and content of EU policy becomes more complex, policy-makers are forced to 
innovate, introducing new and creative ways of reaching agreement and maintaining the 
efficiency of the policy-making process. Both the tobacco control and the medicines ItP cases 
are illustrative examples of how multiple interests and market dynamics affect the kind of 
governance which characterises health policy.  
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The TPD, for instance, provides an insight into the use of the comitology procedure. 
Comitology is a process which enables the implementation of a particular piece of legislation 
to be delegated to the Commission
11
. Most governments and constitutions have provisions for 
the delegation of power to the executive – they exist to speed up the legislative process and 
remove technical and logistical detail from the already complex process of agreeing and 
passing a law. They also allow for elements of a law to be updated and amended without re-
starting the entire legislative process. As such, delegated powers are a common and, in 
themselves, uncontroversial feature of government (EU Public Affairs Consultant A). In the 
EU, comitology was first introduced in the 1960s to deal with the more technical aspects of 
the CAP and agriculture remains one of the most active sectors – in 2011, just one of its 18 
new-comitology committees met 76 times (Brandsma, 2013: 33).  
In contemporary EU policy-making, new comitology is used in almost every sector; each year 
the EU produces around 60 to 70 legislative acts, but adopts over 2000 delegated and 
implementing acts; the content of these acts is theoretically technical, but it is often central to 
the meaning and effect of the legislation and is commonly quite political in nature (EU Public 
Affairs Consultant B). Delegated acts give the Commission great freedom, preventing the 
Council or the Parliament from amending its proposals and requiring large majorities to 
secure a veto. Implementing acts require that proposals are put before and take account of 
opinions from committees of member state experts. These national representatives commonly 
come from the civil service or relevant ministries but can come from any background. This 
creates an immediate geographical imbalance, since larger member states have more experts 
to choose from, and raises concerns about the independence and vested interests of the 
representatives present. As such, and particularly in the revised form introduced in the Lisbon 
Treaty, comitology can be seen to have taken on a new and less benign character. 
The TPD contains more than 20 implementing and delegated acts. The implementing acts 
provide for the use of dedicated committees to decide which additives should be on the 
priority list for enhanced reporting, what technical specifications should be used for the 
layout, design, and shape of combined health warnings, and what standards shall be adopted 
for the establishment and operation of the tracking and tracing system, among other 
provisions. The delegated acts give the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts 
regulating emissions levels, additive levels and the picture library for use in package health 
warnings, for example. There is concern among the health community that some of the 
provisions pushed into delegated and implementing acts significantly affect the functioning of 
the policy and should have been dealt with in the body of the Directive (EU Health NGO C). 
In the list of diseases mentioned on health warnings, for instance, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (COPD) has been left out as a result of insufficient expertise in this area on 
the committee responsible (EU Health NGO I). Comitology procedures are also remarkably 
difficult for civil society groups to influence, raising questions about the accountability of 
health governance.  
Comitology is an early example of a governance tool developed to deal with increasingly 
complex and prolific EU policy. Similarly, the NMGs emerged during the 1990s in response 
to the ‘gridlocks’ facing EU policy activity which increasingly encroached upon areas of high 
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 Officially, the system known as ‘comitology’ no longer exists, having been replaced by delegated 
and implementing acts in the Lisbon Treaty (Articles 290 and 291 TFEU). However, this article adopts 
the commonly-used term ‘new comitology’ to refer to post-2010 delegated powers procedures.  
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political sensitivity, such as health, welfare and education (Héritier, 2002: 187). Emblematic 
of the ‘…inherent ability of the EU…to constantly reinvent itself as part of an evolutionary 
process of…survival’, these approaches departed from the traditional community method of 
policy-making by including private actors in policy formation (Szyszczak, 2006: 487). The 
group of instruments referred to as the NMGs includes voluntary performance standards, self- 
and co-regulation mechanisms, social benchmarking, target setting and non-binding 
agreements, among others. They have in common their emphasis on voluntarism, subsidiarity 
and inclusion and they seek to influence policy and behaviour through learning, diffusion, 
persuasion, peer pressure and standardisation of knowledge (Héritier, 2002: 187). The most 
widely studied of the NMGs is the OMC, designed to facilitate the exchange of information, 
the establishment of benchmarks of good practice and the development of non-binding policy 
guidelines in areas where harmonisation is not possible (McKee et al., 2004b).  
Since many aspects of health policy are considered national responsibilities and agreement on 
binding EU regulation is difficult to achieve, the NMGs have been extensively applied in this 
area. Examples include the networks on rare diseases, eHealth and HTA introduced as part of 
the Directive on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare (Greer, 2011), joint actions in the 
areas of cancer control, health workforce and health inequalities, and the Pharmaceutical 
Forum, which played a leading role in medicines ItP policy development. Furthermore, the 
Amsterdam Treaty extended the original employment-focused OMC to cover pensions, social 
inclusion, health and migration. The SPC, which oversees the health policy strand of the 
OMC, was established in 2004 to coordinate approaches to a variety of health issues in line 
with the commitment to the European Social Model outlined in the Lisbon Strategy. Its initial 
aims were deliberately vague, however, so as to provoke as little opposition as possible and, 
consequently, it is comparatively less advanced than its equivalents in the social inclusion and 
pension fields (Mossialos et al., 2010; Steffen, 2005: 40).  
Both the comitology procedure and the NMGs play a significant role in contemporary health 
governance. The use of the former is particularly interesting as an indication of what issues 
are considered ‘technical’ and how their resolution via a non-legislative procedure affects 
their content. The latter provides an insight into the creative licence used by the Commission 
in obfuscating the limits to its legal authority in health and the strength of soft law as an 






Figure 9: Summary of health policy dynamics, case study four 
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Burden-shifting, high consensus (safety) 
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Top-down & indirect Europeanisation 
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THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN HEALTH 
The case of patient mobility policy 
The development of EU patient mobility legislation – often referred to as cross-border 
healthcare legislation – has been described by a leading expert in the field as a ‘solution 
without a problem’12. Forced onto the European agenda by a series of judgements handed 
down by the CJEU, for member states it represented the first major threat to the financing of 
health systems and the first unanticipated exposure of those systems to free movement 
principles. Its academic significance is substantial as a case study in judicial activism, legally-
driven integration and ‘uninvited Europeanization’ whilst for policy-makers, its implications 
for national health systems, quality of and access to care offer great potential for policy 
learning and the improvement of health systems (Baeten, 2012; Fahy, 2010; Greer, 2006). 
However, the number of patients seeking healthcare abroad is small and, in most cases, those 
for whom cross-border care holds potential benefit have been accessing such care without the 
help of an EU legal framework for some years (Footman et al., 2014; McKee et al., 2013).  
Whereas the medicines ItP and tobacco control cases illustrate the role of the free movement 
of goods in EU health policy, patient mobility policy has been the battle-ground for the 
application of free movement of services law to national health systems. Furthermore, it is an 
insightful example of changing health governance, with the Court setting the parameters of 
policy decisions and forcing a rights-based approach to policy-making. Finally, in terms of 
competence creep and expanding the EU’s activity in health, the resulting directive introduced 
a raft of new mechanisms for cooperation and is widely considered to represent the pinnacle 
of momentum in EU health policy.  
What is meant by patient mobility policy? 
Discussions of patient mobility generally centre around five ‘categories’ of mobile patient: 
tourists and those seeking emergency care as temporary visitors abroad; people retiring to 
other countries and demanding care in their new place of residence; people living in border 
regions where the nearest or preferable care facility is in a neighbouring state; patients seeking 
care abroad on their own initiative because of perceived benefits in cost, quality, etc. and; 
patients sent abroad by their national health systems for specialised care or to serve domestic 
policy goals (such as challenging care provision monopolies) (Rosenmöller et al., 2006). 
Provisions for migrant workers are covered by regulation on the coordination of social 
security systems, which also contains provisions for emergency care, the first category 
identified above, through the E111 (and more recently the European health insurance card, 
EHIC) systems. However, the need for a policy framework to coordinate care across the other 
four categories only emerged on the European agenda with the application of free movement 
law to the health sector.  
The historical evolution of EU patient mobility policy 
Provisions to facilitate the receipt of planned or unplanned healthcare in another member state 
are not new. Based on the free movement of persons provisions in the founding treaties, a 
mechanism was set up in 1958 to coordinate social security entitlements for migrant workers 
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 Senior figure quoted by Palm and Wismar (2014) during a workshop on cross-border care, delivered 
at the European Health Forum Gastein in October 2014.  
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moving within the European Economic Area (Bertinato et al., 2005: 7). These arrangements 
were codified in Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72 to ensure that certain groups, under strictly 
defined circumstances, could access healthcare abroad based on the coordination, rather than 
the harmonisation of systems (McKee et al., 2004a: 158). The Regulations enabled care to be 
sought in two specific situations: occasional care arising during a temporary stay, to be 
addressed with an E111 form, and planned care, arranged with the ‘sending’ member state and 
requiring prior authorisation via an E112 form. In 1998 a revision of the arrangements for 
coordinating social security systems was undertaken, the primary outcome of which was the 
introduction of the EHIC
13
. This replaced the existing E111 form and was designed to foster 
growth and jobs as part of the Lisbon Agenda, by making cross-border care easier to access 
and the benefits of the EU more visible to citizens (Bertinato et al., 2005: 8).  
Up until this point, the legal basis for cross-border care had drawn upon the principle of free 
movement of people but, in the 1990s, a series of cases brought before the CJEU began to 
forge a basis for cross-border care in the provisions on the free movement of services 
(Footman et al., 2014: 5). 
The Court of Justice and the legal response 
The transformation of patient mobility policy was prompted, in the first instance, by two court 
cases in which EU citizens contested the restrictive pre-authorisation requirements of the 
existing framework (Bertinato et al., 2005: 8). In linked cases, two residents from 
Luxembourg took their national sickness funds to court for refusing to reimburse treatment 
received in another member state. Both treatments constituted planned care; neither had 
obtained the required prior-authorisation from their home institution. In its rulings in Kohll 
and Decker, the CJEU found that health is an economic activity provided in exchange for 
remuneration, irrespective of the type of care or system and that, in most cases, prior 
authorisation thus constitutes a barrier to free movement. The Court acknowledged that 
member states should be allowed to require prior authorisation in certain situations where it is 
necessary to protect the planning and contracting of health systems – this reasoning was 
termed ‘overriding general interest’. However, in the cases of Mr Kohll and Mr Decker, the 
Court found no such justification and ruled that the sickness funds issue the reimbursements 
as requested.  
The Kohll and Decker cases sent waves through the European and national health 
communities, ‘unleashing a flurry of political and academic discussion about the precise 
implications of these rulings that…offer[ed] very little detail of what they meant in practice’ 
(Rosenmöller et al., 2006: 2). The conference organised to address these pressing issues and 
its resulting publications, noted in chapter four, brought forward for the first time the idea of a 
coherent ‘EU’ health policy (McKee et al., 2002; Mossialos and McKee, 2002). What 
followed was more than a decade of case law and a relative explosion of EU health policy 
literature.  
Having established the initial principle, the Court presided over a succession of further cases 
which refined and further delimited the circumstances under which a patient may expect 
                                                          
13
 Amendment to Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72 was made in Regulation 883/2004 and again in 
Regulation 988/2009. Each of these successive revisions has sought to streamline and simplify the 
coordination of social security systems for migrant workers, temporary workers and students but has 
not affected the content of health or social security provisions.  
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reimbursement for care sought abroad
14
. In Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, the Court reiterated 
its finding that hospital care is an economic service in the sense of the Treaty but clarified that 
such care, requiring planning in order to guarantee a rationalised, stable, balanced and 
accessible supply of hospital services, could require prior authorisation so long as this was 
necessary, proportionate and based on objective criteria (Palm et al., 2011: 27). In Vanbraekel, 
the Court gave further details on reimbursement, ruling that where both the free movement 
principles and Regulation 1408/71 apply, patients should be reimbursed at the higher level, so 
as not to discourage them from seeking care abroad. In Müller-Fauré and Van Riet, the Court 
held that the principles elucidated thus far applied to all kinds of health and reimbursement 
system, whether it be a restitution or a benefits-in-kind system. It was also in this linked case 
that the concept of ‘undue delay’ was elaborated, meaning that patients could expect to be 
reimbursed for treatment that was available at home but was subject to an unacceptable 
waiting time. Finally in Watts, a case brought in 2006, the CJEU stated that the obligation to 
reimburse also applies to health systems which, like the UK National Health Service, provide 
their services free of charge. The ruling went on to outline a framework process in which the 
cost of care should be calculated and compared to the objectively quantified cost in the home 
country. 
Political negotiation and the legislative response 
As the case law progressed the European Commission, urged by member states keen to adopt 
a legislative solution that would end the flow of rulings, introduced a number of instruments 
to construct a political framework. The High Level Reflection Process on Patient Mobility, 
launched in 2003, created a set of recommendations across the three Commission departments 
responsible for health, social affairs and the internal market (European Commission, 2003). In 
2004 a communication was issued defining the topics on which work would focus and 
establishing the High Level Group on Health Services and Medical Care to take forward the 
Reflection Process recommendations (European Commission, 2004; Rosenmöller et al., 2006: 
3).  
Having collated a clear overview of the areas where solutions were required, the Commission 
made a first attempt to legislate on the issue of patient mobility in the Services Directive, 
which sought to create an overarching EU regime for the regulation of services. The Directive 
was criticised on a number of levels but in particular, the inclusion of health was rebuked and 
after two years of negotiations, the Parliament agreed to adopt only if health was removed 
(Palm and Glinos, 2010). When the Directive was approved in 2006 the Commission 
announced that it would seek to address the health services issue within a dedicated directive 
and, indicating its tentative support for such a measure, the Council adopted a set of 
conclusions on common values and principles in EU health systems (Baeten, 2012: 9; Council 
of the EU, 2006). These conclusions were important because, whilst the Council did not 
intend for them to become a binding set of minimum standards, they reflected the 
understanding of the hour, which was that a common market requires health systems to 
converge on some level, since the presence of weaker and less expensive health systems in 
some countries creates divergence in costs and distorts competition (Academic Expert, EU 
Health Policy B).  
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 The summary which follows is abridged from the overview given in Palm et al. (2011).  
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Soon thereafter the Commission initiated a public consultation, a Eurobarometer survey and a 
study by the WHO European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies and, in 2008, 
published its legislative proposal for a directive. 
The Directive on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border 
healthcare 
The process for adopting the directive was long, since it sought to move the legal basis for 
action away from the free movement of services and towards a patients’ and citizens’ rights 
imperative (Footman et al., 2014: 7). It also sought to take an integrated approach, 
‘…incorporating not only financial elements but also addressing the wider ‘flanking’ 
measures’ needed to reassure patients and providers (Palm et al., 2011: 32). As such, member 
states feared it might infringe upon national competence for the planning and contracting of 
services and were wary of its impact on the provision of rationalised, stable, balanced and 
accessible hospital care (Bertinato et al., 2005: 9). To address this, the legal base of the 
proposal was changed from a single reliance on the internal market provisions (Article 114 
TFEU) to a split legal base with the public health article (Article 168 TFEU). This also 
allowed for the inclusion of a number of cooperation and coordination measures and 
facilitated the expansion of the original scope of the text (Baeten, 2012: 12).  
The adopted Directive does not create new patient entitlements but rather clarifies existing 
ones (Baeten and Palm, 2012)
15
. It states that EU citizens have the right to reimbursement 
when receiving care in another state and that this reimbursement should be given up to the 
cost of the same treatment at home, where neither sets of fees can discriminate between 
domestic and travelling patients. It allows member states to make reimbursement subject to 
prior authorisation only where the care being received is a) an overnight stay or b) highly-
specialised or cost-intensive, and permits refusal of prior application only where there is no 
undue delay at home or where the cost of reimbursement would threaten the overriding 
general interest of the health system. These exceptions exist to protect the planning and 
financing of sustainable health coverage. The quality and safety standards and relevant 
legislation of the country of treatment apply and a set of minimum patients’ rights are 
enumerated – they include provisions for appeal against decisions of authorisation and 
reimbursement, redress and compensation, privacy and access to health records and non-
discrimination. Finally the Directive requires that member states establish national contact 
points to provide information to incoming and outgoing patients, encourages them to engage 
in frameworks for enhanced coordination in eHealth and HTA, and provides for the creation 
of a European reference network.  
The deadline for transposition into national law was set for October 2013 and in 2015 the 
Commission published its first report on the implementation of the Directive (European 
Commission, 2015b). The actual impact upon patient consumption of cross-border care and 
health system financing is acknowledged to have been minimal – of only 560 applications for 
prior authorisation in 2014, just 360 were granted – but where services are being consumed 
abroad, problems in the provision of information and continuity of care remain (European 
Commission, 2015b: 5; EPHA, 2015a; Panteli et al., 2015).  
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 Overview of the Directive’s provisions adapted from Rowan (2014).  
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The integration and Europeanisation of patient mobility policy 
The cross-border healthcare case is one of the clearest possible examples of both sectoral and 
vertical integration by neofunctionalism in health. In response to a functional policy problem 
created by the free movement principles, member states conceded sovereignty in a specific 
area of policy and created a harmonised policy framework at the European level. Furthermore, 
evidence of cultivated spillover can be seen in the tactical addition of coordinating and 
cooperating health measures which were not strictly necessary for the functioning of the 
policy, such as the networks on HTA and eHealth, but which further expand the EU’s activity 
in health. Finally, during the drafting of the Directive – and the initial attempt to subsume 
health into the Services Directive – supranational-level interest groups played an active role, 
calling for an explicit public health basis and greater emphasis on patients’ rights (EPHA, 
2008b).  
Member states were central in granting the Commission a mandate to pursue an EU-level 
policy framework and the final Directive has maintained significant ‘steering capacity’ for 
national governments, but it is difficult to imply an intergovernmental model of integration; 
Greer (2006: 143) describes patient mobility as ‘a dramatic case of neofunctional spillover 
dynamics, driven by the Court and provoking activity in a policy sector where no member 
state intended it’. In the marked absence of national demand for an EU health services policy, 
the Court ‘…set in motion a dynamic that governments and health policy actors [could] not 
escape’, leaving them with minimal discretion in building a legislative framework around the 
case law (Lamping, 2005: 30; Baeten, 2012: 6).  
Since the Directive came into force in October 2013 national health systems have been 
required to adapt and comply with the EU framework in a model of top-down 
Europeanisation. This process has not been seamless – infringement proceedings were opened 
against 26 member states and four remained open in July 2015, as a result of incomplete 
transposition of the Directive’s measures (European Commission, 2015b: 1). Furthermore, the 
assumption that fit or misfit dictates the degree or efficiency of transposition is called into 
question by Austria’s rejection of the Directive. Despite being the only country that did not 
need to change its internal legislation in order to comply with the EU rules – suggesting a 
strong ‘goodness of fit’, successful uploading and likely support of the legislation – Austria 
voted against the Directive in the Council. This decision is attributed to the multi-level nature 
of hospital funding in the Austrian system and the influence of the regions on the national 
position (Kostera, 2013).  
However, even before the Directive was finalised, adaptation to the principles enunciated in 
the Court’s judgements could be seen. For instance, Baeten (2012: 7) notes evidence of 
changes in contracting by sickness funds in the Netherlands and the promotion of domestic 
healthcare facilities for export in Belgium and Poland. Furthermore, it is argued that the 
Directive might have an impact even in those areas, such as quality and standards of care, 
which are reserved as national responsibilities. The literature suggest that there is significant 
potential for the Directive to ‘become a lever to change domestic policy and practice beyond 
the strict legal scope of the Directive’, in areas such as transparency of cost calculation and 
provision of information on quality, safety and health professional records (Baeten and Jelfs, 
2012: 26; Rowan, 2014). As such, a form of indirect Europeanisation, top-down in nature but 
beyond the explicit scope of the Directive, can be seen.  
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The process of negotiation and litigation which led to the adoption of the patients’ rights 
Directive also contributed to the broader Europeanisation of health. Hervey and McHale 
(2015: 51) identify the debate, prompted by the Services Directive and embodied in the cross-
border healthcare provisions, as the catalyst for the development of a set of ‘common values 
and principles’ in EU health systems. The stated values and principles – universality, access, 
equity, solidarity, quality, safety, evidence-based ethical care, patient involvement, redress, 
privacy and confidentiality – were adopted by the CoEU in 2006 and subsequently endorsed 
by the Commission and the European Parliament, and are referenced in the PHAPs and other 
EU legislation. Though questions remain about the practical realisation of such values, their 
role in fostering greater coherence in EU health law and further Europeanisation of health 
policy is significant (Hervey and McHale, 2015: 52).  
The governance of patient mobility policy 
The literature on patient mobility concludes unanimously that this is both an integrated and a 
Europeanised area of health. It emphasises the distinct role of the Court in these processes, 
describing the evolution of policy as ‘legally-driven neofunctionalism’ and ‘Europeanisation 
via case law’ (Greer, 2006; Steffen et al., 2005: 5), but it also notes the entrepreneurial role of 
the Commission. Supported by the Court, Commission officials successfully harnessed the 
political demand for an explicit legal basis for health, as well as the broad concern to avoid a 
similar framing as the Services Directive, and used this to its advantage. For the Commission 
the goal of the Directive, in addition to replacing judicial policy-making with executive 
control, was to ‘get a foot in the door’ and establish the EU’s role in health systems policy 
(Academic Expert, EU Health Policy B; UK health association, EU Liaison A). Some felt that 
it went too far – an interviewee from the Parliament noted that ‘there were genuine issues in 
[the] cross-border healthcare [debate]…but the Commission response was excessive, 
expanding specific points to general principles’ (Member of European Parliament B). Others 
viewed the legislation as a ‘Christmas tree’:  
‘Essentially, the Services Directive made clear that dedicated health legislation was 
needed but patient mobility, in and of itself, was not sufficiently interesting to warrant 
attention. Thus an opportunity was presented to add things in. These things weren’t 
drawn from thin air, they were existing projects or ideas, but they were now formalised or 
made more permanent.’ (European Commission, Health Directorate C).  
Riding on momentum and a sense of optimism from other health policy activity, in areas such 
as professional qualifications, tobacco control and pharmaceutical policy, the Commission’s 
strategic action might be understood as opportunity politics (European Commission, Health 
Directorate C; Academic Expert, EU Health Policy A). The ‘additional’ provisions on 
eHealth, HTA and reference networks ‘put in place a new conversation’ on the EU’s role in 
health systems, feeding into the discussion of health as an economic sector and eventually 
resulting in the Communication on effective, accessible and resilient health systems in April 
2014 (European Commission, Health Directorate E).  
The patient mobility case is a good example of the difficulty inherent in attempting to separate 
technical from political elements of health policy. One interviewee noted that ‘patient 
mobility and health equity are the political aspects of health – everything else is technical or 
clinical’ (EU Health NGO C, emphasis highlighted). The logistical and legal provisions which 
needed to be put in place in order to facilitate patient mobility, however, were fairly technical 
– a loose consensus on the rights and responsibilities involved was in place early in the 
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drafting process, not least because such rights and responsibilities had already been stipulated 
by the Court and therefore were not open for negotiation. Even the decision to use a separate 
directive, rather than incorporating the necessary provisions into the existing regulations on 
social security coordination, was essentially a technical one, based on whether the scopes and 
objectives could be sufficiently aligned (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy B).  
However, during the drafting process, certain and specific technical issues became the cause 
of political debate – the inclusion of a second legal basis and of reimbursement for non-
contracted providers are two such examples (Baeten, 2012). The argument that health could 
not be considered a service like any other, used to justify exemption from the Services 
Directive, led to an integrated approach by the Commission which raised opposition in the 
legislature. The original name for the Directive, for instance, was changed from ‘Directive on 
safe, high-quality and efficient cross-border health care’ at the insistence of member states 
wary of its implicit implications for subsidiarity (Palm et al., 2011: 34). Furthermore, whilst 
cross-border care was a fairly routine notion for countries which share borders, it was 
inherently more political for the UK and Ireland, for example (UK health association, EU 
Liaison A). As the first explicit measure to address the market’s role in health services and the 
first explicit statement on the EU’s role in health systems, the Directive was a highly political 
issue. As a result, the Commission team involved in the drafting and negotiation process, 
though containing much technical expertise, saw itself at the interface between the technical 
and political discussions and perceived the process as a political one (Academic Expert, EU 
Health Policy B).  
As a result of the political demand for a legislative solution, the relative strength of the 
Commission as the leader of the legislative process and the careful balance between technical 
and political considerations, patient mobility policy is now governed by framework 
regulation. However, the EU institutions have also made use of softer provisions to support 
and underpin the Directive – targeting via the High Level Reflection Process and its 
recommendations was key to ‘testing the water’ with potential policy options, whilst Council 
conclusions were used to guide the draft proposal and the results of Eurobarometer and WHO 
Observatory research to inform its content. The patient mobility case is also widely 
recognised as the prime example of health governance via litigation and supplementary law. 
Case law is not a policy instrument but can be used by the EU institutions, member states and 
other actors to support, justify or inspire policy positions or proposals. In the patient mobility 
case, the interpretation of the Court aligned with the desired direction of the Commission, as 
opposed to that of national governments, and provided the executive with an additional ‘tool’ 
or ‘lever’ in the policy-making process.  
Horizontal themes in EU health policy: the role of the Court 
The patient mobility, tobacco control and medicines ItP cases are all examples of the kind of 
policy which forms at the frontier between health and the free movement principles, as 
captured in the second stem of EU health policy. In all of these cases, the choice and 
justification of legal base has been an important determinant of policy instrument and mode of 
governance; in some instances, as seen in the previous chapter, this has led to an increased 
role for soft law. Where hard law has prevailed, however, the development of ‘second stem 
health policy’ has elevated a different actor – the CJEU. As the creativity around the legal 
base has increased, so too has the prevalence of legal challenge and contestation. This has 
come firstly from governments and interest groups in the legislative process, as seen in the 
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tobacco control case and, secondly, from individual citizens, as seen in the development of 
patient mobility policy. The demand for judicial ruling has given the Court a central role in 
the development of EU health policy and sparked a debate in the literature on the nature and 
implication of this role.  
Academic interest in the role of the Court ignited in the early 1990s with studies of 
constitutionalisation and the unique nature of the EU’s legal system. For neofunctionalism, 
the Court is identified as an agent of neofunctional spillover and an ‘unsung hero’ of revived 
integration (Burley and Mattli, 1993: 41). For intergovernmentalism, the Court’s power is 
mitigated by the fact that it can only act ‘…through discreet decisions on concrete issues’ and, 
since national governments control the integration process, its decisions are ‘…likely to 
accord with the interests of powerful states’ (Moravcsik, 1993: 624; Garrett, 1992: 537). 
Furthermore, national courts can chose, and in the past have on occasion chosen, to stem the 
Court’s influence by not referring a matter for preliminary ruling and instead interpreting EU 
law as they see fit, thus exercising a ‘gate-keeping’ role in the Court-based development of 
EU jurisprudence (Hervey and McHale, 2015: 56). Both schools now recognise, however, that 
the doctrines of supremacy, direct effect, state liability and mutual recognition, among other 
innovations, have fundamentally altered the personality and potential of the European project.  
‘…it is indisputable that these doctrines, once institutionalised, radically expanded the 
Court’s own zone of discretion and reconstituted the EU as a quasi-federal legal system, 
comparable to other federal fields…Once constructed as a kind of central nervous system 
for supranational, and multi-level, governance, the legal system also sustained an ongoing 
judicialisation of policy-making within many important domains.’ (Stone Sweet, 2011: 
132) 
In health policy the Court has performed two main roles. Firstly, it has supported and 
facilitated the extension of the health mandate and the increasing impact of EU law on 
national health systems. Discussing social policy more broadly, Rhodes (2010) notes the 
importance of the ongoing cycles of the ‘treaty-base game’, in which the Court supports the 
Commission in ‘…stretch[ing] as far as possible the interpretation of “health and safety”’. 
Duncan (2002: 1029) goes as far as to depict the Court and its generous rulings as the 
‘wildcard’ of EU health policy and the EU’s institutional framework. The relevant literature 
widely concurs that the extension of EU activity into health systems via patient mobility 
policy, creeping beyond the boundaries of competence envisaged in the treaties, could not 
have been achieved without the support of the Court or the provisions for state liability and 
litigation by individual citizens (Greer, 2006; 2008; Lamping, 2005).  
The Court’s second role in EU health policy stems from its position as protector of the 
fundamental principles and freedoms enshrined in the founding treaties. Judgements such as 
Kohll and Decker, though considered a turning point, endogenous shock and critical juncture 
in health policy, did not represent new legal thinking or judicial innovation (Mossialos et al., 
2010: 28). Some application of the internal market rules to social security systems had already 
been explored in the 1981 Duphar ruling and the Court was acting within its mandate in 
interpreting the available law in order to address policy gaps (Mossialos et al., 2010: 29). This 
ties into a conception of the Court as neither a driver nor an irrelevant bystander in the process 
of European integration, but rather as an indirect shaper of the broader environment and 
creator of the necessary conditions for Europeanisation. Hervey (2012) uses the example of 
communicable diseases policy and the creation of the ECDC, an area without obvious Court 
intervention or entrepreneurship, to illustrate the Court’s role in shaping the institutional 
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context which facilitated the Europeanisation of a key area of health policy. In particular, the 
Court’s role in designating public health protection as an area of EU responsibility, in 
affirming the constitutional permissibility of EU agencies, in stating the necessity of 
legislation to protect public health and in preventing internal market law from undermining 
such legislation are identified as crucial to the form and substance of contemporary 
communicable disease policy (Hervey, 2012: 977).  A similar characterisation is presented by 
Martinsen (2005, citing Maduro, 1999): 
‘That Europe ever came to regulate national healthcare has not occurred as an output of 
rational political decision-making, but rather as a ‘side-effect’ of how the European Court 
of Justice gradually conferred a ‘supreme’ status to the free movement provisions in the 
EU legal construct and in this way interfered in virtually all areas of national law and 
policy.’ 
Thus the role and influence of the Court in the development of EU health policy, though not 








Figure 10: Summary of health policy dynamics, case study five 
Dynamic Catalyst and driver Actors, interests and politicisation Policy type and instruments Governance mode 
BTO policy 
Blood contamination crisis set agenda 
Mandate from member states 
Driven by Commission, micro-sector  
spillover to tissues & organs 
High macro-sectoral & vertical integration 
Public health actors, some market relevance 
but actors less visible 
Burden-shifting, high consensus (safety) 
Sensitivity, less consensus (ethics) 
Top-down & indirect Europeanisation 
Hard law (safety), soft (ethics) 








Council Presidency agenda-setter 
Commission/Parliament driver thereafter 
Cultivated spillover across micro-sectors 
High macro-sect, weak vert integration 
Health actors, epist communities & experts 
Mostly clinical actors (beginning) 
Some political actors (recent) 
Balance of uploading & downloading 
Soft/indirect Europeanisation 
Soft regulatory, education, 
market-based 
Recom. & resolutions 






Completion of the internal market 
Thalidomide tragedy (crisis) 
Commission (ENTR) driver, spillover 
High macro-sect & vert integration 
Market, business & health interests 
Intra-Commission divisions 
Market v health, little consensus 
Participatory approach to accommodate 










Completion of the internal market 
DG Santé driver, cultivated spillover 
Court role in legal challenges 
High macro-sect & vert integration 
(product standards) 
Market, business & health interests 
Strong interest groups & industry lobbies 
Intra-Commission divisions 
Int’l level influence important 
Top-down Europeanisation 
Hard law (product standards) 
Soft law (SFEs etc.) 









Case law (Bolkenstein) catalyst 
Commission driving actor, 
entrepreneurialism and expansionism 
Court support crucial factor 
Micro-sect & some vert integration 
Health actors, national governments 
Mandate expansion, opportunism, some 
technical aspects 
Political, defensive line from member states  
Top-down Europeanisation 
Hard law (mobility), soft law 
(extra provisions) 
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GOVERNING THROUGH A FISCAL LENS 
Health in the economic governance framework  
The final case study is slightly different in content and structure from those in the previous 
chapters
16. The inclusion of health in the EU’s strengthened economic governance framework 
represents the ‘cutting edge’ of health policy-making and research, having only become a 
reality in 2010 and evolving almost continually since then. It has significant implications for 
the actors, processes and fundamental objectives of health policy, introducing a fiscal 
dimension to existing policies and forging intervention into previously ‘off limits’ areas of 
health system organisation and financing.  
‘Just as the arrival of internal market law incorporated health into the laws and policies of 
the internal market, the arrival of potent new economic governance in the EU 
incorporates health into a structure built not to promote health but rather to promote 
economic stability through austerity.’ Greer (2014: 17) 
This chapter explores how health came to gain a fiscal dimension and to be included in 
instruments of economic governance. It first briefly maps the economic crisis, the EU’s short- 
and long-term responses, and how health has been included in the resulting policy 
frameworks. It then reviews the implications of the ‘third stem’ of health policy for the 
integration and Europeanisation of health, focusing on cooperation in health system 
organisation and reform. Finally, it explores the nature of health governance under these new 
frameworks, particularly in light of the de jure non-binding nature of the European Semester 
and the increasing use of conditionality as a tool for compliance.  
Setting the scene: the European ‘economic crisis’ 
The period described as the ‘economic crisis’ – beginning with the collapse of some of the 
world’s largest banks at the end of 2008 and continuing to the present tentative recovery 
period – comprises a series of individual catalysts and consequences17. The first, a banking 
crisis, originated in the US. Encouraged by the strength of the economy and high asset prices, 
US banks had historically provided extensive credit and made high risk investments, 
commonly issuing mortgages to individuals not fulfilling standard requirements. When the 
economy began to slow in 2007, over-extended homeowners were forced to default on their 
financial commitments, putting pressure on both the American banks which issued the loans 
and banks all over the world with linked investments. In 2008 Lehman Brothers, the fourth 
largest investment bank in the US, collapsed under the weight of its high-risk ventures, 
prompting its investors and trading partners to begin taking precautionary measures and to 
discontinue lending to one another. European banks with investments in the US market were 
hit hard, forcing many member states to bail out the worst affected; between 2008 and 2011 
national governments spent €1.6 trillion rescuing Europe’s banks (European Commission, 
2014c).  
                                                          
16
 It is also an iteration of a working paper presented at the UACES Student Forum Conference 
‘Evolving Europe: voices of the future’, held at Loughborough University, 8-9 July 2013.  
17
 This section closely mirrors EPHA (2014), a report written and published by the author during a 
fieldwork placement, which in turn draws heavily on the overview provided in European Commission 
(2014c). The term ‘economic crisis’, preferred in the majority of the literature, is used for ease of 
reference throughout the thesis.  
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The expense to governments during a period of poor economic performance caused investors 
to look more closely at national finances, revealing significant levels of debt and resulting in a 
dramatic increase in lending rates by markets no longer willing to bear high risk. It was this 
domino effect which turned the banking crisis into a sovereign debt crisis. When the markets 
began to scrutinise the health of member states’ finances, it became apparent that many 
governments had, for a number of years, been financing their budgets through unsustainable 
borrowing, accumulating dangerous levels of public debt. The prevailing economic recession 
served to exacerbate the problem, leaving member states struggling to maintain their 
economies with falling revenues, failing national banks and empty coffers. The sovereign debt 
crisis was met in many member states with programmes to reduce public spending and cut 
services, resulting in rising unemployment, growing inequality and the emergence of a pan-
European social crisis. It is within this difficult context that the EU and its member states have 
sought to strengthen their economic governance policies, to prevent the recurrence of such a 
crisis and to secure a European recovery.  
Economic governance in the EU 
The original structure for the coordination of economic policy between EU member states was 
set by the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. This introduced a ‘triad’ of measures, made up of the 
ECB (Article 105 TEU), the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP, Article 104 TEU) and the 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs, Article 99 TEU). These structures were 
supplemented as part of the EMU framework, unique in that it integrated monetary policy 
whilst leaving fiscal and structural policy under the control of member states. Some ‘soft’ 
policy coordination of the latter areas has historically been organised via the BEPGs and the 
corresponding Employment Guidelines, but this was only formalised in the 2000s.  
Two additional, complementary processes were introduced in the late 1990s. On the demand-
side, stabilisation policies such as the SGP and the Cologne Process encouraged 
macroeconomic discipline; on the supply-side, structural reform was prompted by the 
European Employment Strategy (EES) and the Cardiff Process of capital and market reform. 
These initiatives were followed in 2000 by the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, which 
institutionalised the regular Spring Councils that had emerged to coordinate decisions and 
developments within the EMU system and laid the foundations for the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
Finally the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in 2010, made a number of changes to the 
existing framework. In particular, it strengthened the role of the Commission in EMU by 
enabling it to address warnings to member states whose policies are inconsistent with the 
BEPGs or jeopardise the stability of the EMU framework.  
Crisis response: bailout packages and rescue funds 
As noted in chapter one, the short-term dimension of the EU’s response to the crisis saw the 
creation of a variety of financial assistance and rescue funds. The latter include the EERP, the 
EFSF and the EFSM, which were eventually streamlined under the ESM and which provide 
an emergency reserve for use in the event of future destabilisation.  
The former, commonly termed the ‘bailout packages’, provide financial assistance to 
countries under severe and immediate pressure. These are embodied in Memorandums of 
Understanding (MoUs) and are strongly linked to macroeconomic conditionality; member 
states must implement the required reforms – commonly laid out in Economic Adjustments 
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Programmes (EAPs) – in order to receive the agreed funding and this implementation is 
reviewed regularly by the European Commission, potentially resulting in sanctions for non-
compliance (Stamati and Baeten, 2015: 26).  
Long-term reform: strengthening the economic governance framework 
In addition to these short-term measures, the EU has initiated a series of reforms, significantly 
altering the pre-existing economic governance architecture. The resulting framework has five 
pillars: the SGP, the EuroPlus Pact, the Six Pack, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (TSCG) and the Two Pack (Figure 11).  
Figure 11: The five pillars of EU economic governance 
The five pillars of EU economic governance 
The Stability and Growth Pact 
Originally adopted in 1997, the SGP was reinforced as part of the Six Pack in 2011. Its 
overarching goal is to maintain budget discipline through a series of preventative and 
corrective measures which ensure fiscal policy is conducted sustainably and excessive deficits 
are corrected quickly. 
The EuroPlus Pact 
Adopted in March 2011 by 23 member states, the EuroPlus Pact commits Treaty parties to 
closer coordination of economic policy and tighter surveillance at the EU level. 
The Six Pack 
The Six Pack entered into force in December 2011. Importantly, it codifies the European 
Semester (see below) and makes a number of changes to the process, such as the introduction 
of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). The Six Pack consists of two regulations 
addressing macroeconomic imbalance surveillance, and four pieces of legislation – three 
regulations and a directive – which address fiscal surveillance. 
The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
Incorporating the Fiscal Compact Treaty, the TSCG was finalised in January 2012 and was 
adopted by all but two member states. Consequently, it is not part of EU law but rather is an 
international treaty. Its elements of fiscal policy coordination run parallel to the SGP and, as 
the Lisbon Strategy institutionalised the Spring Council meetings, so the TSCG 
institutionalises the summits of the euro area leaders. Its other key provisions include the 
introduction of a ‘balanced budget’ rule, requiring adherence to a medium term objective 
(MTO) under threat of sanctions. 
The Two Pack 
Adopted in March 2013, the Two Pack is a pair of regulations, applicable to euro area member 
states only, which contributes to the further strengthening of budgetary surveillance. The 
regulations provide for a separate European Semester for euro area member states, with 
enhanced monitoring and assessment of draft budgetary plans and greater surveillance of 
member states experiencing or threatened by financial difficulty. 
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The reform of the EU’s economic governance framework is undertaken in the context of the 
Europe 2020 Strategy. Launched in 2010 to reinvigorate the flagging Lisbon Strategy, the 
Europe 2020 Strategy mobilises existing EU policies in pursuit of smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth (European Commission, 2010a). This pursuit, the Commission noted, must 
be supported by a strengthening of the economic governance framework and greater economic 
policy coordination between the national and the European levels (European Commission, 
2010a: 6). The mechanism identified for ensuring such coordination is the European Semester 
of policy coordination.  
The Semester synchronises the various reporting and assessment cycles of the economic 
governance instruments into one coherent process
18
. The Semester is divided into two stages 
(Figure 12) – the first is dedicated to coordination at the EU level, whilst the second is 
reserved for the incorporation of EU objectives into national budgets. It begins with the 
publication of the Commission’s ‘priorities for Europe’ in the Annual Growth Survey (AGS) 
each November. Governments use the AGS to ensure their National Reform Programmes 
(NRPs), submitted to the EU in late Spring, are in line with EU objectives. On the basis of the 
AGS, the NRPs and a vast range of other reports and analysis, the EU then drafts a CSR for 
each member state, describing the measures which should be taken to ensure healthy public 
finances. This final adoption signals the end of the first stage of the Semester; member states 
now take these recommendations back to their national discussions and integrate them into 
domestic budgets and reform strategies.  
                                                          
18
 Space constraints preclude a detailed exposition of this complex process but the core procedure is 
briefly outlined – for an excellent overview in the social context see Zeitlin and Vanhercke (2015).  
Figure 12: The European Semester of policy coordination 
Source: Eudraconia.org 
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Health in the economic governance framework 
This section examines how health has been included in the EU economic governance 
framework both historically and, in particular, since the economic crisis. The framing of 
health as an ‘economic’ sector is not entirely new; the SGP required the European Council to 
publish the annual BEPGs, which historically included reference to pensions, health and long-
term care systems. Whilst the guidance offered on pension reforms became increasingly 
prescriptive and concrete, the recommendations on health and long-term care remained broad 
and generic, respecting the role of subsidiarity in the organisation and financing of these 
sensitive sectors (Baeten and Thomson, 2012: 2). However, the onset of the economic crisis 
accelerated and intensified the role of health system reform in economic governance, 
fundamentally altering the actors, processes and objectives of EU health policy.  
Health in the financial assistance mechanisms 
The thesis is primarily interested in the governance of health in the long-term macroeconomic 
instruments but insight from the short-term mechanisms is briefly described first. The MoUs 
issued to Greece, Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal and Romania all contain detailed instructions for 
reforming the health care sector (Stamati and Baeten, 2015: 27). In the Portuguese case, 
savings of EUR 664 million were required and the MoU laid out a number of measures for 
achieving this reduction, targeting pharmaceuticals, training and retirement of health 
professionals and stricter exemptions from user charges (Barros, 2012: 17-18). The 2012 
Cypriot MoU contained many measures to support the introduction of the delayed Global 
Health Insurance Scheme but also a number of contradictory requirements. In particular, it 
sought the removal of the ‘Class B’ category of benefits, which provided subsidised care to 
those on low incomes, though research indicates that expenditure on this small pool of 
patients constituted a minimal burden on the health system (Cylus et al., 2013). In Greece, 
arguably the hardest-hit economy and most heavily-targeted health system, an early MoU 
stipulation to cap health expenditure at six per cent of GDP – already a low figure by 
European standards, made worse by the falling value of the national economy – was 
accompanied by the merger of health insurance schemes, the reform of pharmaceutical 
policies, reduction of the health workforce, changes in the purchasing of health services and 
blanket cuts to health sector budgets (Karanikolos et al., 2013; Kentikelenis and Papanicolas, 
2011).  
The MoUs each seek a reduction in health expenditure as their primary aim, targeting, in the 
first instance, spending on pharmaceuticals via negotiation of reduced prices, use of electronic 
prescribing, implementation of prescribing guidelines and increased use of generics (Stamati 
and Baeten, 2015: 27). Beyond this initial strand of reform, however, the measures required 
begin to impact upon principles of universal access and high quality care. Restructuring (and, 
in some instances, closure) of hospitals, changes to payment and reimbursement systems, 
adjustment of baskets of care and benefits packages, reform of insurance funds and reduction 
of the health workforce have tangible impacts on the ability of the health system to deliver 
care and of patients to access it. As such, the increasingly prescriptive nature of EU 
intervention in health systems has revealed tensions between the goals of reducing public 
expenditure and maintaining comprehensive access to care (Baeten and Thomson, 2012: 8).  
Chapter 11 | Case study 6 
106 
Health in the European Semester 
Whilst the targeting of health policies in the financial assistance programmes represents an 
unprecedented degree of intervention and prescription, the measures are temporary in nature, 
tied directly to the receipt of finite loans and bailout packages. By contrast, the European 
Semester is an institutionalised, ongoing process in which measures are presented as ‘soft’ 
recommendations from the Commission and tread a fine line between intervention in areas of 
strict subsidiarity and guidance in areas of common European concern
19
.  
The status of health in the documents and recommendations of the European Semester closely 
mirrors the experience of the Semester itself. Successive iterations have seen the various 
processes tweaked and adjusted and the volume of targeted recommendations increase. 
Similarly, from no mention in the first AGS and scant few references in the first round of 
CSRs, the number of measures featuring health steadily increased, peaking at health-related 
CSRs for 19 countries in 2014 (EPHA, 2015b: 8). In 2015, the Commission undertook a 
streamlining exercise, seeking to reduce the scope and number of recommendations made, 
with references to health moderated to reflect this. At the time of writing, the 2016 AGS has 
been published but the 2016 CSRs have not; these are thus excluded from the analysis.  
Health in the Annual Growth Survey 
Health was first introduced into the AGS in 2012. The 2012, 2013 and 2014 Surveys are 
roughly similar, all noting the potential of the health sector for providing employment, the 
role of health in social protection systems, the need to reform health systems to improve cost-
efficiency and sustainability, and the importance of the internal market for health services. 
The 2013 AGS goes a little further, introducing the notion of ‘transparent pricing in healthcare 
services’ and the need to assess health systems according to ‘the twin aim of a more efficient 
use of public resources and access to high quality healthcare' (European Commission, 2012d: 
9; 5). In these first three years, health appeared under headings relating to ‘fiscal 
consolidation’ and ‘addressing the social consequences of the crisis’, framing the targets of 
Commission guidance as, one the one hand, health expenditure and, on the other, public 
health policies.  
In 2015, despite the broader strategy to reduce the scope of the Semester, health appeared for 
the first time under the heading ‘structural reforms’. The AGS notes that ‘'Healthcare systems 
need to be reformed to provide quality health care through efficient structures’. It also 
discusses the use of the SGP and states that ‘Each Member State is assessed individually, 
taking into account…national challenges posed by ageing, including in the areas of pension 
and health care policies’ (European Commission, 2014d: 13; 15). This theme of flexibility is 
further built upon in the 2016 Survey, which addresses health as an investment item for the 
first time, noting the potential of the Structural Funds for such use (European Commission, 
2015c: 9). Somewhat paradoxically, it also contains the most detail on health seen to date: 
‘Member States need to introduce measures to ensure a sustainable financing basis, 
encourage the provision of and access to effective primary health care services, the cost-
effective use of medicines, better public procurement, improve integration of care 
through up to date information channels (such as e-health), assess the relative 
                                                          
19
 This section reviews the inclusion of health in the European Semester by looking at the AGS and the 
CSRs. The NRPs and other constituent parts are not reviewed in detail, since the primary interest here 
is the EU’s intervention, which is most accurately captured in documents drafted at European level.  
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effectiveness of health technologies and to encourage health promotion and disease 
prevention.’ (European Commission, 2015c: 15) 
Health in the Country Specific Recommendations 
The precise number of ‘health-related CSRs’ issued by the European Commission varies 
according to the criteria used; for instance, whether mention of health within 
recommendations which target the innovation sector constitute ‘health-related’ guidance. 
Adapting data from Azzopardi-Muscat et al. (2015: 379, Table 1), which includes reference to 
long-term care and mentions of health in other policy sectors, and updating in accordance with 
EPHA (2015b) and primary research to include the 2015 CSRs, the number of countries 
receiving health-related CSRs in the Semester to date is summarised in Figure 13.  
Figure 13: Health-related CSRs by country, 2011-2015 
Source: Adapted from Azzopardi-Muscat et al. (2015), EPHA (2015b) and primary research. 
EAP/MoU = bailout or adjustment programme requirement.  
Year 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 
Austria Y Y Y Y Y 
Belgium N Y Y Y N 
Bulgaria Y Y Y Y N 
Croatia Y - - - - 
Cyprus EAP (Y) EAP (Y) EAP (Y) Y Y 
Czech Republic Y Y Y N N 
Denmark N N N N N 
Estonia N N N N N 
Finland Y Y Y N N 
France Y Y Y N N 
Germany N Y Y Y Y 
Greece MoU (Y) EAP (Y) EAP (Y) EAP (Y) EAP (Y) 
Hungary N N N N N 
Ireland Y Y EAP (Y) EAP (Y) N 
Italy N N N N N 
Latvia Y Y N N MoU (Y) 
Lithuania Y Y N N N 
Luxembourg N Y Y N N 
Malta N Y Y N N 
Netherlands N Y Y Y Y 
Poland N Y Y N N 
Portugal N Y EAP (Y) EAP (Y) EAP (Y) 
Romania Y Y Y MoU (Y) MoU (Y) 
Slovakia Y Y Y N N 
Slovenia Y Y Y N N 
Spain Y Y Y N N 
Sweden N N N N N 
United Kingdom N N N N N 
Total 15 21 19 10 8 
Total (Semester) 13 19 15 6 4 
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As with the AGS, both the ‘volume’ of health references and the level of detail contained in 
the CSRs increased to 2014, with a slight decrease seen in response to the Commission’s 
streamlining efforts in 2015. This evolution can be illustrated by briefly reviewing the CSRs 
issued to Austria, which is the only country not subject to an MoU or EAP but receiving a 
health-related CSR every year to date. The 2011 CSR for Austria stated that the government 
should ‘Take steps to further strengthen the national budgetary framework by aligning 
legislative, administrative, revenue raising and spending responsibilities across the different 
levels of government, in particular in the area of health care’ (European Council, 2011). The 
2012 recommendation was virtually identical, but highlighted ‘in particular…concrete reforms 
aimed at improving the organisation, financing and efficiency of healthcare and education’ 
(European Council , 2012). In 2013 the detail increased slightly: Austria should take action to, 
‘Effectively implement the recent reforms of the healthcare system to make sure that the 
expected cost efficiency gains materialise. Develop a financially sustainable model for the 
provision of long-term care and put a stronger focus on prevention, rehabilitation and 
independent living’ (European Council, 2013). The 2014 and 2015 CSRs have reinforced this 
message and introduced the long-term care system into Austria’s recommendations, urging 
the government to ‘improve the cost effectiveness, sustainability and provision of health- and 
long-term care’ (European Council, 2014; 2015). Austria’s experience reflects the general 
trend in health-related CSRs, starting with brief references in the frame of fiscal sustainability, 
developing into more detailed guidance in 2013/14 and returning to vague statements 
supporting ongoing efforts in the most recent recommendations.  
Azzopardi-Muscat et al. (2015: 378) use two different classifications to reveal that the 
dominant themes of the health-related CSRs are sustainability and financing, with health 
appearing most frequently under these headings. However, in the 2013 and 2014 CSRs, the 
guidance branches into the content of healthcare policies, urging reductions in pharmaceutical 
spending, development of outpatient care, better care integration, removal of barriers in health 
professional services and improvement of quality of care (Stamati and Baeten, 2015: 25). In 
the 2015 CSRs, a return is made to the provision of broad recommendations, targeting 
problems that are common to most health systems and suggesting vague objectives for further 
or ongoing reform. Absent to date is any reference to investing in health systems, to 
improving disease prevention and health promotion, to improving health outcomes or to 
ensuring that other CSRs do not have a negative impact upon health (EPHA, 2015b: 9).  
Collectively, the documents of the European Semester comprise the most detailed health 
system monitoring, assessment and prescription undertaken by the EU to date. Though the 
origins of this policy extension can be traced before the economic crisis hit, the acceleration of 
scope and detail since 2010 goes far beyond the ‘natural’ trajectory and has advanced largely 
without the involvement of health actors.  
The integration and Europeanisation of ‘third stem’ health 
policy 
The inclusion of health in the instruments of the economic governance framework, understood 
as an extension of the EU’s policy affecting health, presents a new challenge for the 
mainstream EU studies theories. Why have member states chosen to extend coordination into 
this area and what effect is it having on national health systems?  
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Utilising integration theory, the emergence of health on the economic agenda can be explained 
from both a neofunctional and an intergovernmental perspective. 2010 was a pivotal year and 
the economic crisis played a role in facilitating the introduction of health onto the economic 
policy agenda by creating a window of opportunity for ‘silent revolution’ (Vanhercke, 2013: 
6; Baeten and Vanhercke, forthcoming). Rising health expenditure was a problem for most 
member states for some years prior to the crisis and efficiency drives, spending cuts and 
fundamental reforms were obvious policy options to address this issue; with the ‘suspension 
of normal service’ which accompanied the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the political 
leverage necessary to overcome opposition to such policies, and the involvement of the EU in 
their implementation, became available. However, the change was not entirely unprecedented. 
The foundations for addressing health via fiscal and macroeconomic policy had been laid long 
before the crisis struck and the European Commission had been gaining momentum in this 
direction for some time, solidifying its involvement in pension systems and making increasing 
reference to the financial sustainability of health and long-term care systems. As such, an 
element of spillover can be identified. This can be understood as both functional and 
cultivated in nature. The provision of cross-border health services, for instance, would 
inevitably force transparency, mutual learning and some degree of harmonisation of treatment 
packages and prices (Baeten et al., 2010: 4), whilst coordination in economic policy, focused 
on areas of high national expenditure, would naturally require the inclusion of health. 
Meanwhile, keen to consolidate its creeping competence in health systems, the European 
Commission – though more notably DG ECFIN than DG Santé – can be seen as an 
opportunistic driving force. Thus,  
‘…the financial crisis created a window of opportunity for the EU to claim greater 
legitimacy to influence this domain of national competency – something that had been on 
the Commission’s political agenda for a long time’ (Baeten and Thomson, 2012: 10).  
This said, each individual component of the strengthened economic governance framework, 
including those which impose sanctions and restrictions on non-compliant member states or 
produce detailed analysis of health system organisation, financing and performance, have 
been approved and adopted by national governments. Some of the legislation created, such as 
the TSCG, takes the form of an intergovernmental treaty. In the case of the financial 
assistance mechanisms, obvious political and material pressures have limited the degree of 
genuine choice facing governments, but these are less relevant for the creation of the 
European Semester and the other long-term legislative frameworks. Member states also 
approve the constituent parts of the Semester cycle – the AGS, CSRs and various national 
reports – and have successfully limited the force of these documents, which remain non-
binding. The weakness of the CSRs was highlighted by one interviewee as representative of 
the weakness of the EU – the European Semester is a ‘potential superpower for the 
Commission, but they are missing the opportunity by issuing such weak recommendations’ 
(EU Health NGO C). As such, the relevance of intergovernmentalism remains apparent.  
The situation within the Eurozone, where tighter coordination and stricter surveillance is in 
place, amplifies this trend: 
‘…[since the economic crisis] Eurozone decision-making has combined excessive 
intergovernmentalism (as the overly dominant European Council turned the Commission 
into a secretariat while sidelining the European Parliament) with growing 
supranationalism (as the European Central Bank (ECB) ‘saved the euro’ in exchange for 
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Member State austerity and structural reform while the Commission took on an 
expanding role in fiscal surveillance).’ (Schmidt, 2015a: 34) 
The balanced acceleration of both supranational and intergovernmental integration in the post-
crisis period is reflected in the nature of the instruments it produces. The Semester process 
and the corrective mechanisms of the MIP and MTO were agreed and adopted by national 
governments, but the European Commission holds responsibility for the management and 
perpetuation of the former and the application of sanctions in the latter. The CSRs are 
formally non-binding but have become subject to such a complex web of interlinkage as to 
acquire genuine significance and agenda-setting capacity (Zeitlin and Vanhercke, 2015). More 
fundamentally, the inclusion of health in the economic governance framework goes far 
beyond the mandate intended in the founding treaties (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy A). 
This is perhaps an obvious development – as one interviewee noted, ‘If the area concerned 
were an EU competence, it wouldn’t feature in [the CSRs] at all, it’d just be done by the 
Commission’ (EU Social NGO B). As such, the inclusion of health in the economic 
governance framework represents a stark instance of sectoral integration, extending EU health 
policy activity into a (largely) new area; vertical integration has proceeded with less certainty, 
as the transfer of competencies remains informal and variable.  
As regards the ‘Europeanisation effect’ of health’s economic framing, the degree of influence 
exerted by the EU varies according to the available leverage, as explored below. At one end of 
the scale, those countries in receipt of financial assistance, subject to the conditions of their 
MoU, exhibit clear top-down Europeanisation dynamics and evidence of policy response to 
EU intervention. At the other end of the scale, those countries not receiving EU funds or 
undergoing enhanced surveillance by the EU institutions do not display obvious signs of 
Europeanisation. Interestingly, whilst the precise criteria determining which member states 
receive health-related CSRs is unknown, these two groups generally overlap – those without 
financial difficulty, and thus presenting limited EU leverage, tend not to receive health-related 
CSRs (Azzopardi-Muscat et al., 2015). Complicating the measurement of Europeanisation, 
most European health systems are in a near-constant state of reform, making assignment of 
causation difficult, though this has been attempted in some of the literature (see Hassenteufel 
and Palier, 2015; Pavolini et al., 2015). Furthermore, most research concludes that member 
states have some opportunity for uploading and participating in feedback loops during the 
drafting process for the CSRs – data on how this takes place is limited but suggests the 
potential for circular Europeanisation and utilisation of the third stem by national 
governments seeking support or justification for national policies (Baeten and Vanhercke, 
forthcoming).  
The governance of ‘third stem’ health policy 
As noted, whilst the onset of the crisis accelerated and intensified the inclusion of health 
within the economic governance framework, a narrative on health as an economic sector and 
the EU’s role in health systems was already building prior to 2010. The foundation for the 
relevance of health in the post-crisis period was laid with the creation of the Europe 2020 
Strategy. The launch Communication identifies the health sector as a lever for controlling 
government debt, public expenditure and the sustainability of national finances; specifically, it 
states that long-term financial sustainability must go ‘…hand in hand with important 
structural reforms, in particular of…health care [and] social protection’ (European 
Commission, 2010a: 19; 26). Accordingly, the third multi-annual health programme – the 
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Health for Growth Programme – ‘…strengthens and emphasises the links between economic 
growth and a healthy population to a greater extent than previous programmes’ (European 
Commission, 2011: 2). This link is further embedded in the 2011 Council conclusions on 
modern, responsive and sustainable health systems, which call for the health sector to play an 
adequate role in the implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy (Council of the EU, 2011).  
The 2010 Joint Report on Health Systems, the first dedicated health report to be prepared by 
DG ECFIN, provides a clear outline of the Commission’s intentions and the Council’s 
understanding (European Commission, 2010b). It explores the drivers of health expenditure 
but goes beyond the demographic focus of the EPC’s Ageing Working Group and examines 
organisational factors which affect expenditure and sustainability. It describes good practices 
in areas ranging from the use of electronic health records for data collection, the reduction of 
payment differences between medical staff and the use of extended GP office hours, to the 
improvement of health literacy for self-care, the use of economic (dis)incentives to encourage 
healthy behaviour and the inclusion of ‘pay for performance’ in hospital budgets. The 
Report’s central premise – ‘Cost-effectiveness is crucial if countries are to ensure universal 
access and equity in health, health financing and utilisation’ – is stated alongside the 
justification for EU involvement, namely that the constraints imposed by the economic crisis 
make health system reform and EU guidance in support of this more urgent (European 
Commission, 2010b: 11-12).  
The themes emerging in these documents build on a conversation which started with the 
Directive on patient mobility and continued in the Commission’s communication on effective, 
accessible and resilient health systems (European Commission, 2014e) and the health agenda 
set out in the mission letter from the President of the Commission to the Health Commissioner 
(European Commission, 2014f). They also draw on the discourse rooted in the Council 
Conclusions on the Joint Report, which grant ‘legitimacy to the finance actors to include 
health care reform in the European Semester’ (Stamati and Baeten, 2015: 24), to create a 
narrative on health systems which includes financing, organisation and service delivery. The 
creation of an explicit common policy in this area remains politically infeasible and the few 
existing instruments reflect this reality in the ‘softness’ of their approach. However, the 
acknowledgement of common challenges and the benefits of sharing best practice builds a 
clear narrative, ‘softening the ground’ for an EU role in health systems and the 
institutionalisation of a third stem of health policy (European Commission, Health 
Directorate E).  
Governing health via financial assistance programmes 
Unlike the steady, incremental building of the discourse on cooperation in health systems, the 
intervention into the health systems of member states receiving financial assistance from the 
EU has occurred sporadically and rapidly. Drawing legitimacy from the same narrative on the 
need for cost-effectiveness and sustainability, a framework of highly coercive governance has 
been put in place, transferring an unprecedented degree of sovereignty from the national to the 
supranational level, be it for a temporary period. In some instances a form of framework 
regulation can be seen, in that the methods used to achieved the goals set out by the Troika or 
relevant European institutions remain at the discretion of the national government – in the 
Greek case, for instance, the headline cap of six per cent of GDP for health expenditure is 
binding, but the government faces choices in how it brings about the necessary reduction 
(Gené-Badia et al., 2012). The objectives and processes involved here, however, are starkly 
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different from those in first and second stem health policy. Health sector measures which seek 
to reduce expenditure or increase efficiencies are framed by economic objectives and agreed 
by financial and economic actors, with minimal involvement of health actors and often at the 
expense of health goals and progress (Fahy, 2012, see also below).  
The governance of health via financial assistance programmes less reflects an instance of 
crisis politics than an example of a critical juncture. The window of opportunity created by the 
economic crisis provided the European Commission, along with the ECB and IMF, with the 
political leverage necessary to choose the policy solution they saw fit to address the problem 
of unsustainable health expenditure. The Commission was able to tailor the ideas embodied in 
the early mentions of health in the BEPGs to advocate for coercive governance and a transfer 
of powers from the national to the supranational level. This supports the first hypothesis in 
suggesting that crisis politics lead to coercive modes of governance, and might also suggest an 
entrepreneurial role for the European Commission and its partner institutions in exploiting the 
opportunity to increase influence and power. More importantly, however, it indicates a path 
dependency – though the EAPs and MoUs are temporary instruments, historical 
institutionalism anticipates that the structures adopted in order to fulfil their requirements are 
likely to endure without substantial modification. As such, the reforms undertaken by 
governments implementing an EAP will shape the future of national health systems and lend 
the European institutions a degree of influence previously beyond their reach.  
Governing health via the European Semester 
The way in which health is governed as part of the European Semester is very different to its 
treatment under the financial assistance programmes. It is far more nuanced, utilising a 
complex web of instruments to create a governance framework which has different 
implications for different member states at different times. Formally, the instruments of the 
European Semester, most notably the CSRs, are non-binding. They constitute voluntarist 
governance, setting out guidelines but asserting no obligation on national governments. As 
such, they might be viewed as a natural extension of the initial groundwork set out above, 
developing tools for sharing best practice – and to an extent of ‘naming and shaming’ in the 
annual reviews of implementation – as part of the evolution of the health policy sphere and its 
gradual encroachment into this new field. In this regard it might be seen as an example of 
targeted governance, identifying specific policies which member states might revise, reform 
or study more closely in a forum of collective learning and joint exploration (Sabel and 
Zeitlin, 2012). However, there are two features which make the Semester a much more 
significant and influential phenomenon than a natural policy evolution: the actors involved 
and the increasing use of conditionality.  
The literature highlights the imbalance of actors involved in the Semester process as one of its 
primary flaws. In the early iterations, the Semester and its constituent documents were 
conceived, researched, drafted and managed by finance actors. This logic was drawn from the 
objective and context of the Semester as a tool for coordinating macroeconomic policy, an 
area usually the purview of finance ministries. This raised concern among health and broader 
social policy actors, who were not involved and who feared that social objectives were being 
side-lined, or even undermined, by the new framework (UK health association, EU Liaison B; 
EU Social NGO C; Fahy, 2012). More recently, attempts have been made to redress this 
imbalance – the process behind the CSRs has been made more transparent since 2013 and 
actively involves other DGs, most commonly DGs EMPL, Santé and REGIO in the case of 
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the health-related CSRs, as well as other experts (Baeten and Vanhercke, forthcoming). 
Health ministers began to push for greater involvement in 2011, urging that inclusion of 
health in the Semester consider more than merely cost-containment, and launching a reflection 
process to that end (Council of the EU, 2011). The SLWPPH, which has responsibility for the 
process, maintains a close dialogue with the EPC and the SPC ‘…to ensure that health actors 
are involved in ongoing debates on health systems by economic and social actors at EU level’ 
(Baeten and Thomson, 2012: 4). Furthermore DG ECFIN, which still holds overall 
responsibility for the Semester process, has increased its efforts to involve civil society and 
broader stakeholders (EU Social NGO B). As such, observers have noted ‘…a partial but 
progressive ‘socialisation’ of the content and procedures of the European Semester’ (Zeitlin 
and Vanhercke, 2015: 67).  
Whilst disquiet about the role of social and health actors – if not the broader imbalance 
between social and economic objectives – in the Semester is being gradually assuaged, 
concerning signs of indirect coercion and unanticipated influence are only now becoming 
apparent. Through the increasing use of conditionality in its existing instruments, mirroring 
the requirements made of countries receiving financial assistance, the Commission is 
gradually making implementation of the recommendations of the Semester binding upon 
certain member states. The European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) offer a clear 
example of this strategy: 
‘Although macro-economic conditionality will in principle only apply if the Commission 
‘has a strong case’, funding of health related projects is now also one of the domains 
subject to so-called ‘ex ante conditionality’; this implies that Member States that choose 
to finance health must submit a ‘health strategy’ for approval by the competent 
Commission services. For countries with a health related CSR, the Commission can ramp 
up pressure to include implementation in their strategic plan.’ (Baeten and Vanhercke, 
forthcoming) 
In a similar vein, the EDP has been found to have had an impact on control over health 
expenditure in France, Spain and Italy, where strengthened enforceability has seen more 
importance attached to the CSRs (Hassenteufel and Palier, 2015; Pavolini et al., 2015). As one 
interviewee in recent research by Baeten (2016) noted, ‘…the more you need from Brussels, 
the more weight the EU prescriptions carry’. This soft but powerful conditionality is similar in 
nature to that applied to Romania and Bulgaria following their admittance to the EU and is 
illustrative of the ‘growing use of monitoring reports as instruments for introducing new 
conditions or threats’ (Gateva, 2010: 14). It is a powerful tool with the potential to turn de jure 
voluntarist governance into de facto coercive governance with little member state input.  
The Semester encompasses almost every aspect of health systems and policy from a non-
health perspective, making it difficult to distinguish between its treatment of technical and 
political health issues. One interviewee described the Semester as a framework which no 
longer draws the distinction but rather treats everything as technical (Academic Expert, EU 
Health Policy C). A technical policy issue might be better understood here as a quantifiable 
issue, an issue which can be expressed, measured and analysed using numbers, where the 
assessed value of a particular policy or decision overshadows political debate and provides an 
‘apolitical’ method for deciding upon the correct course of action. This shift to ‘governing by 
the rules and ruling by the numbers’ is well documented by Schmidt (2015b) and has led not 
only to economic problems but also to a crisis is the democratic legitimacy and social 
solidarity of the Union. It has increased the power of the Commission and replaced the 
Chapter 11 | Case study 6 
114 
political process with a technocratic one (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy C). The same 
interviewee noted that, as a result of this technical or quantitative framing, ‘member states are 
locking themselves into something that they don’t dare decide politically’, drawing 
comparison between this and the creation of the Court, which locked governments into an 
inevitable marketisation of health. The idea that the health system issues being explored in the 
Semester could not feasibly be explored in the ‘traditional’ political context is affirmed by 
other interviewees, who also note that the status quo works because the governance is 
formally voluntarist; any introduction of binding law would see strong opposition from 
member states (European Commission, Health Directorate A; E; EU Social NGO B). This 
raises interesting questions in light of the increasing use of conditionality noted above and the 






Figure 14: Summary of health policy dynamics, case study six 
Dynamic Catalyst and driver Actors, interests and politicisation Policy type and instruments Governance mode 
BTO policy 
Blood contamination crisis set agenda 
Mandate from member states 
Driven by Commission, micro-sector  
spillover to tissues & organs 
High macro-sectoral & vertical integration 
Public health actors, some market relevance 
but actors less visible 
Burden-shifting, high consensus (safety) 
Sensitivity, less consensus (ethics) 
Top-down & indirect Europeanisation 
Hard law (safety), soft (ethics) 








Council Presidency agenda-setter 
Commission/Parliament driver thereafter 
Cultivated spillover across micro-sectors 
High macro-sect, weak vert integration 
Health actors, epist communities & experts 
Mostly clinical actors (beginning) 
Some political actors (recent) 
Balance of uploading & downloading 
Soft/indirect Europeanisation 
Soft regulatory, education, 
market-based 
Recom. & resolutions 






Completion of the internal market 
Thalidomide tragedy (crisis) 
Commission (ENTR) driver, spillover 
High macro-sect & vert integration 
Market, business & health interests 
Intra-Commission divisions 
Market v health, little consensus 
Participatory approach to accommodate 










Completion of the internal market 
DG Santé driver, cultivated spillover 
Court role in legal challenges 
High macro-sect & vert integration 
(product standards) 
Market, business & health interests 
Strong interest groups & industry lobbies 
Intra-Commission divisions 
Int’l level influence important 
Top-down Europeanisation 
Hard law (product standards) 
Soft law (SFEs etc.) 









Case law (Bolkenstein) catalyst 
Commission driving actor, 
entrepreneurialism and expansionism 
Court support crucial factor 
Micro-sect & some vert integration 
Health actors, national governments 
Mandate expansion, opportunism, some 
technical aspects 
Political, defensive line from member states  
Top-down Europeanisation 
Hard law (mobility), soft law 
(extra provisions) 











Opportunity window, pre-existing 
groundwork, acceleration 
DG ECFIN entrepreneurialism 
Council central responsibility and control 
Sect & vert integration weak (Semester) 
but strong (MoUs/EAPs) 
Initially economic & finance actors at 
national and EU levels 
More recently, health/social actors 
Diverging objectives and interests 
Intra-Commission divisions 
Weak top-down Europeanisation 
Soft law (Semester), hard law 
(MoUs/EAPs), sanctions. 
Recommendations, MoUs, 
directives & regulations 











Parts I and II have laid out the research problem, the framework for inquiry and the empirical 
data, as well as offering some ongoing analysis of the trends which emerge. It is clear from 
this exposition that EU health policy has developed in a patchwork, oftentimes sporadic or 
even opportunistic, manner and that its governance framework has evolved to reflect this. The 
drivers and dynamics of policy in the public health stem differ considerably from those in the 
free movement stem, and again from those in the economic governance stem. Moreover, the 
dynamics within the stems are also variable, depending upon the legal mandate, level of 
politicisation and external climate which prevails during their negotiation.  
This section of the thesis brings together the trends, patterns, common factors and individual 
dynamics seen in the case studies to answer the research questions posed in the introduction. 
Chapter 12, the analysis chapter, is structured around the theoretical framework and 
hypotheses outlined in chapter three. It first reviews the perspective on EU health policy 
evolution taken by the traditional integration and Europeanisation theories, before turning to 
examine how the governance of health has changed throughout its history. To assess these 
trends and patterns in more detail, the chapter then takes each hypothesis in turn and explores 
the empirical evidence which challenges and supports them. A brief summary outlines the 
main findings ahead of the conclusion.  
Chapter 13, the conclusion of the thesis, uses the exposition offered in the analysis to address 
the research questions posed in the introduction. It takes each question separately and draws 
on the research conducted in parts I and II, as well as the analysis undertaken in chapter 12, to 
examine how the pre-crisis integration and Europeanisation of health policy unfolded, what 
modes of governance accompanied this and how these characteristics and dynamics have 
changed in the post-crisis period. Finally, it returns to the broader context and identifies the 
challenges facing health as an EU policy in the contemporary political climate. It explores the 
potential role of health in the European project and outlines an agenda for further research in 
the field. 
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ANALYSIS 
The evolving governance of EU health policy  
This chapter captures the trends, patterns and features which run through the case studies, 
comparing and contrasting their form, relevance and evolution across the different policy 
areas. In pursuit of the first and second research objectives outlined in the methodology it first 
reviews the explanations of health policy development offered by the mainstream theories of 
integration and Europeanisation, drawing on Schimmelfennig and Rittberger’s (2006) 
classification. It then moves beyond the traditional theories to map the modes of governance 
employed in health, with reference to Trieb et al.’s (2005) typology. It examines each of the 
hypotheses set out in chapter three individually, exploring the implications of particular 
modes of governance for the development of the case studies, the relevance of a 
political/technical policy distinction in health and its relation to the use of hard or soft law 
policy instruments. As such, this chapter lays the foundations for the conclusion, which 
addresses the thesis’ central research questions and explores the future trajectory of EU health 
policy. 
Explaining the development of health policy: the relevance of the 
integration and Europeanisation frameworks 
As noted in chapter three, the integration theories and Europeanisation framework are 
concerned with the catalysts and drivers of cooperation at the European level and national 
level adaptation to the resulting structures. At the broadest level, health supports the 
neofunctional conception of integration as a process, prompted and propelled along by 
domestic actors pursuing their interests at the European level. It is less easily explained by the 
intergovernmental understanding of a series of static decisions to integrate, made in light of 
external pressures and as part of zero-sum negotiations. The intergovernmental model is lent 
some support by the response to the global recession and the increased involvement of 
member states in policy-making and oversight but, as seen in figure 14, each discrete instance 
of intergovernmental integration in health has led to further expansion of the role and 
influence of the EU, in line with neofunctional predictions. This has commonly been 
accompanied by an ‘uninvited Europeanisation’ of national health policy, either via top-down 
market regulation or horizontal peer review and learning processes (Greer, 2006).  
This section examines the dynamics of this evolution and the implications of the health case 
for the dominant theoretical frameworks. It draws on the main themes reflected in the 
empirical data, exploring the changing balance between the community and intergovernmental 
methods of policy-making, the role of crises as integration catalysts and spillover as a 
perpetuator of the process, and the varying degrees of Europeanisation seen at national level. 
As with most instances of EU policy development, the different theoretical perspectives have 
proven to be more or less capable of offering explanation and insight at different periods in 
time and across different issue areas. 
The state of health policy integration 
 Before exploring the dynamics of health policy integration and the explanations offered by 
the theoretical frameworks, an overview of the state of health policy integration is offered. 
Figure 15 plots the case studies on a graphical representation of Schimmelfennig and 
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Rittberger’s (2006) categorisation of integration, according to the degree of sectoral and 
vertical integration seen in each instance. The figure is not constructed using a complex 
formula or calculation – the points are roughly plotted according to the extent to which the EU 
regulates the entirety of policy in the given issue area and the extent to which domestic 
competencies have been transferred to the national level. Thus, for instance, a high degree of 
vertical integration indicates strong EU competence and weak national control, whilst a low 
degree of sectoral integration suggests that the EU has not yet come to regulate the area or 
sector in question. The figure’s purpose is illustrative, providing a comparative overview and 
an application of the categories identified in chapter three to facilitate analysis. 
Figure 15: Mapping degrees of integration in the case study policy areas 
 
For clarity, the figure takes the quality and safety aspects of BTO policy, which are based 
largely on hard law, independently from the supply and sourcing aspects, which are contained 
in softer instruments. Similarly, it separates the policy on health systems organisation and 
financing contained in the Semester from that found in the MoUs. The resulting representation 
illustrates a number of dynamics. Most notably, it shows the high levels of sectoral and 
vertical integration enjoyed by second stem health policy issues; the contrast between the 
quality and safety and the supply and sourcing elements of BTO policy further highlights the 
impact of internal market forces on policy integration. The low levels of vertical integration 
experienced in cancer prevention, BTO supply and sourcing and the Semester provisions 
reflect the formal weakness of soft law, but as the issues fall more squarely into the first stem 
public health mandate, the level of sectoral integration increases. The slightly lower vertical 
integration in patient mobility policy accounts for the voluntary provisions on eHealth, HTA 
and reference networks contained in the Directive, whilst the presence of marginal sectoral 
integration in health system organisation and financing reflects the unprecedented, if limited, 
encroachment into this realm made in the post-crisis era.  
The positioning of the case study policies in figure 15 is not categorical and does not arise 
from rigorous scientific assessment but provides a helpful basis upon which to explore how 
and why EU health policy has reached these degrees of integration. 
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The community method and Commission expansionism 
The early phases of health policy integration are best explained by the neofunctional model. 
The community method dominated the establishment of EU policy in occupational health and 
safety, health professional qualifications, pharmaceutical regulation, BTO regulation and a 
raft of other issues. The European Commission commonly took the lead in these areas, 
exploiting the potential for spillover from blood to tissue and organ policy, from medicines 
evaluation to clinical trials regulation, and from free movement of services to patient mobility. 
It is thus held that the Commission operated, wherever feasible, according to a logic of 
competence extension (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy B). It was supported in this 
endeavour by the CJEU, which was perceived by health actors as a ‘defender of social 
solidarity’ (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy A) and by a vast network of supranational 
interest groups, expert communities and regulatory agencies. Crucial stakeholders such as 
health professional trade unions came to view the EU as a defence against less sympathetic 
national legislation (UK health association, EU Liaison A) whilst technocratic actors 
harnessed the efficiency gains of cross-border research and knowledge exchange in areas such 
as cancer, communicable disease and eHealth.  
‘Who else will deal with [health inequalities] other than the EU? It’s just logical; no one 
wishes to be punished for living in the wrong place.’ (Member of European Parliament 
A) 
One area where political spillover has been less potent than neofunctional theory might have 
predicted, however, is in the absence of supranational citizens’ interests. Patients’ lobbies 
have become increasingly transnational in structure and have shifted their focus to the EU 
level in line with neofunctional premises but, as yet, a lobby of European citizens has not been 
established. This is emblematic of the broader failure of European integration to result in a 
‘European identity’, a core weakness of the neofunctional argument. Though there has been 
broad citizen support for European Parliament action in areas such as health inequalities and 
the social crises affecting Greece, Ireland and other countries in the post-crisis era (Member of 
European Parliament B), the absence of a citizens’ voice in the patient mobility case 
highlights the extent of the problem. Since the benefits of patient mobility – and access to 
health services in general – are highly diffuse, and since citizens still consider their health 
interests to be served at the national level, a crucial stakeholder and potential driver of 
integration is often missing from the health policy debate.  
The intergovernmental model gains support in two instances. Firstly, it has more relevance in 
explaining the case study on cancer prevention, where initiation by the Presidency of the 
Council was followed by intergovernmental leadership and soft law cooperation, rather than 
joint decision-making via the community method. Secondly, the neofunctional depiction is 
challenged by the role of member states in crafting and delimiting the EU’s formal health 
competence. National governments have been responsible for each iteration of the EU’s legal 
mandate in health, leading treaty negotiations which made changes to the wording and content 
of the health article beyond that seen in other policy areas. However, whether such active 
engagement was motivated by a desire to promote the non-market values of the Union or to 
assert formal limits on the EU’s role in health remains open to debate (Merkel, 2015a: 3). It is 
also likely that the motivation for and perceived purpose of the major treaty revisions varied 
between governments – for instance, the Finnish government was understood to be excited 
about the potential expansion of the EU’s health mandate under Maastricht, whilst Dutch and 
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British officials valued the same process as an opportunity to ‘put a lid on Brussels’ 
involvement’ (UK health association, EU Liaison B). As such, intergovernmental health 
integration might be more coincidental and less coordinated than it first appears. Moreover, 
the engagement of health ministers with EU health policy has been far from consistent: ‘The 
history of EU health policy prior to 2008 was of health ministries being surprised by EU 
policies hitting them over the back of the head’ (European Commission, Health Directorate 
C). It was only once the momentum began to build that governments became interested in the 
EU level, making assertions of member state leadership or control difficult to defend.   
Crisis and opportunity politics 
‘What drives EU health policy forward? The most obvious driver for action in health is 
crises’ (Greer et al., 2014: 34). 
Case studies one and five – BTO and patient mobility policy – illustrate the role and power of 
crises as a catalyst of health policy integration. A crisis, in this understanding, can take one of 
two forms – it can be a public health emergency, such as the BSE outbreak or the thalidomide 
tragedy, or it can be an unanticipated political shock to the health system, such as the rulings 
in Kohll and Decker and the application of free movement principles to health. In the former, 
member states have commonly deferred to the European level, keen to shift responsibility to 
the, comparatively weak, EU institutions and regain legitimacy at the national level (Farrell, 
2005: 135; European Commission, Health Directorate E). In the latter, a more entrepreneurial 
approach on the part of the Commission has been required to secure expansion of the health 
mandate. Here, ‘crisis politics’ might be better described as ‘opportunity politics’, with the 
Commission reacting quickly and strategically to opportunity for competence extension. The 
case study on patient mobility policy is an obvious case in point, illustrated by the plethora of 
tangentially-related instruments which were established alongside the necessary legal 
framework, but entrepreneurialism on the part of the Commission can also be seen in the case 
studies on BTO and even tobacco control policy, where the disruption surrounding the 
resignation of the Commissioner was presented as requiring greater resolve in the passage of 
the TPD (EU Health NGO C).  
Considering the broader concept of opportunity windows, figure 14 highlights an event or 
situation which contributes to EU action and integration in almost every case study. Besides 
the public health and political crises identified in the BTO and patient mobility cases, the 
medicines ItP case was heavily influenced by changes in US regulation, lending support to the 
intergovernmental premise that external factors play a part in prompting integration, whilst 
proponents of early cancer policy harnessed the prevailing political climate and the need for a 
‘human face’ of EU policy in pushing their agenda. As such, the health policy experience 
confirms the importance of windows of opportunity and their successful utilisation, as 
anticipated by Kingdon (1984).  
‘Health has developed in a de facto rather than a de jure way – it is unintended, 
uncoordinated and indirect in most cases, and this is what causes the problems.’ (UK 
health association, EU Liaison B) 
Commission entrepreneurialism has been a crucial driver of EU health policy, as illustrated by 
its presence in the summary of every case study in figure 14. The opportunism and creative 
manipulation exercised by committed health actors has been facilitated by spillover from the 
free movement principles and the primacy of EU internal market law. This has, throughout the 
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history of health policy, provided entrepreneurs within the Commission with the necessary 
tools and opportunities to push the boundaries of the EU health mandate. Even before the 
public health competence was institutionalised in the Maastricht Treaty, the market legal base 
enabled health measures to be introduced in areas such as occupational safety, recognition of 
professional qualifications and regulation of television advertising of tobacco products, as 
noted in case study four. These policies, one interviewee remarked, were 'far more important 
and radical than what followed under the formal health mandate’ (European Commission, 
Health Directorate A).  
The Commission has been supported in its entrepreneurial endeavour by the Court. The 
latter’s role has varied across policy areas – in the case study on patient mobility, for instance, 
its rulings prompted and provided the framework for the development of legislation, whilst in 
the tobacco control case, legal intervention came after the establishment of the policy. The 
Court’s rulings have had a significant impact upon policy formulation and implementation in 
both roles but its potential to act as a ‘policy-maker’ is higher ‘when the political institutions 
are not taking the lead’ (European Parliament Advisor, ALDE Group).  
Though there is little role for the Court, the model of entrepreneurialism continues in the third 
stem of health policy and the opportunity politics surrounding the inclusion of health in the 
European Semester framework. The tools for dealing with health as an economic sector 
existed prior to 2010, as did the will to address health using economic and financial policy; 
what was lacking was the opportunity (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy C). Indeed, 
research suggests that officials in DG ECFIN were surprised not to receive more opposition 
from member states to the inclusion of health in the Semester (Academic Expert, EU Health 
Policy C). Though it is difficult to establish how much of the post-2010 integration of health 
is the result of the crisis and how much is simply a continuation of existing plans, it will 
certainly prove to be a critical juncture in the development of the EU’s competence.   
Resurgent intergovernmentalism and ‘locking in’ 
Since the onset of the economic crisis, the climate and focus of the European project has 
changed significantly, bringing with it a change in the internal dynamics of the European 
Commission and its approach to health policy.  
‘Junker and Timmermans [Commission President and First Vice-President] have 
effectively left [DG] Santé to play on their own in a room for five years.’ (European 
Commission, Health Directorate C) 
The rise of Eurosceptic and nationalist sentiment has prompted the Commission to moderate 
its activities and move away from the appearance of expansionism and entrepreneurialism. 
One interviewee went as far as to state that ‘the era of the power grab is over’ and that whilst 
the Commission is gaining significant power and influence in certain areas, it is ‘too 
frightened’ to use it (EU Public Affairs Consultant B). For health policy, this has had a 
substantial impact. When seeking to initiate new policy, DG Santé now faces considerable 
hurdles; unless the issue at hand is a health emergency (and falls outside of the jurisdiction of 
the WHO) or is based on a free movement competence, it has become very difficult to 
persuade the central pillar – in particular the Secretariat General – of its viability or necessity 
(European Commission, Health Directorate A). The scope for self-motivated individuals to 
have an impact upon the policy agenda, traditionally a strong dynamic in the Commission’s 
health policy activity, as seen in the case study on cancer prevention, has been curtailed by an 
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administration which does not see health as a priority (European Commission, Health 
Directorate A; D). What has emerged is a kind of ‘dual speed’ Commission, in which the 
dominant positions in economy and finance are occupied by the dominant member states and 
portfolios such as health are swept aside or even undermined by the prevailing advances in 
fiscal and economic policy (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy A; Member of European 
Parliament B). In place of the kind of DG Santé leadership seen in the case studies on tobacco 
control and patient mobility, intergovernmental cooperation has begun to dominate; this is 
evident in areas such as the joint procurement of medicines for the treatment of rare diseases, 
where the Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourgish governments have established a partnership to 
secure a better deal from pharmaceutical manufacturers (Chronicle.Lu, 25 September 2015).  
The resurgence of intergovernmental decision-making is particularly strong within case study 
six on the reinforced economic governance framework, but this has not necessarily translated 
into full engagement by national health actors. Reflecting the intermittent patterns of 
engagement seen in other areas of health policy national health ministries, initially oblivious 
or indifferent to the potential health impact, declined to participate in the European Semester 
and are only now, via the SPC and EPC, registering interest (EU Social NGO B; European 
Commission, Health Directorate E). However, the few actions they have taken, and perhaps 
more importantly the consequences of those that they have not, have already determined the 
path of the Semester and its potential future impact upon national policy-making autonomy.  
‘Member states have repeatedly locked themselves in to situations which they dare not 
decide politically.’ (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy C) 
The concept of ‘locking in’ has commonly been employed in reference to post-communist 
states and the institutionalisation of democracy and neoliberal political systems (Dimitrova 
and Toshkov, 2007; Hurt, 2012). It is also identified as a key dynamic in the integration of 
health and can be observed, in line with the historical intuitionalist premise, across the history 
of health policy development (Pierson, 1996). First seen in the creation of the Court and the 
inevitable prospect for the application of free movement law to the health sector in case study 
five, it is now reoccurring in the establishment of stringent rules in the economic governance 
framework examined in case study six. In describing the catalyst of integrated patient mobility 
legislation, Greer et al. (2014: 34) note that: ‘Deprived of their historically preferred option of 
having no EU policy, the second best option [for member states] was an EU policy that they 
could influence rather than leaving it up to the Courts’. The ‘deprivation’ experienced by 
member states here is understood as self-inflicted, insofar as they had knowingly created a 
supranational court and committed themselves to abiding by its judgements many years 
previously; though it may not have been explicitly stated at the time, it is unlikely that the 
potential for such an application of the law was not raised (Academic Expert, EU Health 
Policy C). In the case of the Semester a similar evolution is occurring: ‘institutional settings 
are being put in place to replace the political process with something else’, allowing political 
issues to be addressed under the Commission’s stronger mandate in technocratic, quantitative 
decision-making (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy C). Having tied themselves into this 
structure, national governments are now faced with two competing logics in forums such as 
the SPC – on the one hand, they are reluctant to give power to the EU, but on the other, they 
acknowledge that if health is in the Semester, the economic and efficiency perspective should 
be balanced by a quality and access perspective (Social Protection Committee). As such, 
member states have locked themselves in to engaging with the Semester as a tool of health 
policy and to legitimising EU intervention in health systems.  
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Neofunctionalism offers little explanation for the contraction of Commission 
entrepreneurialism and the resurgence of intergovernmentalism seen in the bell-curve 
described by interviewees. However, its neo- variants, encapsulating reformulations of the 
traditional framework, may provide some insight. Seeking to address some of the empirical 
challenges to the neofunctional premises, Schmitter (2004) devises eight new hypotheses 
about the causes, process and consequences of integration, in line with the traditional model. 
The final of these, the curvilinearity hypothesis, predicts that when changes become too rapid, 
‘actors are liable to react defensively, if not negatively’ (2004: 60). As well as maintaining 
relevance for neofunctionalism in the broader contemporary era of EU politics, this hypothesis 
offers some insight into the decline currently facing health policy. If the patient mobility case 
study represents the pinnacle of EU momentum in health, as interviewees suggest, then it is 
plausible that, in line with Schmitter’s neo-neofunctional variant, the momentum gathered was 
too much for national health actors to accommodate, since ‘the whole governing system has a 
very limited capacity for absorbing change, even “good” change’ (Schmitter, 2004: 60).   
Resurgent supranationalism and non-health policy 
In light of the political climate which permeates the post-crisis period, the emergence of a 
multi-speed EU with greater emphasis on intergovernmental decision-making is perhaps 
logical (EU Public Affairs Consultant B). However, it also stands in contrast to the 
unprecedented level of centralisation and intervention inherent in the Semester and broader 
economic governance framework (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy C). Schmidt (2015a: 
42) notes that:  
‘As a result of the crisis, the EU’s long-standing ‘democratic settlement’, in which all EU 
institutional actors were involved in decision-making in their different ways, has become 
unbalanced. Intergovernmentalism became the primary mode of governance, eclipsing 
the Community Method.’ 
However, he goes on in the same passage to add that, 
‘Supranationalism has also increased significantly. Even as the Commission was 
weakened in its traditional role of initiator, it gained greater supranational powers of 
oversight in the context of the European Semester.’ 
As such, supranationalism and the role of cultivated spillover might be seen to be relocating, 
into the realm of fiscal surveillance and economic policy, rather than to be declining across 
the board (Schmidt, 2015a: 34). As the emphasis on economic integration as the central focus 
of the European project has increased it has, in turn, pulled the locus of health-related policy 
into the economic sphere. This change is part of the broader shift in which health is 
increasingly moving out of the health domain, a dynamic which had taken hold before the 
crisis struck but has been expanded, accelerated and brought into sharp focus by the 
increasing role of economic and finance actors in health policy.  
‘Health is no longer just in health; health actors are having to learn about sectors we 
had no dealings with in the past, because that’s where health is now’ (UK health 
association, EU Liaison B).  
The encroachment of non-health actors and the proliferation of diverging objectives is one of 
the defining characteristics of post-crisis health policy and a central determinant of 
contemporary health integration. In addition to the conservative central bureaucracy of the 
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Secretariat General, officials in DG Santé and other actors seeking to advance EU health 
policy now have to consult, negotiate and compromise with actors and interests concerned 
with trade, development, agriculture, industry, the digital agenda, the environment and, most 
recently, economic growth and fiscal sustainability. These non-health actors are not making 
health policy and are not, generally speaking, concerned with health objectives. However, the 
impact of their actions means that health actors are being forced to pursue their goals and 
advance health integration down new, non-health paths. Whilst coordination in areas of 
logical EU-added value and clear national interest – communicable disease monitoring, BTO 
regulation and rare disease research being obvious examples – will doubtlessly continue these 
instances of ‘spontaneous’ cooperation in ‘pure health’ areas are likely to become increasingly 
uncommon (European Commission, Health Directorate E). Instead, the majority of health 
policy – understood as the policy which determines health outcomes – will be contained 
within non-health policies, such as the CAP, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership and the European Semester.   
Free movement, spillover and the future of health policy integration 
Functional spillover from the internal market programme, as evidenced in the case studies on 
medicines ItP, tobacco control and patient mobility, has been a core driver of EU health 
policy. In addition to challenging its state-centricity tenet, the impact of free movement law on 
health integration blurs the distinction that intergovernmentalism draws between high and low 
politics.  
‘Where it makes sense to harmonise for the benefit of “UK Plc”, as it were, in areas like 
competition or data across borders, then it’s understood to be fine. But definitely on 
public health and prevention issues…this is a stumbling block.’ (EU Health NGO B) 
As a sector or single policy portfolio, health occupies a high politics position, since it has ‘…a 
considerable social-psychological dimension when it comes to establishing bonds of trust 
between citizens and states and maintaining strong state-society relations’ (Steffen et al., 
2005: 2). Divided into individual policies, however, some areas of health – financing, 
organisation, service delivery – remain highly sensitive, whilst others – research, evaluation of 
pharmaceuticals, regulation of medical devices – become low politics issues. Case studies five 
and six illustrate the potential for integration of ‘high politics’ health issues, whilst the 
approach of the UK, as described by an interviewee above, demonstrates that even technical, 
‘low politics’ issues with a firm legal basis are not guaranteed to enjoy consensus among 
national governments.  
‘In the absence of a better [health] legal basis, what we have to work with is the 
economic, trade and agriculture angles. There is a still a little internal market influence 
too but less than before. Economy is the main driver now.’ (EU Health NGO C) 
The internal market was the original ‘unknown’ in health policy, providing the potential for 
spillover and the advancement of integration in the absence of member state demand or 
willing. As figures 14 and 15 illustrate, it has played a central part in the integration and 
development of policy in BTO, medicines ItP, tobacco control and patient mobility. In the 
post-crisis era, however, its relevance is declining. As seen in case study six, health policy is 
now concerned with ‘making health systems strong and efficient, rather than with the internal 
market, or competition, or citizens’ (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy, B). The tools for 
addressing efficiency are not located in the internal market or public health, but rather in 
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performance measurement and transparency, as reflected in the mandate assigned to the new 
Health Commissioner in 2014 (European Commission, 2014f). This decline is particularly 
interesting in light of characterisations of ‘tailing off’ in health policy, put forward by a cross-
section of interviewees, which might suggest that the main avenues of free movement 
spillover have been explored and therefore that further momentum is harder to generate. In 
cancer, for example, ‘limits of integration’ might be identified in the EU’s inability to make 
progress on prevention or the primary causes of growing cancer prevalence (Member of 
European Parliament A). Moreover, interviewees report a loss of interest in public health, 
stem one policy and describe its contemporary role as ‘window dressing’ for more sensitive 
policy in health services and systems (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy A; European 
Commission, Health Directorate E).  
A key question is whether the strengthened economic governance framework and the 
implications of instruments such as the European Semester will replace free movement as the 
‘unknown’ of health policy and a catalyst for further integration. A core challenge to the 
neofunctional narrative is the absence of foreseen anticipated spillover from economic into 
political integration. Since it became apparent in the late 1980s, the need for political 
integration to support EMU and the completion of a true internal market has been ‘ignored 
and underestimated, both politically and technically’ (Delors, 2012: 175). In this sense the 
very necessity of the strengthened economic governance framework, understood as a response 
to an economic crisis caused by insufficient political integration, might be viewed as 
confirmation of the failure of the neofunctional vision. At the level of sectoral integration, 
however, the evolution of the EU’s strengthened powers in this field can be framed from a 
neofunctional perspective, emanating from the creation of EMU and spillover into fiscal and 
macroeconomic policy (EU Public Affairs Consultant A; EU Social NGO B). From a similar 
perspective, the inclusion of health within fiscal and macroeconomic instruments might be 
seen as spillover from the emerging narrative on health systems (European Commission, 
Health Directorate E). The range of health policy issues covered in the Semester documents 
and supporting Commission analyses is already considerable, as indicated by its early sectoral 
integration in figure 15, and there remains plenty of scope for further extension into fields 
such as health prevention and quality of care. However, there are two main obstacles to the 
kind of spillover seen in relation to the internal market. Firstly, the degree of 
intergovernmental control in economic governance is significantly higher than that in free 
movement law and policy. As a result, attempts by DG Santé or other health actors to ‘use’ 
the Semester as a health policy instrument, particularly in cases where the guidance issued is 
non-binding and the Commission has limited leverage over the state concerned, are likely to 
enjoy less autonomy and automaticity. Secondly, those responsible for inserting health-related 
provisions and managing the process are not health actors and, as such, have no interest in 
expanding the EU’s health mandate in this way. The entrepreneurial actors who harnessed the 
potential of free movement law for health have less access to the European Semester and thus 
less influence over the process.   
Unbalanced and indirect Europeanisation 
The impact of EU health activity upon national health systems – the Europeanisation of health 
– mirrors the changing nature and patterns of integration discussed above. Until the early 
2000s, the dominant Europeanisation dynamic was one of vertical, direct diffusion. Policies in 
stems one and two, based on legal competences in public health or the internal market, often 
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took regulatory form, as illustrated in figure 14. Action in BTO, pharmaceutical regulation, 
health professional qualifications, occupational health and safety, patient mobility, medicines 
ItP and many others was embodied in hard law instruments, generating top-down and direct 
Europeanisation pressures. In these areas, the Europeanisation of health is well developed – 
instruments such as the WTD and the Directive on the Recognition of Professional 
Qualifications are understood to have had a significant impact at national level (UK health 
association, EU Liaison A).  
Though less common, some evidence of bottom-up Europeanisation can also be seen in 
health. However, this process is almost exclusively utilised by the more developed member 
states, whose health systems, research capacities and related infrastructures are more 
advanced. The causes and impact of this inherent bias are most stark in the comitology 
procedure. The committees convened for implementing acts are comprised of an equal 
number of representatives (usually one or two) from each member state, assumed to be 
experts in the relevant field – as a general rule, larger member states have bigger pool of 
experts from which to choose, whereas smaller states have fewer specialists, or even one 
specialist to cover a range of issues (EU Public Affairs Consultant B). Similarly, countries 
with less advanced health systems or treatment pathways are less able to influence the content 
of EU policies and increase the ‘goodness of fit’ with their existing structures. Interestingly, in 
health, this imbalance tends to turn in favour of less developed health systems when engaging 
in soft, as opposed to direct or binding mechanisms of policy diffusion. Platforms such as 
CANCON, discussed in case study five, are of less direct benefit to countries such as the UK, 
which is generally a ‘net contributor’ of best practice in cancer care and research but less 
developed health systems are likely to gain a great deal in terms of knowledge exchange and 
mutual learning (EU Health NGO B). As the use of comitology and other NMGs proliferates, 
these imbalances and their relation to the broader issue of health inequality are likely to 
become a more central feature of EU health policy.  
‘The CSRs dictate more than you think…I’m not sure why, but certainly more than you’d 
expect given that the sanctions aren’t really there.’ (EU Social NGO C) 
Since the mid-2000s, health has seen a shift towards horizontal Europeanisation and soft 
diffusion. Whilst circular dynamics could already be seen in the reciprocal uploading and 
downloading of early policy in the cancer prevention case study, for example, the emphasis 
has more recently shifted to top-down Europeanisation, as seen in the recommendations of the 
European Semester in case study six. The impact of the Semester and, in particular, the CSRs 
on national policy structures is difficult to establish, on account of their non-binding nature, 
the differing approaches taken by national governments and the obscurity of the drafting 
process. Many CSRs contain recommendations to continue with or complete initiatives that 
are or were already underway, indicating potential scope for uploading, but others are so 
vague that it is difficult to establish what would constitute a direct policy response (Academic 
Expert, EU Health Policy B). However, even in the absence of legal force, the measurement 
and performance assessment aspect of economic governance is understood to be very 
powerful. The strengthened framework has effectively granted the EU a mandate in ‘naming 
and shaming’, which is known to be an influential tool in changing behaviour (European 
Commission, Health Directorate A; Merkel, 2015b).  
Some insight might be gained from Lamping and Steffen (2005b: 18), who captured the 
potential of health Europeanisation via EMU and the SGP in 2005: 
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‘It is evident that cost containment policies have been or will become more intensive in 
the healthcare sector than would have been the case in the absence of European 
integration constraints. Although it is conceivable that most of the health policy 
reforms…would have emerged anyway, i.e. independently of EU membership, European 
integration often further strengthens and legitimises such existing initiatives or the 
consensus for reform.’ 
This same logic is reflected in early impressions of the European Semester and its likely 
impact on the Europeanisation of health (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy C; European 
Commission, Health Directorate E). Though assigning causality is fraught with 
methodological difficulties, the possibility for member states to feed in to the process and the 
strong roles of the Council and European Council suggest that the scope for uploading and 
downloading is substantial.  
The governance of EU health policy 
This section takes the integration and Europeanisation of the case studies as a point of 
departure and explores the modes of governance which have characterised the evolution of 
EU health policy. An introductory section reviews the distinction, elaborated in the conceptual 
framework and raised by many interviewees, between the technical and political facets of EU 
health policy. It examines some of the different ways in which this distinction is understood, 
applied and built into the legislative process, ahead of more detailed analysis under hypothesis 
five. The rest of the chapter is structured around the six hypotheses outlined in chapter three, 
which are examined individually in light of the supporting and challenging information 
gathered from the case studies. Pushing beyond the narrative established by traditional 
integration and Europeanisation analysis, it explores the roles of coercion, framework 
regulation, targeting and voluntarism in the case studies and their implications for the 
development of individual policy areas. 
Mapping modes of governance 
As in the previous section, a visual overview of the modes of governance which dominate in 
the case study policy areas is presented ahead of closer examination of specific instruments 
and policies. Figure 16 provides a more literal ‘map’, based on the typology presented by 
Trieb et al. (2005), of the types of governance which characterise EU health policy.  
As in figure 15, mapping the degree of vertical and sectoral integration seen in the case 
studies, figure 16 separates the quality and safety aspects of BTO policy from the supply and 
sourcing aspects, and takes the policy on health systems organisation and financing contained 
in the Semester independently from that found in the MoUs. Further mirroring figure 15, it is 
not based on complex calculation and does not claim to be infallible. Positioning is based on 
observation of the dominant instruments in a given policy area, their legal form and approach 
to implementation, and the relevance of any accompanying or peripheral policy instruments 
which influence the operation of the policy. As such, figure 15 seeks to provide a visual and 
comparative overview to guide more detailed analysis through the rest of the chapter. From it, 
a number of initial points can be drawn.  
Firstly, it is clear that the majority of EU health policy is dominated by a coercive mode of 
governance. Binding legislation is used and implementation is particularly rigid in areas 
which take as a legal base Article 114 TFEU on the functioning of the internal market, 
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illustrating the strength of the EU’s mandate in this area. Though they are temporary in nature, 
coercion is also dominant in the MoUs, on account of their binding conditionality. A second 
notable point is the absence of framework regulation in health governance – though such 
regulation is common in second stem health policy, it is often designed to ensure rigid 
implementation in the face of political sensitivity or strong industry lobbies, as seen in the 
tobacco control and medicines ItP cases. Voluntarist governance, the figure suggests, is 
reserved for those areas of weakest formal mandate and highest political sensitivity, where the 
instruments used are predominantly soft in nature and the policy elaborated provides for 
considerable national discretion. Finally, the positioning of cancer prevention policy 
illustrates something of the distinction between technical and political health issues. Though 
all of cancer prevention policy is embodied in soft instruments and is adopted only voluntarily 
by national governments, its provisions are more rigid than those of BTO supply and sourcing 
or the health-related provisions of the European Semester. This is because they are clinical in 
nature, setting out best practice and technical guidance which allows for less discretion in 
implementation. As such, technical policy areas enjoy more targeted implementation. 
Figure 16: Mapping modes of governance in the case study policy areas 
 
Politicisation and new modes of governance 
‘Trying to draw a political/technical distinction is a very British approach – it’s about 
separating economic efficiency from politics, but it doesn’t work like that, the whole 
system is suffused with politics.’ (Academic Expert, European Parliament) 
The distinction between technical and political aspects of health, or any other, policy is 
difficult to draw and even more difficult to hold once the legislative process has begun. 
However, it brings attention to an inherent characteristic which determines the way that a 
particular policy issue is perceived and treated. It also contributes to the discussion on modes 
of governance and how they have changed as the scope and depth of EU policy has expanded. 
At the most fundamental level, technical policy issues, based on an agreed problem and a 
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common understanding that the solution is best found at the European level, ‘need urgency 
and consensus’ but can then be addressed using hard law instruments (European Commission, 
Health Directorate A). The degree of urgency and consensus required depends upon the issue 
but also upon the central bureaucratic pillar of the Commission itself, which makes the final 
decision on whether a technical, hard law response will be accepted by the legislature and is 
worth pursuing – if not, it instructs the relevant DG and officials to construct the policy using 
soft law instruments and NMGs (European Commission, Health Directorate A). Therefore, as 
the central pillar of the executive becomes more conservative and cautious in the face of 
member state opposition, the use of NMGs is likely to increase.  
Illustrating the distinction within the EU policy-making context, the link between the political 
and technical dimensions of any one policy issue or action becomes clearer: 
‘If you do things in meetings of experts then your arguments are technical, because 
they’re trying to solve technical problems, whereas if you put [the issues] in the working 
group, [the process] instantly becomes political and much more problematic.’ (European 
Commission, Health Directorate C) 
The choice of forum is, to some extent, at the discretion of the Commission, but a mandate is 
needed from a political grouping to ensure commitment to implementation of the later work 
agreed at the technical level. This contributes to the strategic agenda-setting of the 
Commission – an interviewee involved in the ongoing implementation of the patient mobility 
Directive noted that the issue of prior authorisation had been deliberately assigned only a very 
short agenda point at an upcoming EPSCO Council meeting, so as to gain the necessary 
mandate whilst leaving actual discussions to a later technical meeting where political concerns 
would have less prominence (European Commission, Health Directorate C).  
Outside of the Commission, the parameters of technical and political health policy might be 
drawn from the division of responsibilities between the EU and the WHO or the EMA. Both 
of the latter are technical bodies – they feed technical expertise into the EU, which brings this 
into its multi-sectoral, political processes (European Commission, Health Directorate E). 
Though the Commission is broadly understood to be a technical executive, by comparison to 
the EMA or the WHO, it might better be described as quasi-political (Academic Expert, EU 
Health Policy A). Meanwhile, the WHO’s role is delimited by its status as a supranational 
agency; its constituents are governments, not citizens, meaning that it should not get involved 
in the political domain. This constrains WHO influence in areas such as air pollution, where 
there is broad public support for action but governments remain reluctant – in these cases, the 
WHO has been known to collaborate with the Commission as a channel for expressing its 
political position (World Health Organization A).  
These conceptions aid understanding of why some areas of health policy have developed 
along different paths to others and why the balance of health policy evolution has begun to 
shift. One interviewee described the distinction by equating ‘regulation’ with technical issues 
and ‘policy’ with political ones. Another, in assessing the relevance of the distinction in 
contemporary health policy, noted that in previous decades an assignment of ‘technical’ or 
‘political’ was easier to make and the corresponding path of the policy easier to predict, but 
that more recently it has become less tangible:  
‘Perhaps what is needed now is a two-by-two grid, categorising issues as political, 
technical, solvable and unsolvable. We’ve done most of the technical things that we can 
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do, but there are many that we can’t do because of their path-dependency and starting 
points. Health issues are never an island unto themselves, they are wrapped up in 
systems of education and others things, so in cases like health professional training, 
which should be a technical issue, differences in the prior system of postgraduate 
training become a barrier.’ (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy A) 
This reflects the notion, discussed above, of having reached the limits of integration in some 
areas of health. The inability of the EU to advance into policy on cancer prevention, for 
example, indicates that the solvable and technical areas of the current mandate have been 
explored and exploited as far as is possible and that further action will require either a change 
in the treaty or a dramatic shift in political will (Member of European Parliament A). Whilst 
treaty change remains an infeasible option, EU activity is pushed into softer, more innovative 
forms of governance.  
The rest of the chapter draws on the dynamics of the technical/political distinction in its 
evaluation of the hypotheses outlined in part I.  
Hypothesis one: Crisis politics results in coercive forms of governance 
The role of crisis as an opportunity for non-incremental policy change and as a driver of such 
change in health policy is well acknowledged in the literature (Greer et al., 2014: 34; 
Nohrstedt, 2008: 258). Crises ‘create political opportunity windows for advocacy groups 
challenging established policies, newly incumbent office-holders and other potential change 
agents’ (Boin et al., 2009: 82). In health, the changes ushered in by these windows have 
commonly been binding in nature, creating hard law in areas where no, or less coercive, 
structures existed previously. Hypothesis one explores this relationship and its relevance in 
the post-crisis era.  
The case studies reveal some differences in the nature of crisis politics and policy-making 
between ‘stem one’ and ‘stem two’ issues. Where the crisis is a public health emergency – in 
cases such as the thalidomide tragedy, the blood contamination scandal, the BSE outbreak, the 
SARS pandemic or the PIP breast implant scandal – the response has commonly been one of 
agency creation and delegation of responsibility to the EU level from governments keen to 
shift burden and regain legitimacy with their electorate, as seen in the BTO case. Where the 
crisis is political in nature, affecting citizens and patients indirectly but more immediately 
requiring negotiation and decision-making between policy-makers, as in the patient mobility 
case or the political scandal encompassing the latter stages of the TPD, national governments 
have been more cautious. They are reluctant to part with any more autonomy than is necessary 
and are more likely to try and shape the outcome in accordance with their interests. However, 
in both cases the resulting legislation or policy output is likely to be binding and to take the 
form of, at least, framework regulation, if not coercive governance. First stem crises have 
resulted in the creation of the EMA, the EFSA, the ECDC, the revised regulatory framework 
for medical devices and the extension of treaty mandates on food safety, pharmaceuticals and 
BTO regulation. Second stem crises prompted the establishment of a legal framework for the 
free movement of patients and the resurrection of the struggling TPD. Though not at the 
furthest extreme of coercive governance, these instruments all represent hard law, 
supranational-level responses.  
An in-depth survey of the literature of crisis policy-making is beyond the scope of the thesis 
but the framework put forward by Boin et al. (2009) is helpful in indicating how different 
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actors approach and utilise crisis situations such as those which have punctuated the 
development of health policy. Setting aside the option to deny the existence of a crisis, there 
are two approaches that actors can take. In the first, they might frame the crisis as a threat to 
the collective good embodied in the status quo and seek to defend it as far as possible; in the 
second, they might frame the crisis as an opportunity, highlighting the flaws in the status quo 
and the need for fundamental change (Boin et al., 2009: 84). This distinction aids 
understanding of the difference between stem one and stem two crises, with the kind of public 
health emergency which comprises the former being much harder to frame as a threat to the 
status quo and more likely to result in an overhaul of it. In political crises, it contributes to 
analysis of the differing approaches taken by national governments and the Commission – the 
patient mobility case was approached as an opportunity by DG Santé, keen to ‘Europeanise’ 
the mobility of healthcare services, but as a threat by member states, aware of their legal 
obligations but reluctant to permit extensive European encroachment.  
When looking at crises at the European level, an additional variable is introduced. In the event 
of a crisis at national level, governments seeking to frame it as a threat and thus to defend the 
status quo would be expected to acknowledge but not to maximise the significance of the 
event, so as not to ‘rock the boat’ in a way that might invite criticism, risk or overhaul of the 
system (Boin et al., 2009: 85). Where the supranational level becomes involved, however, 
national governments may be able, or indeed may seek, to maximise the significance of the 
event so as to draw attention to shortcomings or over-reaching by the EU institutions, or to 
shift blame. The PIP breast implant scandal in 2012, for instance, saw charges brought against 
the manufacturers but the blame for the regulatory failings was levelled at the EU, thus 
absolving national governments.  
To trace the political rationale behind the framing of a crisis as an opportunity, RCI utilises 
principle-agent models to examine the delegation of authority to regulatory agencies such as 
the EMA, ECDC and EFSA and notes the role of functional pressures in prompting this 
outcome. National governments, RCI holds, make a strategic choice to establish independent 
agencies and other bodies so as to overcome information asymmetries, ensure commitment 
from other actors, shift blame and manage complex, technical issues (Thatcher, 2002: 125). 
The existence of such pressures helps to make evident the logical added-value of cooperation 
at the EU level and each of them can be identified in the BTO case study and various other 
public health crisis-response measures, supporting the broader notion that technocratic, 
regulatory policy is a core foundation of health integration. However, in a review of the 
literature on delegation Pollack (2008) finds that, in fact, few governments cite Commission 
expertise or technical capacity as the motivation behind a decision to transfer autonomy. This 
stands in contrast to the neofunctional assumption, adopted by proponents of supranational 
governance and other theoretical approaches, that the Commission’s technical capacity is a 
crucial driver of and incentive for further integration, which seems to be well supported by the 
health experience and the case studies (Richardson, 2006). As such, health policy challenges 
the assumptions of the RCI framework and presents an interesting new space for empirical 
investigation.  
The inclusion of health in the economic governance framework represents a similar kind of 
political, second stem crisis to that seen in the patient mobility case study. It is important to 
clarify the dependent variable here – the strengthening of the EU’s economic governance 
powers was itself undertaken in response to an economic crisis, but it is the inclusion of health 
within this framework which is the focus of this hypothesis and which represents a political 
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crisis for national governments and a potential opportunity for the Commission. In this case, 
the diverging approaches taken by different internal divisions of the Commission are as 
important as those taken by the Commission and national governments. Using Boin et al.’s 
(2009) categorisation, DG ECFIN has successfully framed unsustainable health expenditure as 
a facet of the sovereign debt crisis and the fundamental reform of how such expenditure is 
governed, namely by introducing EU-level coordination, as the necessary solution. What has 
been crucial is the presentation of both the problem and the solution as technical issues, 
related to functional coordination, technocratic governance and oversight of quantifiable 
policy variables, so as to avoid the kind of politicisation seen in stem two crises (Academic 
Expert, EU Health Policy C). DG Santé, meanwhile, initially took the opposite approach to 
ECFIN, joining NGOs and the broader public health community in drawing attention to the 
threat posed to health by its inclusion in such structures and calling for a reversion to the 
previous status quo. More recently, it has shifted to work within the new structure, seeking 
instead to use it as a vehicle for pursuit of its own goals in improving access and quality of 
care.  
Greater insight may be gathered from re-framing these ‘political crises’ as windows of 
opportunity, leading to critical junctures in the development of a given policy. In both the 
patient mobility and the economic governance case studies an exogenous and unanticipated 
stimulus – a series of case law in the former, the strengthening of the EU’s powers in 
economic governance in the latter – opened windows of opportunity in which the decisions 
made and action taken would prove to set the path of further policy development (Pierson, 
2000; 2004). Both also support the neofunctional emphasis on continuity and spillover, rather 
than change or reversal in the face of exogenous pressure (Pollack, 2008). In the patient 
mobility case, the locking-in of institutional structures was crucial – having subjected other 
sectors of the health system to free movement law for many years and in light of the earlier 
attempt to extend this to health services in the Bolkenstein Directive, the fundamental 
elements of patient mobility policy were already broadly established. Moreover, the case law 
of the Court served to lock-in these elements from below, granting a set of rights to a 
constituency of patients which would then fight against losing them (Pierson, 1996). The same 
path dependence is likely to ensure the duration of the new economic governance framework. 
Building on the early efforts to address health through macroeconomic instruments, both the 
Council and the Commission continue to generate ‘positive feedback’ in their public 
statements, encouraging utilisation of and adherence to the Semester and its health-related 
recommendations (Council of the EU, 2016; Pierson, 2000; 2004). It may yet also emerge 
that, given the capacity for some Semester provisions to undermine health policy objectives, 
Scharpf’s (2006) characterisation of intergovernmental joint-decision mechanisms as rigid and 
prone to inefficiency is supported by the third stem health policy case.  
The pressures facing governments (principals) in the event of a public health crisis make 
delegation to an independent regulatory agency (agents) and the establishment of coercive 
governance mechanisms an obvious choice. In the event of a political crisis the inevitability of 
a coercive response is less clear but, as demonstrated in the patient mobility and TPD cases, 
hard law has generally been favoured. The economic governance case study challenges these 
models – the window of opportunity presented to the EU after the economic crash was met 
with the introduction of non-binding Semester process, whilst the political crisis facing health 
actors with the inclusion of health in this process has been met with confusion and eventual 
endorsement. As its implications become apparent, member states may yet be prompted to 
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frame this latest exercise in Commission – or at least DG ECFIN – expansionism as a threat to 
national health systems, but unless this happens soon, the prevailing status quo is likely to 
become entrenched.   
Hypothesis two: Framework regulation, as embodied in the EU regulatory 
state and the integration of the internal market, is declining in relevance 
Framework regulation is the default governance mode of the internal market and the EU’s 
regulatory state. As use of alternative modes, such as the OMC and redistribution policies like 
the ESF, has proliferated and appetite for further integration has decreased, so too the scope 
and relevance of regulatory policy has declined (Falkner, 2010: 284; Richardson, 2006: 7). 
This hypothesis examines the implications of this trend for health and its changing relevance 
in the post-crisis era.  
At a fundamental level, the regulatory state is associated with technocratic governance. In 
health, this is embodied in the work of the EMA, the EFSA, the ECDC and the various other 
agencies and expert bodies which contribute to and implement health- and consumer-related 
product regulation. The integration of standards on pharmaceuticals, tobacco, medical devices 
and BTO products, has now been achieved – divergences in implementation notwithstanding 
– in most areas, as reflected in the high degree of sectoral integration seen in figure 15. Taking 
a RCI approach, such agencies and their activities will doubtlessly prevail, in light of their 
clear added-value and the logic of delegating to reduce transaction costs (Pollack, 2008), but 
they are unlikely to expand. The technical functions which they were established to fulfil are 
now in operation and their policy parameters are well defined, meaning that any further 
regulatory expansion is likely to be related to process, rather than product, standards. The 
regulation of processes, which targets standardisation of the way in which health services are 
structured and delivered, is far more political than that of products; integration of this 
sensitive sphere of national competence is fraught with difficulty and requires more 
innovative approaches to governance (Wallace and Reh, 2015: 104). Thus, the decline of the 
regulatory state can be linked to the idea, introduced above, of having reached the limits of 
‘easy’ integration and ‘solvable’ problems and being forced into the use of voluntarist modes 
of governance. This trend can be seen in the development of BTO policy – early policy on 
blood and tissue products was technical and binding upon member states, whereas more 
recent progression in organ policy has seen framework regulation in the technical, product-
based elements of the policy, but recourse to voluntary instruments where extension into the 
more political issues of supply and ethical sourcing practices has been attempted.  
Of particular relevance for the integration of health is the link between the regulatory model 
of policy-making and the entrepreneurialism of the European Commission. The internal 
market gave resourceful actors within DG Santé the opportunity to expand their influence into 
non-health sectors which impact upon health and the determinants of health – as outlined in 
previous sections and illustrated in figure 14, this strategy has been crucial to the development 
of EU health policy. However, the scope for entrepreneurialism by DG Santé and other health 
actors is dependent upon the foundation and composition of the relevant policy network. As 
the relevance of the internal market regulatory base has receded, the Commission and other 
health actors have been forced to rely on influencing less amenable structures and networks in 
agriculture, trade and economic policy instead (EU Health NGO C). The decision-making and 
legislation which has resulted from these ‘new-to-health’ policy networks has not always 
promoted health objectives or served health goals – as such it challenges the assumption, held 
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in most policy network analysis, that interactions between a policy community are generally 
positive-sum (Rhodes, 2006). As the variety of actors and levels involved in health has 
increased, securing positive health policy outcomes has become more difficult, as evidenced 
in cases such as food labelling, reduction of alcohol-related harm and measures targeting the 
subsidisation of tobacco production. The involvement of non-health actors and interests 
within the health policy community has commonly served to politicise the issues at hand and 
often resulted in ‘losses’ for the health agenda.  
During this process of politicisation, framework regulation has played a crucial role. 
Providing enough flexibility to accommodate different interests and approaches whilst 
maintaining enough binding force to ensure compliance from actors whose main objective 
might not be the betterment of health, it has enabled policy to be constructed in areas of high 
political sensitivity, as seen in the case studies on medicines ItP and tobacco control. It also 
serves to facilitate political agreement between governments in cases such as patient mobility, 
where member states were reluctant to agree to coercive European governance but willing to 
accept framework regulation as a compromise. The political potency of the Semester, 
meanwhile, is embodied in its force, or rather lack of it. If it were to be contained in 
framework regulation, the politicisation of the process would be intensified dramatically (EU 
Social NGO B). As it stands, the degree of coercion exists on a continuum and the future force 
of the instruments involved is being ‘locked in’, as anticipated by the historical institutionalist 
model, whilst the CSRs remain sufficiently vague to minimise member state opposition in the 
immediate cycle. For those countries whose CSRs are becoming more binding – on account of 
assessed macroeconomic imbalances or violation of the SGP – the recommendations made 
have yet to be onerous, objectionable or tangible enough to antagonise national governments.  
For the moment, the instruments of the economic governance framework remain at the 
extremities of the modes of governance mapped in figure 15, taking either a coercive or a 
voluntarist form. However, in light of the broader emphasis on the EMU-element of European 
integration, the potential is raised for a resurgence of regulatory policy in the economic and 
fiscal, as opposed to internal market, sphere. This would likely take a more ‘rules-based’ 
approach, using indicators to determine progress towards broad policy objectives as part of 
performance assessment (Schmidt, 2015b) and mirroring DG ECFIN’s attempts to frame the 
outputs of the Semester as technical, regulatory instruments, rather than policy statements or 
extensions of integration, so as to avoid political opposition. It would also likely involve a 
very different set of actors to traditional, market-based EU regulation. Applying policy 
network analysis an important ‘sub-government’ of actors, responsible for implementing this 
strategy, can be identified (Saurugger, 2014: 114). DG ECFIN has established a small but 
dense network of analysts and experts who feed into and enhance the ‘technocratic’ 
credentials of the CSRs, wielding great influence over the content and nature of the final 
recommendations (Baeten and Vanhercke, forthcoming). Meanwhile a wider network, more 
akin to a thematic or issue network, exists outside of this group and includes DG Santé and 
other health actors, who enjoy more limited access and influence (Saurugger, 2014: 118, 
figure 5.1). As such, the emergence of a new stream of framework regulation is unlikely to 
afford health actors the same opportunities as internal market regulation.  
The future of regulatory policy within the economic and fiscal fields is, as yet, uncertain. The 
replacement of the internal market by economic governance as the focus of EU activity has 
the potential to embody a resurgence of regulation but, whilst its instruments remain (at least 
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formally) voluntary in nature and whilst the HiAP principle is applied less rigorously here 
than in internal market policies, such a shift in health policy activity is unlikely.  
Hypothesis three: Governing by targeting is more commonly employed 
where there is strong political will 
The targeting mode of governance is the hardest to identify. It has a similar non-binding 
nature to the voluntarism mode but requires rigid implementation; this is characterised, for 
instance, by significant detail in EU recommendations or built-in performance monitoring 
processes which put pressure on member states to comply. It is also the only mode which is 
commonly embodied in both soft and hard law instruments, and the case studies reveal 
examples of both forms. This hypothesis explores the relationship between targeted 
governance and political will, in light of the apparent paradox of achieving agreement on rigid 
and prescriptive methods of implementation but failing to back this up with binding force. In 
essence, its asks why targeting is chosen as the appropriate form of governance in certain 
health policy areas and what advantages it offers over voluntarist or more coercive 
instruments.  
Embodied within a hard law instrument, targeted governance takes the form of a ‘should 
provision’, usually contained in the preamble or recital of a directive and prescribing specific 
but voluntary measures which go beyond the required action in the body of the legislation. 
Examples of the latter can be found in most health legislation, usually as a provision which 
could not, for political reasons, be agreed as a binding requirement but which appears instead 
as a suggested method or approach to implementation. For instance, the 2002 Blood Directive 
states that: 
‘Blood establishments should establish and maintain quality systems involving all 
activities that determine the quality policy objectives and responsibilities and implement 
them by such means as quality planning, quality control, quality assurance, and quality 
improvement within the quality system, taking into account the principles of good 
manufacturing practice as well as the EC conformity assessment system’ (Directive 
2002/98/EC, paragraph 16, emphasis added) 
Similarly, the TPD contains detailed lists of features and characteristics to which the Directive 
should apply and where implementation should be focused: 
‘Tobacco products or their packaging could mislead consumers…This is, for example, 
the case if certain words or features are used, such as the words ‘low-tar’, ‘light’, ‘ultra-
light’, ‘mild’, ‘natural’, ‘organic’, ‘without additives’, ‘without flavours’ or ‘slim’, or 
certain names, pictures, and figurative or other signs. Other misleading elements might 
include, but are not limited to, inserts or other additional material such as adhesive labels, 
stickers, inserts, scratch-offs and sleeves or relate to the shape of the tobacco product 
itself.’ (Directive 2014/40/EU, paragraph 27, emphasis added) 
Targeting is thus used to guide or direct implementation in directives where this is formally at 
the discretion of national governments. It might also be understood as a tool for expressing the 
intended ‘spirit of the law’ – the Directive which regulates the provision of medicines ItP 
suggests that the principles which underpin the prohibition on television advertising of 
prescription drugs should be extended to all other media types, and that regulation of 
medicines ItP should strive to provide a high level of consumer protection (Directive 
2001/83/EC paragraph 44; 40). Whilst political constraints mean that binding agreement of 
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such values could not be adopted, targeted governance enables legislators to provide guidance, 
examples and indicators of what the Directive is seeking to achieve.  
When embodied in a soft law instrument, targeted governance more closely resembles a 
voluntarist provision but contains detailed guidance for implementation. For instance, the 
Council Recommendation on cancer screening (Council of the EU, 2003) sets out a 
framework for the establishment of cancer screening programmes in member states, noting the 
various characteristics that these should have in order to be effective, but also including in the 
annex a list of the screening tests ‘which fulfil the requirements of the recommendation’. The 
goal here is similar to that pursued via binding instruments – to steer implementation towards 
an agreed objective in the absence of hard law enforcement – but without reference to an 
accompanying coercive instrument. As such, it might also be understood as a precursor to 
hard law. The first report on the implementation of the above cancer screening 
recommendations noted that ‘The scale of these activities underlines the substantial impact 
which recommendations of the Council of the European Union can have on the health of the 
European population’ (European Commission, 2008c: 3), whilst the second detailed the vast 
array of EU activity in cancer which has emerged as a result of the Recommendation and the 
later EPAAC programme (European Commission, 2014g). Here, targeted governance 
demonstrates the power of soft law as a tool for ‘laying the groundwork’, influencing 
behaviour and bringing about policy harmonisation.  
Sociological institutionalism is a particularly relevant approach when considering the role of 
targeted governance. It holds that the creation of informal institutions, the sharing of 
experiences and the establishment of common cognitive frameworks, as seen in the case study 
on cancer prevention and the introduction of the OMC in health, will result in changes in 
behaviour (Risse, 2004). The way in which these changes occur is labelled isomorphism – this 
results from ‘social processes of emulation and diffusion…Actors replicate the organizational 
models collectively sanctioned as appropriate and legitimate’. As a result, the model of best 
practice in cancer screening, for example, is copied and spreads throughout national health 
systems (Saurugger, 2014: 94). This process bears comparison to Kingdon’s (1984) multiple 
streams model, in that the EU provides, via the ongoing ‘primeval soup’ of policy-making, an 
evidence-based common policy solution, informed by the best practice of member states. 
Made aware of an issue, such as poor performance in cancer screening, via the problem 
stream and seeking a policy solution, national governments then look to the European 
framework to inform their responses and a process of isomorphism begins. The provision of 
policy solutions is the foundation of the EU’s role in health; collecting and curating data and 
experiences from across the Union, it establishes a bank of targeted frameworks and best 
practices and makes them available as a tool of socialisation. The EU’s position as a 
legitimate and trusted source of expertise in health policy thus facilitates a form of indirect 
diffusion, where member states emulate EU standards and practices (Börzel and Risse, 2012). 
Interestingly, Saurugger (2014: 94) identifies three catalysts of isomorphism – mimesis and 
normative pressures, both of which involve the migration of professionals between different 
organisations, and coercion. The latter ‘refers to pressures from other organizations, mostly 
the government via public subsidies, upon which institutions are dependent’ (Saurugger, 
2014: 94). This raises interesting potential for case study six and the influence of the health-
related provisions of the European Semester. The value of sociological institutionalism as a 
framework for analysing voluntarist instruments is explored further in the next section but 
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bears particular relevance for the CSRs in light of the increasing conditionality being assigned 
to them.  
Drawing on the sociological institutionalist perspective, it is thus perhaps more accurate to 
surmise that governing by targeting is commonly employed and most likely to be effective 
where the ‘logic of appropriateness’ is strong (March and Olsen, 1996). Political will is 
clearly an important element of successful soft law but where targeted governance is used in 
the absence of political consensus, as in the case study on cancer prevention, for example, 
sociological approaches might offer a better insight into why such instruments are utilised.   
Hypothesis four: Voluntarist governance is becoming increasingly coercive 
EU health policy has been embodied in and has relied upon instruments of voluntarist 
governance for many decades. As illustrated in figure 14, soft law has played a role in the 
development of almost every area of health, either as the central pillar of EU activity or as a 
supporting instrument; in both cases, as the exposition in the case studies has demonstrated, it 
has considerable strength as a tool for bringing about policy convergence. Extrapolating from 
the typology presented in chapter three, a shift towards coercion in voluntarist health 
instruments would be characterised by more rigid implementation and a greater degree of 
prescription, as well as more binding legal effect and greater leverage or force. Whilst 
accepting that, by definition, the presence of rigid implementation measures or binding legal 
effect precludes an instrument from being classed as voluntarist, this hypothesis explores the 
evolving use of soft law instruments, particularly in light of changes to the use of 
conditionality in EU policy and the importance of leverage in the strengthened economic 
governance framework.  
A ‘strengthening’ of voluntarist governance in first and second stem health policy is difficult 
to identify. Taking, for instance, the communication establishing a partnership on cancer in 
case study two and the Action Plan on organ donation in case study one, both documents set 
out broad objectives and provide member states with substantial discretion in implementation. 
The Action Plan goes into a little more detail, identifying priority actions in pursuit of the 
objectives and introducing common indicators and benchmarks for monitoring progress, but 
neither instrument can be considered rigid in its approach. Similarly, the patient mobility 
directive contains voluntarist provisions for the establishment of networks in rare disease 
research, eHealth and HTA; the relevant articles (12, 13, 14 and 15 of Directive 2011/24/EU) 
outline the objectives of these bodies and offer some logistical support at the EU level but are 
otherwise to be interpreted and actioned as member states see fit. Looking at the legal effect 
of voluntarist governance, however, a shift can be seen in the proliferation of social learning 
and ‘soft’ Europeanisation tools, which exert considerable pressure on governments. As noted 
by sociological approaches, practices such as peer review, benchmarking, ranking, common 
indicators and performance monitoring have significant capacity for changing behaviour via 
the ‘logic of appropriateness’ and indirect diffusion (March and Olsen, 2004; Börzel and 
Risse, 2012; Merkel, 2015b). Furthermore, soft law has frequently been invoked by the Court 
as a source of interpretation, muddying the divide between legally binding force and legal 
effect (Stefan, 2012), and the OMC is considered to be stronger than traditional soft law, since 
the higher level of political participation and rigid procedures entail more mutual 
commitments and exert more forceful peer pressure (Borrás and Jacobsson, 2004: 189). 
Moreover, understood as forums of ‘deliberative democracy’ and antidotes to the waning 
legitimacy of EU decision-making, mechanisms such as the OMC and the new comitology 
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system are likely to be favoured by policy-makers (Richardson, 2006: 8). Thus, whilst 
accepting that soft law is, by definition, non-binding, its force and effect have increased and 
its use has proliferated as EU health policy has evolved.  
The voluntarist instruments of the strengthened economic governance framework are not only 
more coercive in their current form, but suggest potential for increased strength in the future. 
At their ‘peak’ in 2014, the CSRs were highly prescriptive, targeting the content of national 
healthcare policies on the basis of detailed assessment of health systems. For instance, the 
Bulgarian government was urged to increase efficiency by ‘improving transparency in 
hospital financing’ and the Irish CSR recommended ‘more frequent price realignment 
exercises’ for patented medicines (Council of the EU, 2014a; 2014b). Against an overarching 
objective of reducing health expenditure, increasing sustainability and improving efficiency, 
the CSRs and accompanying Country Reports
20
 offered detailed guidance on how member 
states might meet these goals. More significantly, however, the CSRs, MoUs and other 
instruments of the economic governance framework move beyond urging the achievement of 
overarching goals and encourage the introduction of specific reforms. The 2013 CSR for 
Malta recommended that the government ‘Pursue health-care reforms to increase the cost-
effectiveness of the sector, in particular by strengthening public primary care provision’, 
whilst the 2014 CSR for Latvia urged action to ‘Reform social assistance and its financing 
further to ensure better coverage, adequacy of benefits, strengthened activation and targeted 
social services’ (Council of the EU, 2013; 2014c). Moreover, the 2015 AGS includes health 
under the heading ‘structural reforms’. This is a new development and signals 
institutionalisation and acceptance of the treatment of health as an economic sector. The level 
of prescriptive detail contained in the CSRs and other  instruments of the Semester is not 
sufficiently onerous as to classify them as forms of targeted governance; they operate at a 
relatively abstracted level in comparison to, for example, the Council recommendation on 
breast cancer screening. However, their content clearly indicates a tendency towards 
prescriptive governance and more rigid implementation mechanisms.  
Drawing on the governance literature two perspectives on the future strength of the Semester 
process can offer insight. Firstly, as seen in the case study on patient mobility, the decision to 
create a Semester, to engage in its various analyses, benchmarking and collective review 
exercises and to include health within the outputs of this process is likely to become ‘locked 
in’, as high institutional thresholds – embodied in the networks established between DG 
ECFIN and the Council and the binding nature of the legislation establishing the Semester – 
make overhaul of the system and removal of all references to health infeasible. Positive 
feedback from the EU institutions will encourage member states to treat the voluntary CSRs 
as important instruments and implement them fully, whilst national governments, applying a 
high discount rate to measures which sacrifice long term autonomy but project remedial action 
against high public debt in the short term, will continue to permit the inclusion of health in 
macroeconomic instruments (Pierson, 1996). Perhaps most importantly, because of the rigid 
and inflexible nature of joint decision-making mechanisms, sub-optimal policy results which 
undermine health objectives – such as CSRs which urge reductions in public spending on 
social protection systems – are likely to become entrenched.  
                                                          
20
 The Country Reports, previously known as the staff working documents and published alongside the 
CSRs, are now published a few months prior to the CSRs. They contain detailed analysis of the 
situation facing each country and valuable insight into the data and assessments upon which the final 
CSRs are based.  
Chapter 12 | Analysis 
139 
A second perspective concerns the use of conditionality to increase the force of third stem 
voluntarist instruments. Within the economic governance framework the EU has created a 
continuum of leverage in which the degree of force exerted by instruments such as the CSRs 
depends upon the financial stability of the country to which they are addressed; countries 
which need more from the EU are under a greater pressure to fulfil the CSR requirements 
(Baeten, 2016). This is closely linked to the practice of conditionality and reflects the process 
of isomorphism via coercion anticipated by sociological institutionalism. The EU has applied 
conditionality to its relations with third countries since the early 1990s and has used it to ease 
the transition of the Central and Eastern European states which joined the EU in 2004 and 
2007 (Smith, 1998; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). More recently, however, the use 
of post-accession cooperation and verification mechanisms (CVMs) has highlighted the 
potential for other uses of conditionality: 
‘The increasing application of differentiated and targeted conditionality highlights the 
evolutionary nature of EU enlargement conditionality. Furthermore, it reflects the 
Commission’s growing expertise in the candidate countries and new member states. More 
importantly, by establishing individual country specific benchmarks, the Commission has 
managed to instrumentalize its knowledge. Benchmarking indicates that the Commission 
not only can identify a problem but it can provide detailed guidance on how the problem 
should be addressed.’ (Gateva, 2010: 13) 
As a result of their weak incentive structure, the CVMs applied to Romania and Bulgaria have 
struggled to bring about the intended convergence of judicial reform and anti-corruption 
measures, but they highlight the power of broad, high-frequency reporting as an instrument 
for ‘continuous political pressure’ (Gateva, 2010: 15). A similar strategy for indirect 
Europeanisation and isomorphism via coercion is seen in the structures of the ESF, which has 
been found to influence domestic policies through leverage, learning and conditionality 
(Verschraegen et al., 2011). The latter mechanism refers to the requirement that actions 
funded by the ESF fit the objectives of the EES – crucially, the EES has recently been 
integrated into the broader Europe 2020 Strategy, of which the European Semester is the 
implementing arm (van Gerven et al., 2014: 514). Whilst neither of these examples currently 
applies directly to health, the voluntarist instruments of the strengthened economic 
governance framework are based upon both an intensified system of reporting, benchmarking 
and monitoring, and on pursuit of the Europe 2020 objectives. Furthermore, a mechanism of 
macroeconomic conditionality, creating a link between excessive national public deficits and 
the management of EU funds, already exists within the ESIF and allows the EU to suspend 
funding where requirements are not met (Baeten, 2016; Jouen, 2015). In light of this, as well 
as the emphasis on data collection and HSPA in the Health Commissioner’s latest mandate, it 
is not difficult to imagine a situation in which fulfilment of the health-related CSRs becomes a 
condition for access to further EU resources.  
Hypothesis five: EU health policy has become increasingly political 
In 2005, prior to the economic crisis and the ensuing resurgence of anti-European sentiment, 
Lamping and Steffen (2005b: 24) predicted a fundamental change in the nature of health 
policy, noting that ‘From now on health policy integration is set to become a political rather 
than a simply technocratic process’. This hypothesis draws on the technical/political 
distinction explored above and examines its relation to the bell curve described by 
interviewees and the broader evolution of EU health policy.  
Chapter 12 | Analysis 
140 
A shift to more ‘political’ health policy is well reflected in the case studies, with the more 
recent stem two issue areas requiring continual political choice and negotiation between 
different stakeholders, interests and divergent policy objectives (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). 
One implication of this shift is that the style of decision-making required to balance multiple 
interests involves a more participatory mode of governance on the part of the executive and a 
more active and visible role for the EU legislature. The Commission, seeking to accommodate 
an expanding array of interests and stakeholders, has increasingly turned to more consultative 
and inclusive instruments when designing and proposing policy. Meanwhile, the European 
Parliament has become an important health actor and its elevation to co-legislator has changed 
the dynamics of its role – where it previously provided a counterbalance to the Council by 
supporting the European Commission, it now sees itself as a ‘partner of the 28’ and 
commonly works with the Council, particularly in the comitology system, to restrict the 
autonomy of the Commission, as anticipated by RCI analyses (Academic Expert, European 
Parliament; Pollack, 2003). Furthermore, since the crisis, the European Council has taken a 
leading role in policy-making, moving from a position of guidance and oversight to one of 
active intervention in the day-to-day politics of the CoEU (Puetter, 2012: 168). This 
intensified involvement is largely limited to matters within the economic governance 
framework but it is indicative of a greater political sensitivity in contemporary EU health 
policy and the rise of high-level political negotiation, rather than technical, knowledge-based 
pursuit of shared policy goals as the primary mode of policy-making.  
The politicisation of health policy has resulted in situation, by contrast to that which prevailed 
in the earlier case studies, whereby the primary barrier to greater EU involvement in health is 
political, rather than legal.  
‘If the community and intergovernmental methods don’t work, then we will change the 
treaties, but even without change in the treaty, we can still do much more than we are 
doing now’ (Member of European Parliament A).  
To take the example of data collection and comparison across countries, a powerful tool in 
bringing about policy convergence, there exists scope within the treaties for EU action, ‘…but 
we don’t do it, because the member states are afraid of it’ (European Commission, Health 
Directorate A). Similarly, the institutionalisation of the HiAP principle provided a legal basis 
on which to evaluate all EU policies and their impact upon health, but it is not used to its full 
extent (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy A). Thus, the mandate-stretching and treaty-base 
game strategies which previously shaped the evolution of EU health policy have become less 
relevant and, ‘Ironically, we have now reached a point where we have maximum legal 
potential and minimum political will to use it’ (UK health association, EU Liaison B).  
Health has traditionally been understood as a regulatory policy but in the post-crisis period it 
has become absorbed into macroeconomic policy and framed as an expenditure policy at 
national level. This framing changes the nature of policy-making and politics which apply to 
health, putting greater emphasis on intergovernmental governance and coordinated 
competences (Hix and Høyland, 2011). The limitations that this imposes are reflected in the 
efforts of DG ECFIN to present the Semester as a technical instrument and thus maintain a 
technical policy-making style – the narrative is one of shared policy goals and ‘ruling by the 
numbers’, where policy-solving is pursued through monitoring and evaluation of common, 
measurable indicators (Schmidt, 2015a: 34). The process is dominated by a complex, 
quantitative evidence-base and administered by technocratic actors, as foreseen in Radaelli’s 
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(1999) model of ‘enlightened public policy’, but is far from apolitical. Though it does not 
force national level change the issues it touches upon, particularly in the health field, are 
deeply sensitive and beyond the EU’s formal mandate; as such, ‘[The Semester] is highly 
political…just without policies’ (Academic Expert, EU Health Policy C).  
Perversely, the result of increasing politicisation in health is described by some as a 
proliferation of technical policy activity. Since technical, solvable issues are ‘what DG Santé 
can do’, interviewees report that there has been a resurgence of effort and activity within 
technical policy fields (European Commission, Health Directorate A). This is occurring even 
in areas which are perhaps of limited value to member states or do not contribute to a coherent 
overarching health policy, in line with Scharpf’s model of joint decision-traps (European 
Commission, Health Directorate C; Scharpf, 1988). The effect is perhaps best captured by the 
term ‘cottage industries’, where strands of work are established and assigned to a given team 
within DG Santé, which develops policy and resources but does so largely without interaction 
or dissemination beyond a designated national contact point (European Commission, Health 
Directorate C). The process by which such cottage industries are established can also be 
somewhat sporadic. Activity is commonly the result of a ‘policy by charter’ process, in which 
an interest group forms a position, enlists an amenable MEP to gain coverage within the 
Parliament (often rallying signatories around a charter or resolution) and thus forces the 
Commission to respond by establishing a strand of work on the issue (Member of European 
Parliament B). Exhibiting strong path dependency dynamics, the work stream established by 
this process endures long after the publicity and political attention on the issue has waned, 
with officials in DG Santé continuing to update the relevant resources and ensure 
implementation and compliance with the growing body of EU health policy; ‘It’s not political, 
it just happens’ (European Commission, Health Directorate C).   
Hypothesis six: As a result of the above, health policy-makers have 
increasingly relied on soft policy instruments 
Taking the increased politicisation of health policy as a premise, this hypothesis explores its 
implications for the governance of health to date and in the future. In particular, it draws a 
connection between ‘political’ decision-making and soft law, based on the notion that 
politicisation makes consensus more difficult to achieve and binding EU law more difficult to 
adopt. Broadly speaking, the EU-wide proliferation of soft law and innovative modes of 
governance is a reflection of this dynamic – as the scope and depth of EU policy has 
increased, so too the number of non-binding instruments has multiplied, utilised either in 
support or anticipation of hard law, or as a way around political gridlock. It is this challenge 
which now faces health policy – as the agenda becomes increasingly dominated by political 
and insolvable issues, health actors may find that the only way to avoid stagnation is to 
encapsulate policy in non-binding governance instruments.  
One of the reasons that politicisation results in soft law is that it restricts the 
entrepreneurialism of the Commission, traditionally a central driver of EU health policy. The 
increased conservatism of the central Commission bureaucracy is identified by many 
interviewees as the root of a ‘pulling back’ on the part of the executive, leaving in its wake 
excess treaty capacity. Whereas, in the past, the Commission might have seized upon any 
opportunity to exploit such capacity and pushed ahead with hard law solutions, even in 
political areas like tobacco control and free movement of patients, it is now far less assertive 
in its approach. This is not to say that soft law was previously irrelevant. As the case studies 
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demonstrate, it was a central part of policies such as cancer prevention, and it was commonly 
used in certain areas – SFEs, diet and physical activity, alcohol and health – where the 
strength of relevant lobbies and the conflicting interests of national ministries made agreement 
difficult. However, in previous periods hard law was still pursued wherever possible and the 
dominant ‘issue of the day’ in health policy might as likely have been addressed using a 
binding as a non-binding instrument. By contrast, in the current climate, the extent of 
politicisation is such that any DG wishing to pursue a hard law instrument is required to 
demonstrate an almost unattainable degree of ‘added value’ and necessity before gaining the 
approval of the Secretariat General (European Commission, Health Directorate A). Thus 
politicisation has two significant outcomes. Firstly, the scope for committed and 
entrepreneurial individuals to drive policy forward, historically an important feature of the 
development of health, is greatly reduced (European Commission, Health Directorate C; EU 
Social NGO B). Secondly, the contemporary health agenda and any emerging health policy is 
likely to be dominated by non-binding instruments.  
The inclusion of health in the European Semester holds the potential to exacerbate the latter 
effect significantly. Not only is it a (formally) non-binding mechanism, but it incorporates the 
most fundamental elements of national health systems and policies – how they are financed 
and managed – thus affecting health at the most upstream point and bringing every other 
aspect of health policy under its umbrella by default. At present, the Semester is not being 
actively used as an instrument of health policy. Though the recommendations on 
pharmaceutical expenditure have prompted some interest from the generics industry, health 
actors are not ‘lobbying’ DG ECFIN as another health legislator; civil society organisations 
lack the resources to justify engagement with such an abstracted tool and DG Santé recognises 
the limits to what can pursued within the Semester’s recommendations (EPHA, 2013; EU 
Social NGO B; European Commission, Health Directorate E). However, the relevance of the 
Semester for health is becoming more widely recognised, with DG Santé pushing for 
inclusion of measures on quality and access, and civil society actors calling for greater 
emphasis on prevention and investment (Social Protection Committee). Moreover, there is a 
fundamental logic in the minds of member states that, whilst the inclusion of health in such an 
instrument is an undesirable necessity, steps now need to be taken to ensure that a balance 
between market and social objectives is achieved (Social Protection Committee). Thus, as the 
recommendations made and the analysis which underpins the Semester gets increasingly 
detailed, greater attention is likely to be focused on its policy-making capacity and greater 
relevance assigned to its potential as (yet another) soft instrument of health policy.  
Two caveats to this trend towards voluntarist and targeted governance should be made. 
Firstly, as alluded to above, the decline of hard law might best be characterised as a decline in 
contemporary relevance, rather than a decline in overall volume. Though the politicisation of 
health, the conservatism of the Commission and the prevailing political climate make the 
adoption of further binding and expansionist health legislation unlikely, existing health policy 
remains largely intact and is comprised of a balance of soft coordination and hard regulation. 
Secondly, should the European Semester and other tools in the economic governance 
framework continue to ‘strengthen’, arguably the most influential facet of health policy will 
be one of coercive, rather than voluntarist, governance. As noted in the final case study and 
subsequent analysis, such a situation is not on the immediate horizon, but is certainly feasible 
in the longer term. This would significantly alter the balance between soft and hard health 
policy in favour of the latter.  
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The increasing reliance on soft law as a tool of EU policy is evident. In the case of health, use 
of ‘creative tools’ like comparable information, benchmarking and multi-stakeholder 
platforms is a response to weak powers and small budgets, as well as rising politicisation 
(Greer et al., 2014: 36). Moreover, this is not a new phenomenon – requirements to report on 
progress towards healthcare for all legal residents and workers were in place in the early 
1990s, prior even to the establishment of the public health mandate (Hervey and Vanhercke, 
2010: 107). The introduction of the OMC and its extension into health institutionalised the 
role of voluntarist governance and also indicated a recognition on the part of the EU 
institutions that the nature of health policy was beginning to change. As seen, as the EU has 
extended its influence through technical policies and regulation, the pool of remaining policy 
problems has become increasingly saturated by political and unsolvable issues. Here, the 
community method cannot be so readily applied and binding regulation is more difficult to 
agree. Thus, a new approach to coordination has been required and has taken the form of 
voluntarist, soft law governance, via mechanisms such as the OMC. Whether this trend will 
continue depends upon a range of external factors – the political climate, public perception of 
the European project, the material and political resources afforded to DG Santé and the 
Commission more broadly, the emergence of new health threats – as well as the trajectory of 
the European Semester as a tool of contemporary health policy. For the moment, soft law 
seems likely to remain the primary instrument and voluntarism the dominant mode of 
governance, but a shift in this status quo in the future is not out of the question.  
Summary 
Review of the case studies and analysis of the individual hypotheses reveals a continuous, if 
not always coherently directed or deliberately undertaken, process of integration, 
Europeanisation and governance development in health policy. Moreover, it highlights the 
substantial differences in drivers and dynamics between first, second and third stem health 
policies. Reflecting the experience of the European project as a whole, early supranational 
momentum was later moderated by resurgent intergovernmentalism, whilst the proliferation of 
soft law and NMGs prompted a shift from top-down to more circular and reciprocal 
Europeanisation. The eruption of crises and the rational-choice politics which surround these 
situations has played a critical role, oftentimes resulting in the adoption of hard law 
instruments and delegation of autonomy to supranational agencies, but the economic recession 
and the inclusion of health in the resulting policy frameworks has presented a new kind of 
crisis, the political parameters of which are less obvious. Governance by framework 
regulation appears to be tied to the fate of the single market, which itself might be understood 
to be declining in relevance as economic governance takes centre stage, but the regulatory 
potential of the latter is, at least on paper, quite significant. Targeting is a governance 
approach which has been used in health for some time, either as a precursor to hard law or as a 
tool for expressing its intended ‘spirit’ and meaning. In line with sociological approaches, it 
has proven to be an effective change agent and, as the issues on the health agenda have 
become more sensitive and steadfast political will has become less dependable, its use has 
increased. Finally, overarching recognition of the power of soft law has led to a perception of 
strengthening in voluntarist governance, though this is not reflected in the formal construction 
of policy instruments in stems one or two. Stem three, by contrast, presents a challenge to the 
form and use of voluntarist governance and the potential, via increasing conditionality and 
path dependence, for greater coercive force.  
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More fundamentally, perhaps the central insight from the hypotheses is the importance of 
politicisation as a determining variable and its relevance for the mode of governance 
employed in a given policy area. Earlier health policy was dominated by technical issues – 
either in the form of clinical best practice and advances or of product regulation in the internal 
market – and governance more commonly took a more binding and rigid approach as a result. 
However, as the ‘supply’ of technical health issues diminishes and the political climate of the 
EU intensifies, it is this dynamic which will form the core challenge of contemporary and 
future health policy. 
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CONCLUSION 
Health policy in the post-crisis era 
In pursuit of the objectives outlined in the methodology, the thesis has explored the 
integration, Europeanisation and governance of EU health policy, pushing beyond the 
traditional perspectives to map the changing nature of health policy instruments and steering. 
The final chapter seeks to satisfy research objective three by using the research and analysis 
conducted in parts I and II to ‘update the textbook’ on EU health policy. It does this by 
addressing each of the three research questions identified in the introduction in turn. It first 
describes the pre-crisis integration, Europeanisation and governance of health, examining the 
differences between stem one and stem two case studies and the role of politicisation in 
shaping health policy. Having established the prevailing narrative, it summarises how these 
dynamics and characteristics have changed in the post-crisis era, noting the paradox of 
increased intergovernmental policy-making alongside the revival of supranationalism. It 
discusses the modes of governance seen in the third stem of health policy and their extension 
into those building blocks of the health system reserved for national control. Finally, the 
concluding section draws on the concepts and dynamics identified in the case studies to 
inform reflections on the future development of health, offering an agenda for further research 
and some preliminary conclusions on the trajectory of contemporary EU health policy. 
How did the pre-crisis integration and Europeanisation of health 
policy unfold? 
The case studies have shown health to be a well-established and distinct portfolio of EU 
activity. Macro-sectoral integration has brought health under the European policy umbrella 
and micro-sectoral integration has spread, to a greater or lesser extent, across most issue areas 
and through most building blocks of the health system. For the majority of the time this 
process has proceeded in a neofunctional manner, the growing interconnectedness of health 
systems and markets prompting spillover throughout the sector, and has reflected rational 
actor-based models, the logical added value and political benefits of delegation prompting 
coordination between states. Underpinning this development, the primary determinant and 
feature of health policy integration has been its constitutional asymmetry. The imbalance 
between market and social competences has resulted in a patchwork of micro-sectoral and 
uneven vertical integration – as seen in figure 15, many issue areas are now integrated to some 
degree, but the assignment of decision-making competencies within them varies significantly 
and very few can be considered harmonised policy regimes. The Europeanisation of health has 
reflected this piecemeal process. For the most part, it has progressed in a top-down manner, as 
national actors were caught ‘off-guard’ by EU provisions and binding regulatory frameworks 
proliferated; more recently, the expansion of soft law has facilitated a more indirect, 
socialisation-based Europeanisation process. As seen in the case studies on BTO and cancer 
prevention in particular, the presence of technical expertise and EU policy resources, 
particularly those curated by the public health agencies, is now built into the organisational 
logic of member states. In other areas, such as the patient mobility case study, 
Europeanisation continues in a more uneven fashion, caught between oscillating national 
perceptions of EU health activity as a threat to sovereignty or a valuable facet of social 
Europe.  
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As in all EU policies, some elements are best explained by reference to neofunctional 
assumptions, whilst others fit better with an intergovernmental approach. In line with the 
neofunctional model, the integration of health has been driven by ‘…extensive political 
leadership by the Commission, the (self-) interests of actors within…national/transnational 
interest groups, and the accumulation of logical consistencies’ (Lamping, 2005: 21), as well as 
the steady progression of legal integration and the support of the Court (Martinsen, 2005). 
Functional spillover from the internal market project, political spillover from the proliferation 
of EU-level interest groups and cultivated spillover from entrepreneurial supranational 
institutions are all evidenced in the case studies and support the neofunctional model. National 
governments have not been absent from these processes – they fought successfully against the 
inclusion of health in the Services Directive, took the lead on early cancer policy initiatives 
and have managed, for the most part, to keep the EU out of the ‘high politics’ realm of health 
system organisation and financing. Moreover, intergovernmentalism finds support in the 
dynamics behind formal health integration, and in the role of exogenous factors and domestic 
interests – such as pandemic outbreaks and protection of national pharmaceutical industries – 
in determining its pace and extent. However, whilst elements of neofunctional logic can be 
seen at the centre of each of the case studies, intergovernmentalism remains unable to account 
for the reality that a European health policy has emerged in the absence of a comprehensive 
treaty base, explicit mandate or member state demand (Greer, 2006: 135; 2014: 17). Put 
simply, neofunctionalism is more relevant in more instances.  
One crucial factor which both schools of the founding dichotomy recognise, however, is the 
relevance of a technical-political distinction. Just as neofunctionalism highlights the 
technocratic capacity of supranational institutions as key to the migration of responsibility to 
the EU level, so too intergovernmentalism acknowledges the rational added-value of pooling 
sovereignty in technical, ‘low politics’ issue areas (Rosamond, 2000: 57; 77). The premise 
that the trajectory of European integration is influenced by the degree of technocracy involved 
in the particular policy area is strongly supported by the EU health policy experience. The 
case studies on BTO, cancer prevention and economic governance demonstrate the power of a 
‘technical framing’ in health and their respective legislative experiences stand in contrast to 
those seen in medicines ItP, tobacco control and patient mobility. This dynamic aids 
understanding of the shifting nature of EU health policy in its second and third stems – as 
more actors and interests become involved, consensus on the means and ends of health 
integration become less common and its trajectory is distorted.   
What mode(s) of governance dominated in this period? 
Health originated as a regulatory policy, drawn together from separate strands of legislation 
on occupational health and safety, social security coordination and public health. It was 
immediately multi-level in nature – trade unions, transnational corporations and other sub-
national actors played central roles in the development of early health and social policy and 
various expert networks and communities fed into early public health measures, as seen in the 
case study on cancer prevention, for example. As a result of these multiple networks, early 
and first stem health policy privileged the ‘politics of expertise’ and the ‘politics of ideas’ 
(Richardson, 2006: 25), facilitating a technical policy-making style. Moreover, public health 
crises, which prompted several of the early steps in EU health policy development, led to the 
creation of technical agencies, whilst product regulation in the internal market lent further 
technical framing and legal support to policy integration. As a result, and as illustrated in 
figure 16, health policy-makers were commonly able to utilise coercive and framework 
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regulation modes of governance. Voluntarist and targeting instruments were often employed 
in accompaniment or support of binding legislation but the substance and parameters of health 
policy were, for the most part, governed with some degree of coercion.  
With health’s exposure to the full force of free movement law and the expansion into second 
stem policy areas, health governance underwent a transition. The proliferation of actors and 
interests involved in the health policy community and the integration of non-health issue 
networks intensified the multi-level nature of decision-making and prompted a shift in the 
kind of instruments and approaches employed. In an attempt to accommodate the vast range 
of perspectives and interests now involved and reflecting the trend of policy-makers faced 
with a legitimacy crisis, health actors introduced an increasing number of public 
consultations, reflection processes and multi-stakeholder forums into the governance 
framework (Richardson, 2006: 8). As seen in the case studies on medicines ItP and tobacco 
control, the resulting policy-making style was a political one, characterised by continuous 
negotiation and decision points (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). This politicisation has increased 
reliance on softer governance, embodied in targeting or voluntarist instruments, so as to 
accommodate flexibility, preserve political commitment and overcome gridlock. As such, 
second stem policy represents health’s ‘constructivist turn’, in which integration has been 
shaped and pushed forward by informal process as much as by formal ones. It has become a 
testing ground for the power of soft law and innovative modes of governance, displaying great 
promise in the case of cancer prevention (Trubek et al., 2008), and has challenged the 
rationalist perspectives which dominated earlier periods.   
How have these characteristics and dynamics changed in the 
post-crisis period? 
The strengthening of the EU’s economic governance framework and the inclusion of health 
within the instruments it has established has taken health into a new and unprecedented era, 
challenging the existing narratives and dynamics of health policy. In essence, what has been 
presented is a new avenue through which health policy might be integrated, Europeanised and 
governed. Just as the use of the internal market legal base to protect health allowed a second 
stem of health policy to emerge, the nascent consensus around addressing health via 
macroeconomic policy processes presents the potential for a third stem of activity. The early 
strands of this activity are focused on health system performance and sustainability. They 
target data collection and the development of detailed, country-specific health system 
analysis, raising the possibility of extension of EU influence into building blocks one and five 
of the WHO health system classification, areas long reserved for the exclusive control of 
national governments. However, the political climate and its impact, particularly on the 
Commission, mean that the further development and institutionalisation of third stem health 
policy has an uncertain trajectory.  
Contemporary EU health policy integration and Europeanisation 
The treaty base and assignment of health competences remain unchanged in the post-crisis 
period, meaning that the constitutional asymmetry and weak mandate continue to underpin 
policy development. In reality, if any change has occurred, it has been a reinforcing of these 
barriers – the former has been exacerbated by the intensification of economic integration and 
the consequent side-lining of social objectives, whilst the latter forms an even greater hurdle 
in light of the increasing conservatism of the Commission and its central bureaucratic pillar. 
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Similarly, the catalysts of health policy remain largely the same – the opportunity window 
presented by the economic crisis allowed the institutionalisation and acceleration of previous 
efforts to address health within the macroeconomic framework, confirming the importance of 
path dependency in dictating policy development. What has changed in the post-crisis period 
is the process and driving force of health policy integration and Europeanisation. The 
structures, interests and possibilities facing health actors seeking to advance third stem health 
policy are significantly different to those available for the utilisation of free movement law 
and the establishment of second stem health policy.  
Firstly, the nature of the legal base is different. The Semester is a voluntarist instrument and 
the inclusion of health within it is not the result of a formal decision; as such, the legal 
provisions cannot be so easily manipulated and the ‘treaty-base game’ is not so readily 
applicable. Secondly, health actors’ position within the policy network which surrounds the 
Semester is very different to their position in the debates which characterised the tobacco 
control, medicines ItP and patient mobility case studies. Whilst the latter involved 
collaborating with corporate and market interests, engagement in the Semester process 
requires them to seek to influence actors from ministries of economy and finance. Crucially, 
such cooperation is not conducted between equal partners but rather is structured as health 
‘contribution’ to DG ECFIN’s management of the Semester and its analyses, resembling more 
of an issue network than a policy network or epistemic community. As a consequence, health 
actors have found themselves on the outside of the Semester. DG Santé has established a 
dialogue with DG ECFIN and health actors have developed mechanisms for participating in 
the process where possible but they remain constrained by its economic purpose and 
parameters, the absence of a formal avenue for engagement and a lack of transparency.  
The external constraints imposed by the nature of the Semester are accompanied by a number 
of internal limitations within the Commission itself, in particular DG Santé. When asked 
about the prospects of contemporary health policy, interviewees describe a decline in the 
momentum of DG Santé since the late 2000s, resulting from increasing politicisation and a 
loss of institutional memory; ‘we’re not being treated like serious policy partners and we 
don’t deserve to be because we’re not thinking like serious policy partners’ (European 
Commission, Health Directorate C). When combined with the conservatism of the central 
Commission and the restrictions facing health actors within the economic governance 
framework, this has significant implications for the development of third stem health policy. 
Presented with little scope for the kind of opportunism or creative utilisation of available tools 
seen in second stem health issues, the role of entrepreneurial individuals and health actors is 
substantially reduced. Health continues to ‘creatively muddle through’ but health actors, and 
in particular DG Santé, have considerably less control over the process than they enjoyed in 
the past. As such, one of the primary drivers of first and second stem health policy has been 
rendered unavailable. This raises the question, for both health policy practitioners and the 
mainstream EU theories, ‘who or what will now drive health policy?’  
This is a difficult question because the common drivers of health policy expansion, which can 
be traced in figure 14, have less obvious relevance to the economic governance case study. A 
public health crisis is unlikely to generate the necessary momentum, though the recent focus 
on anti-microbial resistance suggests that crises will continue to provide stimulus for action in 
the public health arena. Meanwhile, the economic governance framework lacks the priority 
and binding force of the internal market as a justification for further policy convergence. The 
Court’s role has so far been negligible, its ‘enforcing’ role being performed instead by the 
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imposition or threat of conditionality, and it is not yet clear that member states attach too 
much importance to the Semester as a process, let alone to its health-related provisions. Thus, 
it seems likely that the driving force necessary to promote and further develop this third stem 
is likely to come from the European Commission, either at the behest of member states or via 
independent entrepreneurialism. This presents three main possibilities.  
Firstly, the model of supranational entrepreneurialism could prevail under the stewardship of 
DG ECFIN and the SPC, as the importance of health system sustainability and the need to 
balance the Semester’s economic objectives with social concerns is increasingly prioritised. 
This fits well with the historical institutionalist approach, given DG ECFIN’s prior advances 
into pension and long-term care systems, and with experience from the SPC, which suggests 
that member states are keen to balance the economic perspective of the Semester with a social 
one (Social Protection Committee). A second possibility is that a similar entrepreneurial role 
might be undertaken by DG Santé, but in an adjacent field – here the confluence of 
conversations on performance assessment, financial sustainability and access to care might 
present a window of opportunity for the development of an EU health systems policy, taking 
DG Santé into a new policy realm and marking a crucial step in the journey towards a 
European health system. This would more closely mirror the patient mobility case study and 
would likely involve the use of voluntarist governance to establish supporting policies and 
complementary initiatives around the central stream of Semester policy output. Finally, 
member states may, in the face of institutional ‘stickiness’ and path dependency, choose to 
fully endorse and engage with the Semester as a tool of economic coordination and a valuable 
framework for ensuring both sustainability and quality of care in the health system. The case 
studies suggest that an external catalyst might be required to prompt such a change of 
approach – it is feasible that the financial failure of one national health system, for instance, 
with its inevitable ramifications for neighbouring patients and health systems, might be 
sufficient to revive discussion of more integrated health system financing. This assessment 
does not seek to offer predictions about the future integration and direction of health policy 
but rather to highlight the continuing importance of supranational stewardship in its 
development.  
Contemporary EU health governance: an agenda for further research 
The mainstream theories face a steep challenge in explaining the development of health’s 
third stem and the extent of health integration to date. The explanatory power of 
neofunctionalism is limited by the failure of the EU project to result in a common health 
identity or demos, whilst intergovernmentalism cannot overcome the emergence of a health 
policy in the absence of demand or its encroachment into ‘high politics’ realms. 
Europeanisation offers a valuable framework for analysing the formation and operation of 
health policy but does not proffer a vision or final goal. As such, whilst acknowledging the 
value of these frameworks in assessing the catalysts and drivers of policy integration and 
convergence, the case studies have shown the governance approaches to offer greater potential 
for insight into contemporary health policy.  
As noted by Schmidt (2015a: 42), the post-crisis era has seen an intensification of both 
intergovernmental and supranational dynamics in EU policy-making. Observing similar 
trends, Scharpf (2006) adds a new characterisation to his existing joint decision-making and 
intergovernmental categorisations of EU governance, termed supranational-hierarchical 
governance. Observing the autonomy and influence of the CJEU and the ECB in the early 
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2000s, Scharpf identifies a mode of governance in which these institutions are able to exercise 
policy-making functions without the involvement of politically-accountable actors (2006: 
851). Though the Semester retains a significant degree of control for the intergovernmental 
institutions, the unprecedented powers of intervention wielded by the Troika in the EAPs and 
MoUs make Scharpf’s model relevant to the post-crisis era.  
The unbalancing of the democratic settlement in contemporary health policy (Schmidt, 2015a) 
exacerbates the legitimacy gap facing EU policy-makers and warrants exploration of 
deliberative democracy and experimental governance models (Scharpf, 1999; Pollack, 2005; 
Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008). Moreover, insight into the trajectory and influence of the European 
Semester might be gained from application of the historical and sociological variants of 
institutional analysis, drawing on dynamics of ‘locking in’, path dependency and socialisation. 
Such analysis might address the origin of third stem health policy, identifying how much of it 
resulted directly from the crisis and how much of it would eventually have emerged anyway, 
the path it is likely to take and the changes it is likely to experience in the coming Semester 
cycles, and the mode of governance – be it voluntarist or coercive – which will likely 
characterise it. It might also offer insight into the fate of the ‘pre-existing’ health policies, 
established in the first and second stems, in light of the renewed emphasis on economic 
integration. A closer examination of the historical circumstances under which health has 
expanded beyond its official mandate, perhaps through the lens of principle-agent analysis, 
might inform assessment of the conditions necessary for the further development of a ‘health 
systems’ policy. More broadly, institutional analysis of the executive could be crucial in 
determining the fate of the Commission in the contemporary political climate and implications 
for its roles as a sponsor of European integration and a health policy entrepreneur.  
More fundamentally, the centralisation which accompanies the post-crisis strengthening of 
economic governance – a paradoxical phenomenon in the prevailing anti-European climate – 
is generating revived relevance for the ‘pre-theories’ of European integration. The problems 
which currently face the EU are generally located in its institutional asymmetry and the 
absence of a fiscal federalism to accompany economic integration, supporting the federalist 
assertion that a genuine centre of power is needed in order for a supranational entity to operate 
efficiently. Similarly, post-crisis developments lend weight to the functionalist notion that 
member states, on account of the short-termism and desire for power of national governments, 
are the institutions least suited to addressing the complexities of contemporary public policy 
and to ‘nurturing the fundamental development of their citizens’ (Saurugger, 2014: 18-19). 
These arguments points to a need for ‘ever closer union’, a path with profound implications 
for the future of EU health policy.  
The future of health governance in Europe 
The thesis has described, explored and put into context the latest chapter of EU health policy. 
Using the stems heuristic, it has illustrated how the window of opportunity provided by the 
strengthening of the EU’s pre-existing roots in macroeconomic coordination has laid the 
foundations for a third realm of health policy, pushing into the ‘final frontiers’ of health 
system organisation, financing and service delivery. It has also identified a trend of 
politicisation in health and traced its links to the bell-curve of health policy development 
described by interviewees. As the locus of health policy has expanded beyond the health 
sector, the policy community has grown, modes of governance have become more 
participatory and progress towards a coherent and effective EU health policy has faltered.  
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What might be inferred about the trajectory of the health bell-curve in light of these trends? 
Exploring the potential for change, a number of possible paths are presented. The external 
political climate will play a central role in determining whether health enjoys a second 
expansion as part of an intensified programme of economic coordination, or suffers further 
stagnation and decline in the face of resurgent subsidiarity and nationalism. Internally, several 
factors come in to play. Whilst the possibility still remains that the Semester might ‘go the 
same way as the OMC’ and exist purely as a supporting health policy mechanism (Social 
NGO C), the path dependency and locking-in dynamics observed in case study six support a 
historical institutionalist understanding of its durability. Moreover, the potential to invoke a 
sense of technocracy in the European Semester by framing it as an economising process may 
negate some of its political potency and prompt health and social actors to pursue greater 
balance within the CSRs – such activity could form the basis of a third stem policy on 
sustainability and quality of care. Fundamentally, though any revision of formal health 
integration structures undertaken now would likely be reductionist, informal structures 
continue to proliferate and supranationalism to prosper within them – the question is therefore 
whether these voluntarist and targeted governance structures have the potential to spill over 
and generate an ongoing integrative momentum.  
Exploration of these future possibilities is an informative exercise but, from the experience 
seen in the case studies and the broader policy integration literature, it is most likely a 
theoretical one. Rather than expansion or retraction of the EU health policy agenda and 
portfolio, the more probable outcome is an endurance of the status quo. The increasing 
relevance of non-health determinants and policy processes is unlikely to be reversed and the 
decline of technical health regulation, resulting in an agenda of unsolvable and political health 
issues, has already been shown to delimit the further development of health competence. The 
weakness and conservatism of the Commission, a central and determining feature of the 
contemporary health policy arena, is continuously exacerbated by the refugee crisis and the 
faltering of Schengen, the resurgence of populism and the lagging economic recovery. Most 
fundamentally, those responsible for EU health policy seem to lack the vision and resources 
necessary to overcome these constraints and initiate change. As such, health policy is likely to 
continue on a defensive basis, seeking to avoid repeal of first and second stem policies in the 
face of deregulation, to mitigate the undermining of health objectives in the Semester process 
and to highlight the value of continued cooperation in technocratic, low politics public health 
issues. 
Reference to the case studies suggests that the way to overcome these suboptimal outcomes is 
to move from politicised negotiation to a problem-solving approach (Scharpf, 1988) – in 
essence to make contemporary health policy more technical. As explored in case study six, 
this is precisely the approach being taken by the actors responsible for the European Semester, 
evidenced in the quantitative and technical narrative which has accompanied its development; 
as such, what is occurring in the post-crisis era might better be viewed as an economisation, 
rather than a politicisation, of health policy. The importance of a technical or political framing 
for the future of the Semester is emblematic of the broader contradiction facing contemporary 
EU health policy and the survival of the European project as a whole. In order to address the 
current political crisis, the EU must increase citizen support and reduce the disconnect 
between European policy and local outcomes. Within this task, there is a strong role for social 
and health policy as areas with direct and tangible impact upon individuals and the potential to 
‘humanise’ the European project. As seen in the case studies, the necessary expansion of 
Chapter 13 | Conclusion 
152 
social and health policy activity can be achieved in one of two ways. The first will require an 
injection of political will and an extension, either formal or informal, of the existing 
mandates; an unlikely prospect given the dominant subsidiarity rhetoric from national 
governments. The remaining option, already underway in some areas, is to deepen social and 
health policy integration by framing as many elements as possible as technical issues, thus 
removing them from the political arena. The resulting irony is that the best hope for 
reconnecting Europe to its citizens and regaining support for the European project lies in 
removing health and social policy from the democratic arena and putting it in the hands of 
experts and technocrats. Fundamentally, it is the interaction and balancing of this inherent 
contradiction which will determine the role played by health in a politicised EU and thus the 
future development of the policy. 
Appendix I | Full list of interviewees 
153 
Appendix I: Full list of interviewees 
Interviewee (identifying label) Date of interview 
Academic Expert, EU Health Policy A 9 July 2015 
Academic Expert, EU Health Policy B 28 May 2015 
Academic Expert, EU Health Policy C 30 June 2015 
Academic Expert, European Parliament 22 May 2015 
Council of the EU, Legal Service 6 June 2013 
EU Public Affairs Consultant A 22 May 2015 
EU Public Affairs Consultant B 18 June 2015 
EU Environment NGO A 28 March 2013 
EU Environment NGO B 18 February 2013 
EU Health NGO A 20 November 2012 
EU Health NGO B 20 July 2015 
EU Health NGO C 21 May 2015 
EU Health NGO D 10 July 2015 
EU Health NGO E 8 May 2015 
EU Health NGO F 2 July 2015 
EU Health NGO G 24 June 2015 
EU Health NGO H 9 July 2015 
EU Health NGO I 2 July 2015 
EU Social NGO A 26 March 2013 
EU Social NGO B 1 June 2015 
EU Social NGO C 21 March 2013; 22 June 2015 
European Commission, Health Directorate A 1 June 2015 
European Commission, Health Directorate B 25 March 2013 
European Commission, Health Directorate C 8 July 2015 
European Commission, Health Directorate D 9 June 2015 
European Commission, Health Directorate E 12 June 2015 
European Commission, Health Directorate F 20 March 2013 
European Commission, Legal Affairs Directorate 6 May 2013 
European Parliament Advisor, ALDE Group 6 June 2013 
European Parliament Advisor, EPP Group 19 June 2013 
European Parliament Advisor, S&D Group A 24 May 2013 
European Parliament Advisor, S&D Group B 16 July 2015 
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European Parliament, Legal Service 11 June 2013 
Member of European Parliament A 14 July 2015 
Member of European Parliament B 25 June 2015 
Member of European Parliament C 15 July 2015 
UK health association, EU Liaison A 11 June 2015 
UK health association, EU Liaison B 11 May 2015 
Social Protection Committee  13 July 2015 
World Health Organization A 23 June 2015 
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Appendix II: Interview discussion topics 
This appendix lists the discussion topics sent to each participant in advance of fieldwork 
interview.  
The rise of EU health policy 
 How would you characterise the way in which the EU’s health policy has evolved 
since the EC was created?  
 Has it grown too much/not enough/beyond its mandate? 
 To what extent do you consider health to be an ‘integrated’ policy area? 
 To what extent do you consider health to be a ‘Europeanised’ policy area? 
National versus supranational health policy 
 In which specific areas of health has the EU been most successful in achieving its 
stated aims? 
 In which areas have member states most successfully retained control? 
 How has the balance between national and supranational responsibility in health 
changed? 
 How might it change in the future? 
The governance of EU health policy 
 How has the governance of health – broadly understood as the way in which 
European health actors seek to control policy and change outcomes – changed over 
time? 
 What determines the kind of governance which is likely to be successful in a given 
health policy area? 
 To what extent have regulation and ‘hard law’ given way to voluntary coordination 
and ‘soft law’? 
The politicisation of EU health policy 
 Is there an understood distinction between ‘political’ and ‘technical’ health policy 
issues? 
 What determines the ‘level of politicisation’ in health policy?  
 Who is driving health policy at the European level and what opposition do they face? 
 How is the governance of health approached differently according to the level of 
politicisation? 
 Is it fair to state that there is now a substantial body of ‘technical’ health policy, 
conducted on a day-to-day basis, which is led by the EU? 
Economic governance and the future of EU health policy 
 What are the implications of inclusion in the economic governance framework for the 
scope and governance of health policy? 
 Is the inclusion of health in mechanisms such as the European Semester an indication 
of its institutionalisation as an EU policy area? 
 To what extent is it fair to characterise this as a ‘new era’ of health governance? 
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